

## Abstract

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**Abstract:** In the past decades, sanctions have become a vital part of the European Union's (EU) Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). To better understand decision-making within the CFSP, this work focuses on how the EU sanctions against Russia are upheld. It does so through the lens of the Netherlands and Finland, two small countries in the EU. The study concentrates on the way small countries participate in sanctions regimes, which is important due to the required unanimity for upholding sanctions. Both domestic dynamics for participating in sanctions as well as attitudes towards European cooperation are taken into account.

By conducting a Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA) on parliamentary debates in Finland and the Netherlands from 2016, the study compares the interests and focus of national politicians when sanctions are under discussion. The material consists of approximately 170 units of coding per country, which originate from around 15 debates throughout the year.

The results offer new insight into some of the factors affecting decision-making of small states in sanctions. The data shows that the Netherlands has a stricter stance towards upholding sanctions on Russia, whereas Finnish politicians highlight the impact of sanctions on Finland. In general, both the Netherlands and Finland are in favour of upholding sanctions, but strongly differ domestically in the way they go about the sanctions.

In conclusion, this study finds that small EU countries present themselves as strongly supporting EU unity when sanctions are in place. Nevertheless, these countries differ significantly in domestic preferences, meaning that they participate in sanctions regimes through different means.

**Master's thesis**

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# **Consensus through different means. Finland, the Netherlands, and the persistence of EU restrictive measures**

**The role of small countries in the EU's Common  
Foreign and Security Policy**

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# 1. Introduction

## 1.1 Case study and main ideas

In the winter of 2013-2014, domestic tensions in Ukraine quickly evolved into a global impactful event. Starting as protests in Kyiv against then-president Yanukovych in 2013, the crisis eventually resulted in a war in Eastern Ukraine and the annexation of the Crimean peninsula by Russia.<sup>1</sup> In the following months and years, Eastern Ukraine became a focal point of geopolitical conflict between Russia and the Western world.<sup>2</sup> One of the ways through which the European Union (EU) responded to the conflict was by implementing restrictive measures, often called sanctions. Its first implementation of sanctions in February 2014 targeted individuals in Ukraine responsible for excessive police violence.<sup>3</sup> The EU became, mostly in line with the US, especially vocal after a rapid flow of events resulting in Russia's annexation of Crimea.<sup>4</sup> In different phases, a part of the international community implemented sanctions against Russian individuals and against the Russian government in general. Initially, this started by excluding Russia from the G8.<sup>5</sup> In response to the controversial referendum on the political status of Crimea, the EU started implementing more sanctions. One day after the referendum, on 17 March 2014, the Council of the European Union announced sanctions targeted towards Russian individuals.<sup>6</sup> The strongest economic sanctions came into place in July 2014.<sup>7</sup> In the months and years to come, the EU expanded and adjusted sanctions against Russia. As of 2021, almost all sanctions are still in place.<sup>8</sup> The implementation of these sanctions meant a break with earlier foreign policy of the EU towards Russia. In earlier tensions involving Russia, EU leaders tried to avoid imposing sanctions to respond to the events.<sup>9</sup> Apart from affecting Russia, the sanctions and counter-sanctions

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<sup>1</sup> Hanna Shelest, "After the Ukrainian crisis: Is there a place for Russia?" *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 15, no. 2 (2015): 191-192.

<sup>2</sup> Wan Wang, "Impact of Western Sanctions on Russia in the Ukraine Crisis," *Journal of Politics and Law* 8, no. 2 (2015): 1.

<sup>3</sup> Laura Klompenhouwer, "EU stelt sancties in tegen Oekraïne, Witte Huis 'verbolgen' over geweld," *NRC Handelsblad*, February 20, 2014, <https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2014/02/20/witte-huis-geschokt-door-geweld-tegen-betogers-in-oekraïne-a1427045>.

<sup>4</sup> Wang, "Impact of Western Sanctions on Russia in the Ukraine Crisis," 2.

<sup>5</sup> Viktor Szep, "New intergovernmentalism meets EU sanctions policy: the European Council orchestrates the restrictive measures imposed against Russia," *Journal of European Integration* 42, no. 6 (2020): 857-858.

<sup>6</sup> "Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP" (L 78/16-21), Council of the European Union, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2014:078:0016:0021:EN:PDF>.

<sup>7</sup> Viljar Veebel and Raul Markus, "Lessons from the EU-Russia Sanctions 2014-2015," *Baltic Journal of Law & Politics* 8, no. 1 (2015): 175.

<sup>8</sup> "Timeline – EU restrictive measures in response to the crisis in Ukraine," General Secretariat of the Council, accessed January 30, 2021, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/nl/policies/sanctions/ukraine-crisis/history-ukraine-crisis/>.

<sup>9</sup> Szep, "New intergovernmentalism meets EU sanctions policy," 857-858.



following 2014 resulted in problems for European countries as well, which were for a large part economic difficulties. The impact of these sanctions on European countries was different depending on the place and sector.<sup>10</sup>

The differences in impact of the sanctions on individual member states highlight an important aspect of decision-making regarding the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Since all EU countries must agree unanimously on upholding sanctions, how do individual countries perceive and exercise power when it comes to deciding on EU restrictive measures, and do they exercise power on a national or an EU-wide level?<sup>11</sup> How do individual countries differ in their participation in sanctions policies, and what unites them? This study examines the role of individual countries in prolonging sanctions. It focuses specifically on small states, actors whose influence is often overlooked in studies on the CFSP that focus on the role of individual states. By comparing Finland and the Netherlands, the study examines both country-specific characteristics of dealing with sanctions, as well as stances of these countries towards European cooperation. It includes the ways different small countries perceive power in the persistence of sanctions regimes. The study finds that even though small countries tend to agree on prolonging sanctions, the way they deal with sanctions both domestically and internationally differs significantly. This is important in understanding what dynamics are behind the sanctions mechanism and that upholding them is not a self-evident centralized procedure.

## **1.2 Theoretical embedding and research focus**

Restrictive measures have been a key policy tool in international relations for several decades. Within the EU, sanctions are part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which coordinates the way the EU responds to international challenges. Before the 1990s, international sanctions usually comprised trade embargoes. Later on, during the first decades of the EU, sanctions imposed by the EU became more and more “targeted”. These targeted sanctions focus on denying one or several individuals access to the EU and its financial institutions. While the EU initially followed sanctions implemented by United Nations (UN) resolutions, in the past two decades it has increasingly started adopting sanctions on its own

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<sup>10</sup> Marcin Szczepanski, “Briefing: Economic impact on the EU of sanctions over Ukraine conflict,” *European Parliamentary Research Service* PE 569.020 (2015): 3-7, [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/569020/EPRS\\_BRI\(2015\)569020\\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/569020/EPRS_BRI(2015)569020_EN.pdf).

<sup>11</sup> Juha Jokela, Niklas Helwig and Clara Portela, eds., *Sharpening EU Sanctions Policy. Challenges and Responses in a Geopolitical Era* (FIIA Report, 2020), 14.

initiative.<sup>12</sup> A reason for the increase of EU sanctions beyond those of the UN is the EU's focus on the promotion of human rights and democratization in its external relations. In addition, the development of the CFSP in the early 2000s made the EU's foreign policy more centralized, with different policy decisions than those made previously by individual member states.<sup>13</sup> The focus in this study is on sanctions imposed largely on the EU's own initiative, implemented in a centralized manner.

This work starts by elaborating upon the existing literature on sanctions, which includes setting up a framework through which the literature is used in the study following. It looks at the different dimensions explaining the logic of implementing and upholding sanctions. Since the start of the academic debate surrounding sanctions in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, research has in large focused on the effectiveness of sanctions. This research often overlaps with discussions on what the aims of sanctions really are. Official documents usually state that sanctions have the objective to change the behavior of targets, but the academic debate has gone beyond this in unraveling different layers of objectives and actors behind sanctions imposition and prolonging.<sup>14</sup>

One of the most important works this study draws on is by Francesco Giumelli, connecting dimensions of power with different functions of sanctions regimes. Recognizing these different functions brings an understanding of how Dutch and Finnish politicians exercise power in upholding sanctions regimes. Giumelli divides the dimensions of power in sanctions regimes into coercing, constraining and signaling. When sanctions intend to make a target country do something that they otherwise would not do, sanctions coerce. Constraining ensures that certain intended steps by the target country do not take place, while sanctions are signaling when they prevent conflicts from arising in the first place.<sup>15</sup> Countries also implement signaling sanctions to other countries beyond the targeted state, to provide a positive image for themselves as guardian of a certain global norm.<sup>16</sup> Recognizing the distinction between coercing, constraining and signaling sanctions is valuable because it goes beyond an understanding of whether sanctions are effective and what direct objectives are connected to them; this distinction goes towards an understanding of the actual function of the

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<sup>12</sup> Jokela, Helwig and Portela, *Sharpening EU Sanctions Policy*, 11-13.

<sup>13</sup> Ian Anthony, "Sanctions applied by the European Union and the United Nations," in *SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford University Press 2002), 203-204; 210-212.

<sup>14</sup> Francesco Giumelli, Fabian Hoffmann and Anna Ksiazczakova, "The when, what, where and why of European Union sanctions," *European Security* 30, no. 1 (2021): 3-4.

<sup>15</sup> Francesco Giumelli, *Coercing, constraining and signalling. Explaining UN and EU sanctions after the Cold War* (ECPR Press 2011), 1-3.

<sup>16</sup> Viljar Veebel and Raul Markus, "At the Dawn of a New Era of Sanctions: Russian-Ukrainian Crisis and Sanctions," *Orbis* 60, no. 1 (2016): 130.

sanctions in place.<sup>17</sup> It thus provides a better picture of the way sanctions regimes work in the Netherlands and Finland.

This study first looks at international sanctions in general, but quickly shifts the focus to the role of individual member states in the EU sanctions mechanism. At first glance, each member state's role in the mechanism seems significant: in both its implementation and prolonging, all EU member states must agree on the sanctions regime. When purely looking at the mechanism, the power surrounding its implementation seems equally divided among member states. Nevertheless, scholars such as Clara Portela et al. and Christopher Hill have noted that not every country is as influential in constructing and upholding sanctions as others are. In upholding EU sanctions on Russia, for example, the importance of German leadership in both spearheading the sanctions regime as well as mediating with Russia has been an important factor.<sup>18</sup> In EU sanctions policy in general, scholars such as Hill and Lehne have noted the leadership of France, Germany and the UK as main drivers.<sup>19</sup> Others, such as Szep, have highlighted the role of the European Council in implementing and upholding sanctions. According to Szep, the European Council uses upholding certain norms important for the EU as its main driver for sanctions.<sup>20</sup> Despite the supposed leadership roles of the European Council and larger states, the construction and upholding of sanctions is a process between governments that involves the agreement of all the member states.<sup>21</sup> In practice, this involves decision-making through the Council of the European Union, in which there is more emphasis on bargaining with individual member states' interests in mind.<sup>22</sup> The role of individual member states within this intergovernmental process, particularly smaller states with less influence, is the specific focus of this study. How are sanctions reflected within these member states and does this reflection differ from country to country?

Individual countries within the EU have different reasons to join sanctions regimes. Niklas Helwig and Matti Pesu describe that elements in the decision-making process on sanctions are strategic culture, economic factors, security concerns, history, and international pressure and norms. To analyze ways in which individual countries participate in sanctions

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<sup>17</sup> Giumelli, *Coercing, constraining and signalling*, 1-3.

<sup>18</sup> Clara Portela, Paulina Pospieszna, Joanna Skrzypczynska, and Dawid Walentek, "Consensus against all odds: explaining the persistence of EU sanctions on Russia," *Journal of European Integration* 43, no. 6 (2021): 684-686.

<sup>19</sup> Christopher Hill, "The Big Three and the High Representative," in *The EU Presence in International Organizations*, eds. Spyros Blavoukos and Dimitris Bourantonis (Routledge 2011), 90-92; Stefan Lehne, *The Big Three in EU Foreign Policy*, (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2012), 1-2.

<sup>20</sup> Szep, "New intergovernmentalism meets EU sanctions policy," 855-856.

<sup>21</sup> Paul M. Silva II and Zachary Selden, "Economic interdependence and economic sanctions: a case study of European Union sanctions on Russia," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 33:2 (2020): 234-235.

<sup>22</sup> Szep, "New intergovernmentalism meets EU sanctions policy," 862-863.

regimes, they state, “one must pay attention to a state’s general attitude towards sanctions as a policy instrument.”<sup>23</sup> After this, a country’s position on a certain sanctions regime needs to be analyzed. Thirdly, the international environment can explain the decision to participate in a sanctions regime or to refrain from joining it. The process of deciding on the implementation and upholding of sanctions regimes thus includes different layers, in which individual countries each participate in different ways.<sup>24</sup> Since the main purpose of this study is to unfold differences between countries in the EU in sanctions prolonging, the reasoning behind participating in sanctions regimes is important to understand.

The role of individual countries is especially interesting in explaining the persistence of EU sanctions, since all countries have to agree unanimously on their prolonging. There is considerable scholarship focusing on how sanctions came into place, but the EU’s ability to uphold sanctions for years remains somewhat under the radar. In those sanctions imposed against Russia, Clara Portela et al. highlight the interaction between the European Council and domestic politics as particularly important in upholding the sanctions for more than seven years.<sup>25</sup> They argue that the domestic and international dimension intertwine in drawing up and maintaining sanctions. Individual countries had to reinterpret and stretch the guiding principles for EU-Russia relations as set up by the EU. Within the EU member states, some argue for stricter sanctions, while others prefer milder sanctions. In maintaining consensus, Portela et al. note that domestic groups are important to take into account. ‘Strict’ states, which prefer to prolong sanctions regimes, include influential groups that are opposed to sanctions. Less strict states, which more quickly prefer the lifting of certain sanctions, have domestic groups lobbying for stricter sanctions. The processes of debating and justifying sanctions domestically thus matter in sanctions prolonging.<sup>26</sup>

Especially in recent years, with a call for more power for national governments, smaller countries are an interesting focus of study. The choice between cooperating more closely or having greater autonomy from EU processes, among which are sanctions as well, is especially pressing for smaller states. According to Haugevik and Rieker, among others, the EU framework is important for their national security. Simultaneously, more integration is perceived as a threat to their national identity. Haugevik and Rieker claim that smaller states

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<sup>23</sup> Niklas Helwig and Matti Pesu, “EU Decision-making on Sanctions Regimes,” in *Sharpening EU Sanctions Policy. Challenges and Responses in a Geopolitical Era*, eds. Niklas Helwig, Juha Jokela, and Clara Portela (FIIA Report 2020), 95.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 95-96.

<sup>25</sup> Portela et al., “Consensus against all odds,” 683.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 683-695.

have a stronger preference for international cooperation than larger states. However, smaller countries can have different degrees of loyalty, autonomy and integration into the EU. In the upholding of sanctions regimes this makes that smaller countries can maintain very different interests.<sup>27</sup>

To elucidate the dynamics of individual countries within EU restrictive measures, this study focuses on the role of two countries in upholding EU sanctions. Moving away from the literature concentrating on the role of large states as France and Germany, this study comprises a comparison between Finland and the Netherlands. Some scholars, such as Thorhallsson, classify the Netherlands and Finland as small states in the EU.<sup>28</sup> These states, according to scholars such as Krotz & Maher, and Lehne, do not belong to the traditionally most important states in EU foreign policy.<sup>29</sup> However, they do need to agree on prolonging sanctions in order for them to continue. Therefore, it is important to study more than solely the large and powerful EU states. To get a complete picture of how the EU imposes and prolongs sanctions, all member states need to be taken into account.<sup>30</sup> For that reason, this study seeks to understand the specific role of the Netherlands and Finland in upholding EU sanctions. The main question this study answers is: *In what ways do smaller countries in the EU differ from each other in their approach to the upholding of EU sanctions and how are these differences reflected on their participation in sanctions regimes and their attitudes towards European integration?*

To start understanding this main question, several sub-questions require answers. First, it is necessary to explain how the sanctions mechanism of the EU works. What are sanctions exactly? What are the official reasons for sanctions to be implemented and prolonged and how do these official reasons reflect reality? When moving away from the international layer of restrictive measures it is necessary to understand how individual countries can differ in their approach to sanctions regimes. Do small countries consider sanctions to be a tool of coercing, constraining or signaling, or do they use sanctions differently? Do small states use the sanctions mechanism as a tool for closer European cooperation, or are sanctions used by individual countries as a way to enhance intergovernmentalism? Do domestic reasons play a

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<sup>27</sup> Kristin Haugevik and Pernille Rieker, "Autonomy or integration? Small-state responses to a changing European security landscape," *Global Affairs* 3, no. 3 (2017): 211-219.

<sup>28</sup> Baldur Thorhallsson, "Small States in the UNSC and the EU: Structural Weaknesses and Ability to Influence," in *Small states in a legal world*, eds. P. Butler and C. Morris (Springer International Publishing AG 2017), 44.

<sup>29</sup> Stefan Lehne, *The Big Three in EU Foreign Policy*, (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2012), 1-2; Ulrich Krotz and Richard Maher, "Europe's crises and the EU's 'big three'," *West European Politics* 39, no. 5 (2016): 1053-1055.

<sup>30</sup> Lehne, *The Big Three in EU Foreign Policy*, 1-2; Krotz and Maher, "Europe's crises and the EU's 'big three'," 1053-1055.

large role in prolonging sanctions, or is the international level much more important? In answering these questions, the results of this study reflect different dimensions. First, the results add something to the debate surrounding the role of individual countries in the CFSP in general. Second, the study outlines characteristics specific to the EU sanctions on Russia. It provides a new perspective on the sanctions against Russia by focusing specifically on the role of individual countries in prolonging them. This is important, because the sanctions have been in place for several years without much perspective of lifting them. The overarching goal of this study is to answer questions relating to the first dimension: how do individual countries, especially small countries, utilize the sanctions mechanism within the CFSP? This study offers new insight into some of the factors affecting decisions of small states in sanctions, offering an important step forward in terms of understanding decision-making within the CFSP.

### **1.3 Research material and relevance**

This study compares parliamentary documents from Finland and the Netherlands by using Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA). The documents under study provide a variety of opinions including both governmental stances and opposition's viewpoints in both Finland and the Netherlands. All documents stem from 2016. This year is interesting to understand the prolonging of sanctions for several reasons. First, all EU sanctions were prolonged in this year. Second, it became clear that previous international agreements for solving the conflict were not having their hoped effect. In March 2015, the EU aligned the lifting of sanctions to the implementation of the so-called Minsk agreements, to which both Ukraine and Russia did not comply at the end of 2015. Therefore, sanctions were prolonged despite earlier hopes for lifting them by 2016. Third, the conflict in Ukraine was somewhat calm in 2016, causing little reason for entirely new sanctions to be implemented.<sup>31</sup>

The parliamentary documents studied here cannot provide a complete picture of how sanctions are reflected within countries. They nevertheless reflect a range of opinions within the country, even when the conflict was not anymore reaching the headlines on a daily basis. For that reason, analyzing parliamentary documents is more useful than, for example, newspapers. While newspapers play a significant role in public perception and public attention for foreign affairs, they are limited in their ability to give a full picture of foreign

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<sup>31</sup> General Secretariat of the Council, "Timeline – EU restrictive measures in response to the crisis in Ukraine."

policy.<sup>32</sup> The approach in this study is thus not to understand exactly how the public perceives foreign policy in Finland and the Netherlands, but rather how the political debate in these countries regarding sanctions might differ. This is important, because the standpoint of the political elite is one of the main actors in determining a country's position in EU sanctions regimes.<sup>33</sup>

In understanding how sanctions are discussed in national politics, QCA is an effective method. The method is flexible in analyzing large text data, which is helpful when comparing textual data that spans over a certain period of time. It makes it possible to draw attention to the content of the articles, while also putting it into context. This study follows a roadmap for conducting QCA developed by Margrit Schreier that involves a pilot, main coding and analysis phase.<sup>34</sup> In drawing up the coding frame, this study uses conventional content analysis, which describes certain phenomena. It also uses directed content analysis, which uses existing theoretical conceptions to build a coding frame.<sup>35</sup> The data used in the QCA is divided into five dimensions, which each cover a part of the main research questions in this study.

Apart from shifting the focus away from the most populous countries in the EU, comparing the Netherlands and Finland is useful for several other reasons. Looking at economic factors, both countries have often expressed similar interests in EU cooperation.<sup>36</sup> For example, the voting behavior of both countries in the EU regarding European integration is similar.<sup>37</sup> In population size, the Netherlands is significantly bigger than Finland, with around 17.4 million people compared to around 5.5 million in 2020. Within the EU, this brings both countries somewhat in the middle, not having the power that for example France and Germany have.<sup>38</sup> Multiple scholars have described countries such as the Netherlands and Finland as small countries in the EU. The Netherlands is for example a small state with “a strong preference for cooperation at the European level”.<sup>39</sup> Finland, similarly, is a small

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<sup>32</sup> Stuart Soroka, “Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy,” *Press/Politics* 8, no. 1 (2003): 42-43.

<sup>33</sup> Portela et al., “Consensus against all odds,” 687.

<sup>34</sup> Margrit Schreier, *Qualitative Content Analysis in Practice* (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2012), 5-7.

<sup>35</sup> Hsiu-Fang Hsieh and Sarah Shannon, “Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis,” *Qualitative Health Research* 15, no. 9 (2005): 1279-1283.

<sup>36</sup> Daniel F. Schuld and Thomas Henökl, “New Alliances in Post-Brexit Europe: Does the New Hanseatic League Revive Nordic Political Cooperation?” *Politics and Governance* 8, no. 4 (2020): 84-85.

<sup>37</sup> Lewis Dijkstra, Hugo Poelman, and Andrés Rodríguez-Pose, “The geography of EU discontent,” *Regional Studies* 54, no. 6 (2020): 739.

<sup>38</sup> “Living in the EU,” European Union, accessed January 30, 2021, [https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/figures/living\\_en](https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/figures/living_en).

<sup>39</sup> Steven Blockmans, “The Benelux approach to EU integration and external action,” *Global Affairs* (2017): 11.

country supporting and promoting the “common institutional and normative framework of the Union and the community-centered orientation of its power structures”.<sup>40</sup>

Despite noticeable similarities in general policy preferences in the EU, the Netherlands and Finland are also quite different in its foreign policy. The relationship with Russia, for example, is different in both countries. Russia used to be the largest trading partner of Finland until the tensions in Ukraine broke out.<sup>41</sup> While not being the most important anymore, Russia remains a significant trading partner.<sup>42</sup> Besides being a long-term trading partner, Finland shares 1300 kilometers of land border with Russia and has had relatively close political relations with Russia throughout the past decades.<sup>43</sup> The Netherlands, on the other hand, is less reliant on Russia in its trade and is historically and geographically not as close to Russia. In economic relations, the only exception to this rule are imports of mineral fuels.<sup>44</sup> Certain events also deserve attention when analyzing the Dutch way of dealing with EU sanctions. In relation to Russia, this especially concerns the downing of flight MH17, which eventually led to a third phase of sanctions on Russia imposed by the EU.<sup>45</sup> Most victims on board of this plane were Dutch, which undoubtedly affected the country’s relationship with Russia.<sup>46</sup>

Besides the specific characteristics of the Netherlands and Finland that make this study interesting, this research is important due to the lack of diverse country comparisons in research of the EU’s CFSP. In-depth comparisons between the Netherlands and Finland regarding their participation in the sanctions mechanism of the EU are, to the best of my knowledge, currently non-existent. There have been case studies to explain the persistence of EU sanctions on Russia, for example by Portela, Pospieszna, Skrzypczynska & Walentek, who compared Spain and Poland.<sup>47</sup> Others, such as Siddi, have put the emphasis on Germany’s leadership during the construction of sanctions against Russia.<sup>48</sup> Comparisons between two small EU countries are difficult because of the lack of mutual expertise between

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<sup>40</sup> Teija Tiilikainen, “Finland – An EU Member with a Small state Identity,” *European Integration* 28, no. 1 (2006): 79.

<sup>41</sup> “Finnish exports to Russia down more than 35 percent,” YLE, last modified July 8, 2016, accessed February 1, 2021, [https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/finnish\\_exports\\_to\\_russia\\_down\\_more\\_than\\_35\\_percent/8251837](https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/finnish_exports_to_russia_down_more_than_35_percent/8251837).

<sup>42</sup> “Kauppa,” Tilastokeskus, last modified March 15, 2021, accessed March 17, 2021, [https://www.stat.fi/tup/suoluk/suoluk\\_kotimaankauppa.html](https://www.stat.fi/tup/suoluk/suoluk_kotimaankauppa.html).

<sup>43</sup> Tobias Etzold & Hiski Haukkala, “Is There a Nordic Russia Policy? Swedish, Finnish and Danish Relations with Russia in the Context of the European Union,” *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 19, no. 2: 252-255.

<sup>44</sup> Wiel Packbier, *Internationale handel in goederen van Nederland 2012* (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS), 2013), 14.

<sup>45</sup> Szep, “New intergovernmentalism meets EU sanctions policy,” 859-861.

<sup>46</sup> “Vlucht MH17,” Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, accessed February 28, 2021, <https://mh17tijdlijn.nl>.

<sup>47</sup> Portela et al., “Consensus against all odds.”

<sup>48</sup> Marco Siddi, “A Contested Hegemon? Germany’s Leadership in EU Relations with Russia.” *German Politics* 29, no. 1 (2018): 97-114.



both countries: in the Netherlands, for example, it is since 2013 not possible anymore to study Finnish on an academic level.<sup>49</sup> The specific choice for comparing Finland and the Netherlands has for a large part to do with both the political and language knowledge of the author. I understand Dutch fluently and I am an advanced user of Finnish, following both countries closely over the past years. Therefore, the translations in this study are my own.

Chapter 2 starts by setting up a theoretical framework, which makes it possible to analyze the sanctions of the EU on Russia. It begins by going deeper into the definition of sanctions, and explain what EU sanctions actually are. To understand the case study better, a section providing context for EU sanctions on Russia follows next. Once the definition and context of sanctions is clear, the theoretical part goes deeper into the general power relations in sanctions. This involves an analysis of the concept of sanctions as coercing, constraining and signaling, with the aim of highlighting different objectives states can have to impose or prolong sanctions. Other theory regarding the ultimate aim of sanctions is under consideration in this section as well. The second part of the theory, starting from section 2.2, concerns the role of individual countries in the foreign policy of the EU. This part also puts focus on EU integration theory, which helps in explaining how individual countries use the sanctions mechanism. The section starts by outlining general theory regarding the role of individual countries, after which it touches upon theory about “small” countries.

Once the theoretical framework has been set out, the study moves towards the QCA of Dutch and Finnish parliamentary documents. Chapter 3 starts by a discussion on the use of QCA, followed by a section explaining how the framework of this study came into place. This includes outlining the research design and a description of the coding frame used. Following this, chapter 4 presents the results of the QCA. The last part of this study, chapter 5, contains the discussion section drawing the data and theory together. In conclusion, I will show that while individual countries present themselves as being united in the larger framework of the EU, their individual interests are clearly distinguishable in their approach towards EU restrictive measures.

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<sup>49</sup> “Suomi ja Alankomaat. Kahdenväliset suhteet,” Ulkoministeriö, accessed January 26, 2021, <https://finlandabroad.fi/web/nld/kahdenvaliset-suhteet>.

## 2. Theoretical framework

### 2.1 Theory and operation of sanctions

#### 2.1.1 Defining sanctions

Restrictive measures have been part of the academic debate from a plethora of different perspectives. These perspectives range from expectations of how sanctions operate, to underlying factors in the decision-making process of sanctions, to the role of individual states in sanctions regimes and foreign policy in general. Theorizing sanctions generally starts by looking at the power dynamics behind sanctions, which includes the expected operation of sanctions.<sup>50</sup> After defining what we understand as “sanctions” or “restrictive measures”, this study moves to exploring these power dynamics by comparing several theories that have been leading in the study of sanctions in the past decades. Next, it focuses on theory of sanctions as coercing, constraining and signaling. To make it possible to study the participation of individual countries in sanctions, the second part of the theory focuses on individual countries and their role in the wider framework of sanctions.

The groundwork of the academic debate on restrictive measures was set up in the second half of the twentieth century. It is complicated to determine exactly what “sanctions” or “restrictive measures” mean, because sanctions have been discussed from a wide range of perspectives. In the early academic debate on international sanctions, most focus was put on the role of economic sanctions. These economic sanctions, according to James Barber, “are economic measures directed to political objectives”.<sup>51</sup> The economic measures are usually accompanied by other restrictions, which for example restrict diplomatic and cultural ties. According to Barber, economic measures sometimes are an addition to the use of force, but these two do not necessarily go hand in hand.<sup>52</sup>

Johan Galtung, one of the most influential scholars in theorizing sanctions and their functions, included in his definition of sanctions a slightly more clear-cut idea of what sanctions are and included in his definition also a general objective of sanctions. According to him, sanctions are

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<sup>50</sup> For example Johan Galtung, “On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions: With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia,” *World Politics* 19, no. 3 (1967): 378-416; Clara Portela, *European Union Sanctions and Foreign Policy: When and Why Do They Work?* (London: Routledge, 2010); Michael Brzoska, “From Dumb to Smart? Recent Reforms of UN Sanctions,” *Global Governance* 9 (2003): 519-535; Helwig, Jokela & Portela, *Sharpening EU Sanctions Policy*; Haugevik & Rieker, “Autonomy or Integration?”; Portela et al., “Consensus against all odds.”

<sup>51</sup> James Barber, “Economic Sanctions As a Policy Instrument,” *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 55, no. 3 (1979): 367.

<sup>52</sup> Barber, “Economic Sanctions As a Policy Instrument,” 367-368.

actions initiated by one or more international actors (the “senders”) against one or more others (the “receivers”) with either or both of two purposes: to punish the receivers by depriving them of some value and/or to make the receivers comply with certain norms the senders deem important.<sup>53</sup>

According to Galtung, it is not necessarily logical that sanctions serve both purposes directly. He noted that punishment is in general not a good method for making others comply. Therefore, it is more important to look at which purpose is more important, than assuming that both purposes are directly in place.<sup>54</sup> Others, such as Hufbauer et al., define sanctions as “the deliberate, government-inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relations”.<sup>55</sup> Much of the literature concerning sanctions focuses on economic sanctions, instead of focusing on sanctions in general. Nevertheless, sanctions can differ greatly in scope: they can be for example through political, diplomatic, sectoral, or individual measures.<sup>56</sup> Many definitions of economic sanctions are also applicable to international sanctions in general. Just as economic sanctions, international sanctions in general are “geared to ‘exercising pressure’ with a view to ‘producing a change in the political behavior of another actor’”.<sup>57</sup> Scholars have also noted that sanctions are imposed as a response to “illegal or politically undesirable acts”.<sup>58</sup> Thus, the basic idea of what a sanction is stays similar regardless of whether the sanction is economic or constituting a different focus.

What the different definitions share is that sanctions are a mechanism creating a different situation than the relationship between the sender and receiver once was. Economic sanctions are portrayed as an “exceptional measure”, being the “antithesis” of normal foreign economic policy.<sup>59</sup> Other restrictive measures often complement economic sanctions. This concerns for example diplomatic measures. As a general definition for sanctions, it is thus important to not solely focus on the economic mechanisms behind sanctions. As a broader definition of sanctions, this study uses a definition proposed by Portela et al., who describe sanctions as

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<sup>53</sup> Johan Galtung, “On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions: With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia,” *World Politics* 19, no. 3 (1967): 379.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 379-381.

<sup>55</sup> Gary Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliott, and Barbara Oegg. *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered* (Washington, DC, Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2007), 3.

<sup>56</sup> Thomas Biersteker et al., “UN targeted sanctions datasets (1991-2013),” *Journal of Peace Research* 55, no. 3 (2018): 407.

<sup>57</sup> Clara Portela, *European Union Sanctions and Foreign Policy: When and Why Do They Work?* (London: Routledge, 2010), 21.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, 21.

<sup>59</sup> Anton Filipenko, Oleno Bazhenova, and Roman Stakanov, “Economic Sanctions: Theory, Policy, Mechanisms,” *Baltic Journal of Economic Studies* 6, no. 2 (2020): 70.

the politically-motivated withdrawal of a benefit that would otherwise be granted, and whose restoration is made dependent on the fulfilment of a series of conditions defined by the sender.<sup>60</sup>

This definition not only considers sanctions as restrictions being imposed by the sender, but also connects sanctions to certain conditions. Sanctions are in theory thus not purely reactive, but also provide an opportunity to be lifted again. This characteristic of sanctions is important for this study, because it means that renewing sanctions is not the self-evident way to go.

### **2.1.2 Sanctions in the EU**

The EU has implemented a wide variety of sanctions, which can be divided into roughly three different types of sanctions. The sanctions have, according to Portela and Biersteker, different “embeddedness” in the international context. First, the EU implements sanctions that are agreed upon by the UN. These sanctions are a direct result of UN Security Council (UNSC) decisions; the EU does not have any observable role in these sanctions. Second, the EU autonomously decides upon sanctions that go further than UN sanctions. In other words, the EU implements “supplementary measures” in addition to sanctions instated by the UNSC. Third, the EU implements sanctions without any sanction decision made by the UNSC. This happens for example when the UNSC does not agree on a sanctions package. These sanctions are the most autonomous of all three types applied by the EU. This last category does not necessarily mean, however, that these sanctions come into place completely autonomously. These sanctions are often in line with sanctions implemented by the United States, but are usually not completely the same. The sanctions package of the EU on Russia falls in the third category.<sup>61</sup> In the past, the US often led the way in designing sanctions in which the EU participated, even when the EU regularly adopted sanctions that were more modest in scope. In recent years, however, there is a visible divergence between the EU and US sanctions policies. This predominantly has to do with a change in US sanctions policies, which have become more aggressive. The main diverging factor is the use of secondary sanctions by the US. These sanctions target companies in third countries that work together with entities under US sanctions. This policy change has large consequences for companies in the EU, who regularly cooperate with entities under US sanctions. This development means that the EU

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<sup>60</sup> Jokela et al., *Sharpening EU Sanctions Policy*, 25-26.

<sup>61</sup> Thomas Biersteker and Clara Portela, “EU Sanctions in Context: Three Types,” *Research Collection School of Social Sciences* paper 1688 (2015): 1-2.

acts more autonomously than before with regard to sanctions, even though the influence of the US should not be underestimated.<sup>62</sup>

The basis for the current procedures in the EU for implementing and prolonging sanctions have been the *Guidelines on the Implementation and Evaluation of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions)* (hereafter the Guidelines) and the *Basic Principles of the Use of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions)* (hereafter the Principles) of respectively 2003 and 2004.<sup>63</sup> As stated in the Principles, the EU implements autonomous sanctions “in support of efforts to fight terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and (...) to uphold respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance”.<sup>64</sup> These principles are still the formal objectives of EU sanctions. Other documents attempting to optimize the implementation of EU sanctions complement the Principles.<sup>65</sup> The Guidelines, renewed in 2018, state that sanctions “are imposed by the EU to bring about a change in policy or activity by the target country, part of country, government, entities or individuals”.<sup>66</sup> Lastly, the *Best Practices on Effective Implementation of Financial Restrictive Measures* are important in the way the EU implements sanctions. These documents all make that EU sanctions are centrally legalized. However, implementation and enforcement of EU sanctions is decentralized and thus in the hands of member states.<sup>67</sup>

Thus, when looking at the general definition of sanctions in combination with EU sanctions, the politically motivated withdrawal of a benefit is in the EU the withdrawal of a benefit based on reasons concerning terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance as described in the Principles. This focus is combined with conditions in the Guidelines, which show that sanctions can be implemented against different entities. This means that sanctions can work against states, but on a smaller individual level as well.

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<sup>62</sup> Jokela et al., *Sharpening EU Sanctions Policy*, 46-47.

<sup>63</sup> Portela, *European Union Sanctions and Foreign Policy*, 28.

<sup>64</sup> “Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions)” (10198/1/04), Council of the European Union, 7 June 2004, accessed February 2, 2021, <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10198-2004-REV-1/en/pdf>.

<sup>65</sup> Jokela et al., *Sharpening EU Sanctions Policy*, 24.

<sup>66</sup> Council of the European Union, “Guidelines on Implementation and Evaluation of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions) in the Framework of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy” (5664/18), May 4, 2018, accessed February 2, 2021, <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5664-2018-INIT/en/pdf>, 5.

<sup>67</sup> Clara Portela, “Implementation and Enforcement,” in *Sharpening EU Sanctions Policy. Challenges and Responses in a Geopolitical Era*, eds. Niklas Helwig, Juha Jokela, and Clara Portela (FIIA Report 2020), 106.

### 2.1.3 EU sanctions on Russia and their effects on the Netherlands and Finland

The sanctions imposed on Russia in 2014 concern different types of sanctions. The imposition of sanctions started in March 2014, by introducing asset freezes and travel restrictions to Russian and Ukrainian individuals. In addition, several bilateral negotiations about for example visa procedures were suspended.<sup>68</sup> The EU decided unanimously on these sanctions, even when several countries noted that sanctions would have a negative economic impact on EU member states. In disputes with somewhat symmetrical power relations, which is the case between the EU and Russia, sanctions are generally harmful to both sides. A strong interdependency characterizes the relationship, making the potential for mutual harm high.<sup>69</sup>

In April, May, and July 2014, EU sanctions on Russia were widened in scope. The strongest economic sanctions came into place in July 2014, when the EU introduced sector-specific sanctions against the Russian military industry, as well as its financial and energy sector. Initially, conditions to lift the sanctions were relatively vague, while reasons for implementing sanctions were clearer; the main reasons for implementing and expanding were the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the persistence of Russian-supported separatist military pressure in East Ukraine.<sup>70</sup> The downing of Malaysian Airlines flight MH-17A on 17 July 2014 caused a strong tightening to the sanctions already in place, due to suspected Russian involvement in the shooting of this airplane.<sup>71</sup> In the following months, new decisions by the EU widened the sanctions in place, but the main idea about the type of sanctions did not change. Official conditions to lift the sanctions became clearer in the following months, in which the EU called for the removal of armed forces in Eastern Ukraine in accordance with the Agreement on the Status and Conditions of the Black Sea Fleet stationing on the territory of Ukraine of 1997.<sup>72</sup> The EU regularly reviews its sanctions; economic sanctions, asset freezes and travel bans require unanimous support from all EU members every six months. Within the EU, there are also annual reviews related to measures in place against entities on Crimea.<sup>73</sup>

EU sanctions received a response from the Russian side. Countermeasures followed the sanctions implemented by the EU at almost every round of sanctions implementation or

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<sup>68</sup> Veebel and Markus, "Lessons from the EU-Russia Sanctions 2014-2015," 173-174.

<sup>69</sup> Francesco Giumelli, "The Redistributive Impact of Restrictive Measures on EU Members: Winners and Losers from Imposing Sanctions on Russia," *JCMS* 55, no. 5 (2017): 1062-1063.

<sup>70</sup> Veebel and Markus, "Lessons from the EU-Russia Sanctions 2014-2015," 173-176.

<sup>71</sup> Iikka Korhonen, Heli Simola and Laura Solanko, "Sanctions, counter-sanctions and Russia – Effects on economy, trade and finance," *BOFIT Policy Brief* 4 (2018): 4-5.

<sup>72</sup> Veebel and Markus, "Lessons from the EU-Russia Sanctions 2014-2015," 173-176.

<sup>73</sup> Korhonen, Simola and Solanko, "Sanctions, counter-sanctions and Russia," 3-4.

prolonging. In March 2014, measures were implemented against high-ranked officials of the EU and EU member states. In August 2014, Russia started an embargo on imports of many agricultural products, which impacted all countries that adopted economic sanctions against Russia. Besides the EU, this included the United States, Norway, Canada and Australia.<sup>74</sup> Thus, EU sanctions alone are not the only cause of noticeable sanction impacts on the EU and Russia; Russian countermeasures play a significant role as well.

It is important to note that, as it comes to the impact of sanctions on individual EU member states, sanctions did not affect every country in the EU proportionally. In 2015, seven out of the 28 EU countries suffered net losses.<sup>75</sup> At the same time, some economic sectors in the EU did in fact increase their exports to Russia after the implementation of sanctions. As a whole, however, exports from the EU to Russia decreased after 2014.<sup>76</sup> The impact of the sanctions on trade between the EU and Russia strongly depends on the sector, which also partly explains why sanctions affect different countries economically in different ways. One of the most important sectors is the agricultural sector, of which exports from the EU to Russia dropped in 2016 by 52.6% compared to 2013 levels, almost completely due to the sanctions.<sup>77</sup> In addition, the collapse of oil prices and depreciation of the Russian ruble have also affected exports to Russia.<sup>78</sup>

In February 2015, against a backdrop of clashes, the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France and Germany developed the “Minsk II” agreement with the long-term goal of bringing an enduring peace to the eastern parts of Ukraine.<sup>79</sup> The agreement, which the rest of this study refers to as the Minsk agreement, gave temporary self-autonomy to the regions of Luhansk and Donetsk in eastern Ukraine. At the same time, it set out that all foreign troops should leave Ukraine, as well as the disarming of all illegal armed groups.<sup>80</sup> Soon after signing the agreement, the EU decided to tie the implementation of the Minsk agreement to the sanctions in place against Russia. The full implementation of the agreement became a

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<sup>74</sup> Veebel and Markus, “Lessons from the EU-Russia Sanctions 2014-2015,” 175-176.

<sup>75</sup> M.V. Klinova and E.A. Sidorova, “Economic Sanctions of the West against Russia: Development of the Situation,” *Studies on Russian Economic Development* 30, no. 3 (2019): 362.

<sup>76</sup> Giumelli, “The Redistributive Impact of Restrictive Measures on EU Members,” 1062-1063.

<sup>77</sup> E. Kašáková, B. Baumgartner and M. Žatko, “Opportunities Lost The Impact of the Russian Embargo on its Agri-Food Trade with the EU: Analysis by Selected Indicators,” *International Organisations Research Journal* 13, no 4 (2018): 260-263.

<sup>78</sup> Birgitta Berg-Andersson and Markku Kotilainen, “Pakotteiden vaikutus Suomen vientiin Venäjälle,” *ETLA Muistio* 45 (2016): 1.

<sup>79</sup> Katarzyna Pelczynska-Nalecz and Piotr Buras, *The Minsk (dis)agreement and Europe’s security order* (Stefan Batory Foundation & Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2017), 1.

<sup>80</sup> Silva II and Selden, “Economic interdependence and economic sanctions,” 234.

condition for lifting the sanctions.<sup>81</sup> Interestingly, despite support of the EU for not recognizing Crimea as part of Russia and for supporting a UN resolution on the territorial integrity of Ukraine, the Minsk agreement does not make any reference to Crimea.<sup>82</sup> According to the official readings, EU sanctions on Russia are still tied to the implementation of the Minsk II agreement.<sup>83</sup>

As this study focuses on Finland and the Netherlands, it is especially useful to shed more light on the impact of the sanctions on these countries. Finland, having close ties to Russia, was one of the seven countries in the EU suffering net losses after implementing the sanctions.<sup>84</sup> According to Giumelli, when looking at several economic factors, Finland is among the countries in the EU hardest hit by sanctions, along with countries such as Germany and Italy. In some sectors, Finland suffered the hardest losses of all EU countries with regard to exports.<sup>85</sup> In the case of Finland, the hardest impact on its economy is not due to the sanctions packages of the EU on Russia, which hardly affected Finnish trade. The Russian countermeasures as a result of EU sanctions, however, affected Finland strongly. The sanctioned agricultural sector that was strongly tied to Russia, especially as it comes to dairy and meat industries, suffered a great blow from sanctions.<sup>86</sup>

The sanctions and countermeasures did affect the Netherlands as well. While not being the country economically most affected by the sanctions, its exports to Russia decreased by 39% in 2015 compared to 2013.<sup>87</sup> Just as in Finland, the agricultural sector especially suffered strongly. The export of the agricultural sector almost halved in 2015 compared to 2013.<sup>88</sup> However, as total share of the agricultural exports in 2015, Russia accounts for less than 2%. Therefore, the economic impact is not as large in the Netherlands as in Finland.<sup>89</sup>

Despite the negative economic impact of sanctions, it is important to note that a strong economic impact does not necessarily explain sanctions decisions made in EU countries. As Giumelli argues, some countries that have suffered relatively little in economic terms, for

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<sup>81</sup> Pelczynska-Nalecz and Buras, *The Minsk (dis)agreement and Europe's security order*, 1.

<sup>82</sup> Sebastiaan van Severen, "The Minsk Agreements. Has the Glimmer of Hope Faded?," in *Principled Pragmatism in Practice*, eds. Fabienne Bossuyt and Peter van Elsuwege (Brill/Nijhoff, 2021), 17-18.

<sup>83</sup> General Secretariat of the Council, "Timeline – EU restrictive measures in response to the crisis in Ukraine."

<sup>84</sup> Klinova and Sidorova, "Economic Sanctions of the West against Russia," 362.

<sup>85</sup> Giumelli, "The Redistributive Impact of Restrictive Measures on EU Members," 1069; 1073-1075.

<sup>86</sup> Berg-Andersson and Kotilainen, "Pakotteiden vaikutus Suomen vientiin Venäjälle," 1.

<sup>87</sup> Giumelli, "The Redistributive Impact of Restrictive Measures on EU Members," 1071.

<sup>88</sup> Rianne Spit and Simone Tukker, "Fruitteliers lijden zwaar onder Russische boycot en willen af van sancties tegen Rusland," last modified August 8, 2019, accessed September 3, 2021, <https://eenvandaag.avrotros.nl/item/fruittelers-lijden-zwaar-onder-russische-boycot-en-willen-van-sancties-tegen-rusland-af/>.

<sup>89</sup> "Nederland tweede landbouwexporteur ter wereld," CBS, last modified 6 June 2016, <https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2016/23/nederland-tweede-landbouwexporteur-ter-wereld>.



example Greece, are very critical about the sanctions. On the other hand, countries such as Germany that suffered more are strong supporters of sanctions.<sup>90</sup>

#### **2.1.4 Different logics on the operation of sanctions**

In order to shift the focus to the level of individual member states in sanctions, it is first important to understand in what ways sanctions operate. When sanctions are implemented, different mechanisms are in place. These mechanisms together make that an eventual sanctions package is put into force. First, this theoretical part focuses on the mechanisms behind sanctions packages in general. This means that the focus is on how sanctions are expected to operate, and what different goals sanctions can have. After that, the study focuses on the theory behind the role of individual countries in constituting and prolonging sanctions mechanisms.

Important in sanctions theory is the impact of sanctions on the economy of both the sender and the receiver. Some scholars have conceptualized the mechanism as a form of international bargaining. When implemented, from the sender's perspective some sort of uncertainty exists regarding the receiver's willingness and ability to deal with the restrictions in place. This does not mean that sanctions are only draining on the end of the receivers: both senders and receivers have to bear costs for the sanctions in place.<sup>91</sup> The costs of sanctions increase if the degree of interdependence between the sender and the receiver is high. The sanctions of the EU on Russia are a good example of a sanctions package that affects both sides economically, as described in the previous section.<sup>92</sup> A logic to explain the implementation of sanctions despite economic losses on both sides is the traditional idea of "more pain, more gain". According to this theory, enough pressure on a receiver drains the economy of it to such an extent, that the situation becomes too difficult. The most natural reaction of the receiving end of sanctions would be, according to this theory, to comply.<sup>93</sup>

From the liberal point of view on international relations, countries that have strong economic ties are less likely to impose economic sanctions on each other. This can be explained by the logic of interdependence: sanctions would disrupt not only the economy of the receiving entity, but also that of the senders. In the EU, this logic would mean that individual countries have different attitudes to imposing sanctions that affect the economy. In

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<sup>90</sup> Giumelli, "The Redistributive Impact of Restrictive Measures on EU Members," 1077-1078.

<sup>91</sup> Susan Hannah Allen, "The Determinants of Economic Sanctions Success and Failure," *International Interactions* 31 (2005): 117-118.

<sup>92</sup> Silva II and Selden, "Economic interdependence and economic sanctions," 229.

<sup>93</sup> Veebel and Markus, "At the Dawn of a New Era of Sanctions: Russian-Ukrainian Crisis and Sanctions," 129.

the case of Russia, for example, EU states differ strongly in their economic interdependence with Russia. The logic of interdependence would make that states with closer economic ties to Russia are more likely to oppose these sanctions.<sup>94</sup> This theory does not exclude the pain-gain logic. Instead, the logic of interdependence supposes that the pain is felt on both sides. Because of this, potential senders might decide that the mutual pain is not worth the gain. Presumably, there is as well a balance for sending states between the economic pain suffered from interdependence and the eventual normative gain from encouraging a receiver to change its behavior. Section 2.2.1 considers these normative reasons in more detail.

While the role of economics is important in sanctions, it is necessary to keep in mind that economic concerns are not the only or even main driver for senders when implementing and upholding sanctions.<sup>95</sup> As described by Giumelli, for example, the economic impact of sanctions does not explain the behavior of different countries in constructing and upholding the EU sanctions on Russia.<sup>96</sup> Besides economic sanctions, some scholars state that security concerns play a large role in constituting sanctions.<sup>97</sup> In the end, one of the main reasons to implement sanctions is as an alternative to the use of armed force, or at least as a way to postpone the use of military interference.<sup>98</sup> Such an armed conflict would usually be, from an economic point of view, devastating to both the sender and receiver.<sup>99</sup> Thus, while it is useful to keep an eye on the economic interdependence of countries in analyzing how sanctions are implemented and upheld, other factors than purely economic ones are expected to play a role in sanctions mechanisms.

Related to the pain-gain theory on the effect of sanctions is the “naïve theory” of sanctions, proposed first by Johan Galtung and adopted by many after.<sup>100</sup> According to Galtung, sanctions are usually expected to make receiving entities comply to the will of the senders. Included in this idea is that if a receiver experiences economic losses, political disintegration will take place. This political disintegration in turn means that receivers of sanctions will comply, in order to keep public opinion on their side. However, this idea ignores the principle of adaptation: receivers can adapt to the situation and once this is done,

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<sup>94</sup> Silva II and Selden, “Economic interdependence and economic sanctions,” 229-230.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid., 246-248.

<sup>96</sup> Giumelli, “The Redistributive Impact of Restrictive Measures on EU Members,” 1077-1078.

<sup>97</sup> Silva II and Selden, “Economic interdependence and economic sanctions,” 246-248.

<sup>98</sup> Hufbauer et al., *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*, 9-10.

<sup>99</sup> Silva II and Selden, “Economic interdependence and economic sanctions,” 246-248.

<sup>100</sup> See Galtung, “On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions.” Built upon by for example Helwig, Jokela & Portela, *Sharpening EU Sanctions Policy*; Elizabeth Ellis, “The Ethics of Economic Sanctions,” *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (2013), accessed March 2, 2021, <https://iep.utm.edu/eth-ec-s/>; Hufbauer et al., *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*, Brzoska, “From Dumb to Smart?”; Francesco Giumelli, “How EU Sanctions Work: A New Narrative.” *EU Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Paper* 129 (2013). ”

political disintegration does not take place.<sup>101</sup> It could even be that sanctions cause political integration in the receiving country. This is caused by what is called the “rally-around-the-flag” effect: the people of the receiving entity unite, while the animosity towards the sending entities grows. Some argue that the rally-around-the-flag effect is an important reason why sanctions do not work as expected.<sup>102</sup> Galtung considers many sanctions thus as “naïve”, because instead of reaching compliance they might cause the opposite.

The naïve theory initially theorized the operation of economic sanctions. However, it also applies to other types of sanctions. Targeted sanctions, for example, do not necessarily bring direct economic harm. The naïve theory is nevertheless still applicable; the idea of getting “political gain through economic pain” is substituted by a similar theory of “political gain through nauseating the powerful”.<sup>103</sup> In other words, the logic of the naïve theory of economic sanctions also applies to other types of sanctions. The only difference is that the theory then applies on a more specific level, for example on an individual scale.<sup>104</sup> In the case of this study, the naïve theory is relevant because it shows that senders do not always control how sanctions are received. In studying sanctions prolonging, then, it is useful to consider this theory because the prolonging-related objectives of individual countries might change from their initial aims when countries start to experience the unexpected effects of sanctions.

As becomes clear from the theory discussed above, sanctions do not solely serve one clear-cut goal and do not cause one clear effect. As the naïve theory shows, sanctions that are in place do often not reach the goal of compliance, which could influence the decision for states to participate in certain sanctions regimes. In addition, while the economic influence of sanctions should not be underestimated, it is necessary to keep a wider array of explanations for the upholding of sanctions in place than purely economic explanations. As for objectives, an influential theory by James Barber proposes to divide objectives of sanctions into primary, secondary and tertiary objectives. He notes that objectives are not solely related to changes in behavior of the receiver to whom the sanctions are directed; in reality, a diversity of considerations needs to be taken into account when studying the objectives of sanctions.<sup>105</sup>

Barber divides these in primary, secondary, and tertiary objectives. Primary objectives are related to the behavior and actions of the entity against whom the sanctions are implemented. Secondary sanctions concern the sending entities: this mainly concerns their

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<sup>101</sup> Galtung, “On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions,” 388-393.

<sup>102</sup> Ellis, “The Ethics of Economic Sanctions,” paragraph 1.c.i.

<sup>103</sup> Brzoska, “From Dumb to Smart?” 532.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid., 531-532.

<sup>105</sup> Barber, “Economic Sanctions As a Policy Instrument,” 368.

international status, but also their behavior and expectations. Tertiary objectives of sanctions are broader, international considerations. These objectives relate to the structure and operation of the international system.<sup>106</sup> Separating these objectives is useful in demonstrating that sanctions are driven by different policy objectives, which can be studied simultaneously but can also be separated. This separation is especially useful when trying to answer why certain sanctions are in place, since it shows the complex process of sanctions imposition and upholding.<sup>107</sup>

### **2.1.5 Signaling, Constraining, and Coercing**

As discussed in the previous section, the basic theory around sanctions focuses strongly on the way sanctions work in reaching policy objectives. This study uses this theory to analyze the way Finland and the Netherlands prolong sanctions regimes. The “more pain, more gain theory”, for example, is useful in analyzing narratives from both parliaments. Dividing primary, secondary and tertiary objectives also helps in understanding how these different dimensions are expressed in sanctions policy.

However, to get a fuller understanding of the way sanctions function, it is necessary to go beyond identifying whether sanctions work and what different objectives they have. While certain factors, such as the economic impact, are important to take into account, it is difficult to assess precisely whether sanctions have been successful. Measuring what would have been different without the sanctions remains almost impossible.<sup>108</sup> An often-used way that goes beyond understanding the less flexible pain-gain logic and the goal-driven approach is by dividing the operation of sanctions into coercing, constraining, and signaling. This division has been put forward by Francesco Giumelli, and is used by many as a way to go beyond the pure ability of sanctions to coerce targets.<sup>109</sup> It thus brings a more holistic understanding of the logic behind sanctions.

To understand these different divisions, it is first necessary to understand that sanctions include different dimensions of power. Power theory has been widely discussed in the academic world, with Steven Lukes three-dimensional theory of power being one of the

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<sup>106</sup> Barber, “Economic Sanctions As a Policy Instrument,” 370-373.

<sup>107</sup> Dursun Peksen, “When Do Imposed Economic Sanctions Work? A Critical Review of the Sanctions Effectiveness Literature,” *Defence and Peace Economics* 30, no. 6 (2019): 636.

<sup>108</sup> Catherine Jones, “Sanctions as Tools to Signal, Constrain, and Coerce,” *Asia Policy* 13, no. 3 (2018): 26-27.

<sup>109</sup> Put forward by Francesco Giumelli in *Coercing, Constraining and signaling*. Used by for example Jones, “Sanctions as Tools to Signal, Constrain, and Coerce”; Juha Jokela, Niklas Helwig and Clara Portela, eds., *Sharpening EU Sanctions Policy*; Veebel & Markus, “At the Dawn of a New Era of Sanctions.”

most influential ones.<sup>110</sup> Lukes criticizes in his three dimensions the one-dimensional definition of power proposed by Robert Dahl, often called the ‘pluralist’ view of power.<sup>111</sup> In this definition, Dahl describes his idea of power as “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would otherwise not do.”<sup>112</sup> Lukes criticizes this definition in that it focuses too much on behavior, which fails to take into account how the political agenda is controlled. In many cases, the use of power is more complex and results from mechanics beyond Dahl’s definition of power.<sup>113</sup>

In Lukes’ three dimensions of power, the first dimension relates closely to Dahl’s definition. In the first place, power can be used in a way that A makes B do something which B would not do without the exercise of power. In other words, this type of power is a decision-making power, in which A prevails over B.<sup>114</sup> Power can also make sure that certain decisions are not taken in the first place, concerns the second dimension. This has been called the “agenda-setting power” or “non-decision-making power”.<sup>115</sup> The last dimension of power prevents conflicts from arising and is a “thoroughgoing critique of the behavioural focus” of the former two dimensions.<sup>116</sup> This dimension refers to some sort of ideological power, and causes that “*potential issues* are kept out of politics”.<sup>117</sup> This kind of power, according to Giumelli, “shapes the interests and the knowledge of the actors”.<sup>118</sup> In other words, the last dimension of power has some sort of ideological characteristic.

The dimensions of power relate directly to the role sanctions can play in international relations. Coercing sanctions relate to the first kind of power. When implemented, they attempt the receiver to change its behavior. It causes damage to the receiver and creates incentives to the receiver to implement certain changes. The essence of coercion is in having realistic demands to the receiver; the receiver knows what to do in order to make the sanctions stop.<sup>119</sup> Coercing sanctions include some sort of penalty or a threat of penalties: without these,

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<sup>110</sup> This book was first published as Steven Lukes, *Power, A Radical View* (New York: Humanities Press 1974) and published as a second expanded edition as Steven Lukes, *Power, A Radical View* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2005).

<sup>111</sup> Lukes, *Power, A Radical View*, 16-19.

<sup>112</sup> Robert Dahl, “The Concept of Power,” *Behavioral science* 2, no. 3 (1957): 202-203.

<sup>113</sup> Lukes, *Power, A Radical View*, 19.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*, 16-19.

<sup>115</sup> Giumelli calls this the agenda-setting power in *Coercing, Constraining and signalling*, 1-3; Lukes in *Power: A Radical View* elaborates on “non-decision making power,” 23-25.

<sup>116</sup> Lukes, *Power: A Radical View*, 28.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*, 28.

<sup>118</sup> Giumelli, *Coercing, Constraining and signaling*, 1-3.

<sup>119</sup> Giumelli, “How EU Sanctions Work,” 18.

they do not live up to the realistic demands. As a result, the sanctions lose their coercive elements.<sup>120</sup>

The second dimension of power is connected to the constraining characteristic that sanctions can have. In contrast to coercing sanctions, the goal in constraining is not for senders to make receivers do something specific. Instead, constraining attempts to stop the possibilities of receivers to implement new policies. Constraining sanctions come into effect when the interests of senders and receivers cannot coincide. Giumelli describes this as a zero-sum game context, which “determines the resilience of targets and the determination of senders”. He notes that these sanctions are often in place when entities do not conform to the norms used by the international society.<sup>121</sup> This “international society”, however, can also mean a part of the international society. As described before, it rarely happens that the complete international society implements sanctions because of a breach of a common norm. For example, the UN General Assembly condemned the referendum on Crimea as illegitimate, but not all countries chose to implement sanctions because of this decision.<sup>122</sup>

The last type of sanctions distinguished by Giumelli are signaling sanctions. These sanctions are the most abstract type of sanctions; they are aiming to send a signal that the sender will not tolerate certain behavior. Signaling sanctions do not create direct damage to a receiver.<sup>123</sup> The receivers of signaling sanctions can be the whole international community, but can also be certain states, non-governmental entities and individuals. Signaling sanctions are, for example, used as a tool in a “communication war”; they shape a certain standard, which can be aimed at creating a stigma around receivers.<sup>124</sup> Signaling sanctions often show that there are certain red lines, or norms, in international relations. Some have also considered signaling sanctions as “symbolic” sanctions, because they do not have a directly visible effect.<sup>125</sup> Thus, signaling sanctions are a norm-setting, preventive way of using sanctions.

In the analysis of the QCA in this study, these distinctions help in analyzing how two individual countries differ or coincide in upholding the same set of sanctions. This work thus analyzes which types of power are identifiable in the attitudes of Finland and the Netherlands in upholding the sanctions against Russia. While the main point of this study is to compare how different individual countries behave, it also places this behavior in the wider context of

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<sup>120</sup> Hufbauer et al., *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*, 101.

<sup>121</sup> Giumelli, “How EU Sanctions Work,” 18-19.

<sup>122</sup> Silva II and Selden, “Economic interdependence and economic sanctions,” 233-234.

<sup>123</sup> Giumelli, “How EU Sanctions Work,” 19-20.

<sup>124</sup> Veebel & Markus, “At the Dawn of a New Era of Sanctions,” 129-130.

<sup>125</sup> Julia Grauvogel and Hana Attia, “How do international sanctions end? Towards a process-oriented, relational, and signaling perspective,” *GIGA Working Papers*, no. 320 (2020), 14.

how the EU uses this power. In addition, the QCA makes it possible to identify how the countries use the other mechanisms present in sanctions theory.

## **2.2 Individual countries and “small” states**

So far, the theoretical part of this study focused on general theory concerning the objectives and expected operations of international sanctions. To get a full picture of the way individual countries behave in these mechanisms, it is necessary to zoom in on individual countries and sanctions as well. This section concentrates on the way individual countries operate within wider institutions, such as the EU. Since the Netherlands and Finland have been described as “smaller” countries within the EU, this section also focuses on the specific role and characteristics of smaller countries. Defining “small” countries is problematic, but it is nevertheless useful to distinguish small countries within the EU from bigger ones such as France.<sup>126</sup>

### **2.2.1 Individual countries and different reasons to comply with sanctions**

Helwig & Pesu recognize different steps needed for analyzing how individual countries participate in sanctions regimes. They describe elements in the decision-making process as being manifold: “strategic culture, economic factors, security concerns, history, and international pressure and norms”. These factors overlap to some extent with the general sanctions theory discussed in the previous sections, but carry some differences with it as well. In theorizing the role of individual countries, they argue that it is firstly important to look at a state’s general attitude towards sanctions as a policy instrument. This largely concerns the strategic culture of countries. Some countries have a stronger tradition of softer diplomatic measures, while others are more prone to move towards measures that are more coercive.<sup>127</sup> For example, The Netherlands is a country with an idealist culture that uses sanctions when core foreign policy values are considered to be under threat.<sup>128</sup>

Secondly, a country’s position on a certain sanctions package is important in understanding how different countries participate in sanctions regimes. This has to do with for example geographical location. A country’s position towards a specific sanctions package also relates to the theory of economic interdependence; the more a sanctions-sending country

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<sup>126</sup> Baldur Thorhallsson & Anders Wivel, “Small States in the European Union: What Do We Know and What Would We Like to Know?” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 19, no. 4 (2006): 651-652.

<sup>127</sup> Helwig and Pesu, “EU Decision-making on Sanctions Regimes,” 95-96.

<sup>128</sup> Jan Angstrom and Jan Willem Honig, “Regaining Strategy: Small Powers, Strategic Culture, and Escalation in Afghanistan,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 35, no. 5 (2012): 674.

is trading with a receiver, the more this is likely to hinder sanctions imposition and upholding. Other factors such as friendship between two countries are also important to consider. Thirdly, the international environment also helps to explain why countries join sanctions regimes. Peer pressure can and often does play a large role in upholding sanctions. In the EU, this peer pressure is especially present. Individual countries in the EU need to consider their steps thoroughly when they go against the broader consensus, because this can decrease future bargaining powers.<sup>129</sup>

Whether EU member states prefer milder or stricter sanctions is influenced by both domestic and international factors. Besides the opinions of the governments of different countries, different domestic actors shape the attitude towards sanctions on the domestic level. Portela et al. argue that the interplay between different actors in a state determines the eventual outcome of how a state behaves in upholding sanctions. The domestic groups shaping the attitude of a state can roughly be divided in three different actors: the political elites, public opinion and the business elites. According to Portela et al., any state that is in favor of stricter sanctions includes certain domestic groups that are against these sanctions. On the other hand, countries wanting milder sanctions include domestic groups in favor of stricter sanctions. The attitudes of individual countries are thus not set in stone: instead, domestic differences influence and can change opinions of states on the international level.<sup>130</sup> In the QCA of this study, the focus is on the political elites. However, by taking into account the different political parties represented in the parliament, this study also grasps to a lower extent the views of the public opinion and the business elites.

To understand the way states can participate in sanctions regimes better, theory concerning normative, inward-facing reasons of individual states to participate in the international sphere is helpful. While this theory is common in human rights literature, it has been applied to the EU sanctions on Russia as well by for example Sjørusen and Rosén. According to them, the agreement on establishing sanctions, for example, was reached due to “a sense of collective commitment to the principles of sovereignty and self-determination” in EU member states.<sup>131</sup> They argue that it is important to take into account the normative power of arguments in favor of implementing common EU sanctions.<sup>132</sup>

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<sup>129</sup> Helwig and Pesu, “EU Decision-making on Sanctions Regimes,” 95-96.

<sup>130</sup> Portela et al., “Consensus against all odds,” 684-695.

<sup>131</sup> Helene Sjørusen and Guri Rosén, “Arguing Sanctions. On the EU’s Response to the Crisis in Ukraine,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 55, no. 1 (2017): 32.

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.*, 20; 29-31.



Besides understanding how the EU implements sanctions through normative cohesion, it is also useful to take normative reasons for individual member states into consideration when studying sanctions prolonging. In constructivist thinking on norms, it is assumed that states follow a so-called logic of appropriateness, a concept developed by March and Olsen.<sup>133</sup> States following the logic of appropriateness make decisions according to social norms and conceptions of what is right, instead of a purely economic analysis of what is most beneficial. In other words, according to this logic, a country makes decisions based on what they see as morally correct. The institutionalization of social practices determines what appropriateness is, and develops over time through learning. In following constructivist thinking with regard to sanctions, it is thus important to understand how EU countries come to think of something as morally right.<sup>134</sup>

According to constructivist thought, ideas about what is right come into place through, for example, socialization and acculturation. Socialization comprises the process of certain ideas becoming broadly accepted norms from within a particular region. Once these norms are generally accepted, they strongly influence state behavior.<sup>135</sup> Through acculturation, a state adopts norms that become prevailing in society. As norms and ideas spread, actors become acculturated to them, which then set a change of a state's behavior into motion. It is not a sudden process, but causes behavioral change that is sometimes stronger than coercion or constraining processes. Through acculturation, a country gets a certain idea of what is morally 'right'.<sup>136</sup> Both socialization and acculturation are, according to constructivist thinking, important in constructing a certain idea of what is appropriate.

In the EU, for example, the processes of socialization and acculturation can take place through deep integration. In being part of the EU, countries can behave in ways that are to some extent expected of them, and through acculturation and socialization make these norms commonly accepted and integrated in the domestic sphere. In upholding sanctions regimes, such a norm could explain why EU states feel the urge to comply, even when sanctions mean an economic disadvantage for the country. Normative cohesion of EU member states can thus be one of the reasons for prolonging sanctions.

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<sup>133</sup> James March and Johan Olsen, "The Logic of Appropriateness," in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Science*, ed. Robert Goodin (Oxford University Press, 2011), 478.

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid.*, 478-479.

<sup>135</sup> Beth Simmons, "Treaty Compliance and Violation," *Annual Review of Political Science* 13 (2010): 278-280.

<sup>136</sup> Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, "International Law and State Socialization: Conceptual, Empirical, and Normative Challenges," *Duke Law Journal* 54 (2005): 991-997.

The impact of international norms on domestic policy decisions does not only come from the international level. Institutionalization of norms takes place more forcefully in the domestic sphere. Between countries, this institutionalization varies based on the domestic structure.<sup>137</sup> Cortell and Davis state that domestic political processes influence state behavior based on international norms. They argue that the effects of international norms depend on the salience of the norm in the domestic political discourse as well as domestic political factors.<sup>138</sup> Thus, in accustoming themselves to a certain norm, countries have both an international and a domestic, inward-facing structure at play. In sanctions regimes, this can cause countries to implement sanctions to show domestic audiences that they have done the morally right thing.

When analyzing the attitudes of individual countries in sanctions regimes, it is hence important to bear in mind that different elements affect why countries participate in sanctions. These elements include the general attitude towards sanctions, the specific sanctions package and the international environment. It is also of importance to note that even though countries eventually have one stance towards implementing and upholding sanctions in the EU, there is a plurality of perspectives within the country as well. In explaining other reasons why countries participate in sanctions regimes, normative reasons are good to take in to account. States are expected to have a certain inward-facing normative idea for participating in sanctions regimes, which does not directly target the state suffering from sanctions. In other words, sanctions are not always upheld to just comply with the formulated objective of them.

### **2.2.2 Distinguishing larger and smaller member states**

The theory discussed previously for a large part applies to individual states in general. However, this theory does not work the same in all member states. One of the ways to distinguish different member states in the EU is to classify them according to their size. Scholars often highlight the role of “large” countries such as Germany, stating for example that German leadership is an “assertive hegemon” in the EU’s foreign policy towards Russia.<sup>139</sup> However, problematic in this narrative is that it ignores the influence other EU states have. It is important to take countries that are not “large” into account, since all countries in the EU have to decide on sanctions unanimously.<sup>140</sup>

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<sup>137</sup> Jeffrey Checkel, “Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe,” *International Studies Quarterly* 43 (1999): 87-91; 107-108.

<sup>138</sup> Andrew Cortell and James Davis, “Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A Research Agenda,” *International Studies Review* 2, no. 1 (2000): 66-68; 86-87.

<sup>139</sup> Marco Siddi, “A Contested Hegemon?” 103-107.

<sup>140</sup> Portela et al., “Consensus against all odds,” 686.

It is complicated to determine exactly what a small state is, since “small” depends on the context of a country. Small states can be defined in their relation to bigger powers; in this case, bigger states such as France are the opposite of small states in the EU. However, this kind of definition does not really answer the question of what small states are exactly.<sup>141</sup> A definition of small states can also be based on a combination of the state’s population size and self-representation. The latter understands the self-representation of small states as significantly different from that of larger states, mainly because smaller states represent themselves as being more vulnerable to changes in the security environment.<sup>142</sup> Other definitions of small states have focused on the capabilities of them, meaning that the amount of power of individual states determines their size. However, power does not say much about the challenges and behavior of small states. In addition, it has just as the definition based on self-representation a focus based largely on security policy. A more workable definition focuses on the “spatio-temporal” context of small states, which is less tied to general characteristics.<sup>143</sup> A state can be weak in some relations, but stronger in others. Within the EU, small states are in the spatio-temporal definition those that are unable to change “the basic contours of this context”.<sup>144</sup> In other words, small states in the EU are unable to change the basic contours of the EU drastically. The impact of France leaving the EU would change the institution fundamentally, while the impact of Austria doing the same is significantly less.

### **2.2.3 EU integration theory and small states**

A visible distinction between small countries and larger countries is detectable in EU integration theory. When analyzing the role of small states in EU sanctions regimes, integration theories are helpful to understand how decisions on sanctions are made. This can be done on a supranational level, but could also take place with more influence of national governments. EU integration theory has a large history of thought that, in its core, is based on two grand theories: intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism.<sup>145</sup> In short, neofunctionalism tends to see European integration as containing spillovers of integration, leading to more integration. Intergovernmentalism considers state preferences important in European

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<sup>141</sup> Thorhallsson and Wivel, “Small States in the European Union,” 652-655.

<sup>142</sup> Haugevik and Rieker, “Autonomy or integration?” 213.

<sup>143</sup> Thorhallsson and Wivel, “Small States in the European Union,” 652-655.

<sup>144</sup> Ibid., “Small States in the European Union,” 654.

<sup>145</sup> Dermot Hodson and Uwe Puetter, “The European Union in disequilibrium: new intergovernmentalism, postfunctionalism and integration theory in the post-Maastricht period,” *Journal of European Public Policy* 26, no. 8 (2019): 1153-1154.

cooperation, which is achieved through bargaining.<sup>146</sup> Within these theories, smaller countries are generally expected to lean towards a neofunctionalist approach of European integration, because their power to act alone is smaller than that of bigger countries. Therefore, smaller countries often prefer cooperation on the centralized, European level.<sup>147</sup> After slipping in its attention following the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, European-wide challenges in the 2000s and 2010s renewed the focus on these grand theories of European integration. Nowadays, new versions of intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism are on the table in the academic debate as well, which fit the current situation in a better way. Useful examples of these renewed theories are postfunctionalism and new intergovernmentalism.<sup>148</sup>

Postfunctionalism sees, like neofunctionalism, a potential for some sort of identity formation in Europe.<sup>149</sup> Postfunctionalism, however, puts much more focus on political contestation in EU politics. According to postfunctionalists, this has come to the centre of EU politics. Central is that the former consensus over Europe changed into a “constraining dissensus”.<sup>150</sup> This means that European integration is not anymore a self-evident process of spillovers. This is partly due to the rise of Eurosceptic parties, changes in public opinion and EU legitimacy problems. Political leaders need to “look over their shoulders when negotiating European issues”.<sup>151</sup> Domestic support for European integration is not as united as before. When attempting to evolve European integration, government actors need to look for support more actively.<sup>152</sup> This theory is thus much more skeptical about closer European integration. Postfunctionalism sees the combination of functional EU integration and exclusive identities as potentially disruptive.<sup>153</sup> Centrally organized sanctions can, according to postfunctionalist accounts on EU integration, lead to weaker preferences for integration.<sup>154</sup> This is especially the case in small countries. They are generally not in the position to control their environment as larger countries can, meaning that they prefer cooperating internationally to reduce unpredictability. They might be critical of international cooperation, but leaving an institution

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<sup>146</sup> Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, “Grand theories of European integration in the twenty-first century,” *Journal of European Public Policy* 26, no. 8 (2019): 1114-1118.

<sup>147</sup> For arguments stating this, see for example Blockmans, “The Benelux approach to EU integration and external action,” 1; Haugevik & Rieker, “Autonomy or integration? Small-state responses to a changing European security landscape,” 216.

<sup>148</sup> Hodson and Puetter, “The European Union in disequilibrium,” 1154.

<sup>149</sup> Theresa Kuhn, “Grand theories of European integration revisited: does identity politics shape the course of European integration?” *Journal of European Public Policy* 26, no. 8 (2019): 1214.

<sup>150</sup> Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, “A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining,” *British Journal of Political Science* 39, no. 1 (2009): 5.

<sup>151</sup> Hooghe and Marks, “A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration,” 5.

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*, 1-6.

<sup>153</sup> *Ibid.*, 1116.

<sup>154</sup> Theresa Kuhn, “Grand theories of European integration revisited?” 1224.

such as the EU seems for smaller member states unlikely.<sup>155</sup> In a postfunctionalist approach towards European integration, these countries thus participate in sanctions regimes despite skepticism towards this close integration.

New intergovernmentalism, on the other hand, does not see supranational institutions as the main actors behind European integration. Instead, consensus-seeking national governments are the main driver. New intergovernmentalism sees the post-Maastricht period as a period in which integration has become more intense and highlights tensions between elites and domestic voters. Integration is not prevented by constraining dissensus, but new intergovernmentalism sees a division between the skeptical public and integrationist leaders. In relation to sanctions regimes in the EU, new intergovernmentalism expects member states to actively influence the discussion on sanctions regimes, while leaving less space to the supranational drivers behind these. Both postfunctionalism and new intergovernmentalism see problems in the legitimacy of the EU, but their vision of how integration should take place is different.<sup>156</sup>

When connecting European integration theory to sanctions, thus, much of its relevance is in understanding to what extent individual countries influence the decision-making on sanctions. On the one hand, this can be done on the supranational level, meaning that more power is left to the Council of the EU. This approach fits more in neofunctionalist and postfunctionalist schools of thought. On the other hand, countries can prefer a (new) intergovernmental approach, which puts more focus on the role of individual member states in prolonging sanctions. In this research, both postfunctionalism and new intergovernmentalism are important in explaining how small member states approach EU sanctions regimes. Since small countries generally tend to have less influence in the EU than bigger countries, postfunctionalist aspects are most important in explaining small states behavior in sanctions regimes. In the data, it is thus expected that Dutch and Finnish politicians prefer cooperation on the supranational level. At the same time, this means that domestic disapproval of the effects of this cooperation comes to the foreground, which points towards a constraining dissensus. However, especially since sanctions impact EU countries differently, some politicians are expected to urge their government to proactively discuss sanctions in the EU. In this case, new intergovernmentalism is also helpful in explaining the way in which sanctions are prolonged.

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<sup>155</sup> Haugevik & Rieker, "Autonomy or Integration?" 215-216.

<sup>156</sup> Hodson and Puetter, "The European Union in disequilibrium," 1154-1155.

### 3. Research design and method

To understand how national parliaments reflect on sanctions, this thesis uses Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA) to analyze parliamentary documents from both the Netherlands and Finland. This chapter starts by exploring the versatility of QCA, both in general and for this study. After going deeper into the method, this chapter presents the research design for this study, including the coding frame. While this chapter presents the construction and content of the coding frame, which are part of the results, the fourth chapter presents the results in more detail. The full coding frame, coding sheets of the first and second coding, as well as all units of coding can be found in the appendixes.

#### 3.1 Qualitative Content Analysis in context

As Finnish and Dutch parliamentary debates produce large sets of data, it is necessary to organize this data in a structured manner. For this study, the purpose is to elicit meaning from this data to explain why and in which ways the representative democratic bodies support the upholding of sanctions. In doing so, the goal is to figure out the main structures underlying the opinions of politicians.

QCA has evolved into an effective method to interpret and organize large pieces of data.<sup>157</sup> This allows for making “valid inferences from text”.<sup>158</sup> QCA makes it possible to focus within texts on specific research questions, while systematically taking out those parts that are irrelevant for the research. This is useful for this study, because the goal is to extract and distinguish different opinions from large amounts of text. The roots of the method lay in quantitative content analysis, which originates in the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Where quantitative content analysis focused on frequency counts of certain terms or concepts in texts, qualitative content analysis takes a systematic, interpretative approach to the meaning of material.<sup>159</sup>

In this research, the results of the QCA do not necessarily stand on their own, but do reflect an external social reality that is not always reflected in the material. In other words, describing the meaning of material includes drawing conclusions that do not lay directly in the material.<sup>160</sup> This study does not aim to come up with new theoretical foundations drawn

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<sup>157</sup> Ji Young Cho and Eun-Hee Lee, “Reducing Confusion about Grounded Theory and Qualitative Content Analysis: Similarities and Differences,” *The Qualitative Report* 19, article 64 (2014): 3.

<sup>158</sup> Robert Weber, *Basic Content Analysis*, 9.

<sup>159</sup> Cho and Lee, “Reducing Confusion about Grounded Theory and Qualitative Content Analysis,” 3.

<sup>160</sup> Schreier, *Qualitative Content Analysis in Practice*, 3-5; 169-170.

from the data, as is done in for example Grounded Theory. Instead, the goal is to interpret the large data present in political debates and infer meaning from this by using the theoretical framework presented in chapter 2.<sup>161</sup>

This work uses QCA primarily to conduct a so-called latent analysis. A latent analysis includes that a study interprets data. Latent analyses do not purely describe what data states, but tries to find a deeper meaning as well. A latent analysis is useful to understand qualitative data. This is different from a manifest analysis of data, which stays very close to the text and requires less interpretation. Since parliamentary documents need contextualization and interpretation, this study mainly uses latent analysis.<sup>162</sup> For example, when politicians use figures of speech in their opinions about sanctions, it requires a degree of interpretation. It is not the primary goal of this research to find a deeper meaning beyond what politicians have expressed, for example to unravel long-term domestic strategies of particular political parties. However, the design of this research makes that underlying patterns in sanctions prolonging are discovered, as is the case in a latent analysis. Despite it being a latent analysis, some parts of the material in this study need less interpretation. This in turn means that this study also uses content in a manifest way.<sup>163</sup>

In doing the QCA, this study follows the steps described by Margrit Schreier. This means that the research started by deciding on a research question, followed by the selection of materials to be used in the QCA. This research uses parliamentary documents from 2016, which section 3.2 describes in more detail. The third step a QCA according to Schreier is building a coding frame, after which the material is divided into separate units of coding, which are the single pieces of text to be coded.<sup>164</sup> This coding frame is used in a trial coding, which is tried in a part of the data. This data set needs to be sufficient in its variability and needs to be large enough to try out the entire coding frame.<sup>165</sup> After a trial coding and modification of the coding frame, the main analysis of the units of coding is done. To ensure consistency and increase reliability, parts of the main coding need to double-coded, according to Schreier. To ensure a high standard of consistency and reliability and because this study is conducted by one person, the main coding in this study is done twice with an interval of one

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<sup>161</sup> Cho and Lee, “Reducing Confusion about Grounded Theory and Qualitative Content Analysis,” 16-17.

<sup>162</sup> Mariette Bengtsson, “How to plan and perform a qualitative study using content analysis,” *NursingPlus Open* 2 (2016): 8-10.

<sup>163</sup> Mojtaba Vaismoradi and Sherrill Snelgrove. “Theme in qualitative content analysis and thematic analysis,” *Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung/Forum: Qualitative Social Research* 20, no. 3. (2019). <https://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/3376/4470>.

<sup>164</sup> Schreier, *Qualitative Content Analysis in Practice*, 5-7.

<sup>165</sup> *Ibid.*, 149-151.

month.<sup>166</sup> The last step of a successful QCA is presenting the main findings and putting them into context, to which chapter four is dedicated.<sup>167</sup>

### 3.2 Selection of main material

The data used in this analysis comprises Dutch and Finnish parliamentary documents discussing EU sanctions on Russia. To ensure that the focus is on understanding how EU sanctions are prolonged, the data used comes from 2016. In the case of sanctions on Russia, using documents from 2016 to investigate domestic political influence on EU policy is useful for many reasons. Firstly, this period is a relatively calm moment in the sanctions policy of the EU on Russia. In 2015, for example, EU sanctions on Russia changed still significantly due to the alignment of EU sanctions to the Minsk agreements.<sup>168</sup> While such change is important to investigate as well, it does not reflect the continuation of sanctions as well as a different moment in time. Secondly, 2016 is both in Finland and the Netherlands characterized by relative stability in the political sphere. When researching the political aspect of the continuation of sanctions, it is useful that there are no major policy changes in countries' foreign policy. Both in the Netherlands and Finland there were no changes of government in 2016. In the Netherlands, national elections took place in 2017, with a change of Minister for Foreign Affairs in 2018.<sup>169</sup> In Finland, elections took place in 2015, with a major change in 2017.<sup>170</sup> Thus, at least in the domestic political sphere of both countries, 2016 is a relatively stable moment in time to investigate. Lastly, 2016 is useful to research since all sanctions that were in place in that year were prolonged. This is due to the design of EU sanctions on Russia, which needed to be prolonged every six or twelve months.<sup>171</sup>

In selecting the data, this study used digital archives from both the Finnish and Dutch parliaments.<sup>172</sup> In the Finnish case, the documents used are minutes (*pöytäkirjat*) from plenary sessions in 2016 in the parliament. The documents under study do not include minutes from

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<sup>166</sup> Schreier, *Qualitative Content Analysis in Practice*, 201-202.

<sup>167</sup> Ibid., 5-7.

<sup>168</sup> General Secretariat of the Council, "Timeline – EU restrictive measures in response to the crisis in Ukraine."

<sup>169</sup> "Kabinet-Rutte III (2017-2021)," Rijksoverheid, accessed October 1, 2021, <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/regering/over-de-regering/kabinetten-sinds-1945/kabinet-rutte-iii>.

<sup>170</sup> "Hallituksen tiedot ja kokoonpano. 74. Sipilä | 29.5.2015 - 6.6.2019," Valtioneuvosto, accessed October 1, 2021, <https://valtioneuvosto.fi/tietoa/historiaa/hallitukset-ja-ministerit/raportti/-/r/m1/74>.

<sup>171</sup> Edward Hunter Christie, "The Design and Impact of Western Economic Sanctions against Russia," *RUSI Journal* 161, no. 3 (2016): 52.

<sup>172</sup> In the Finnish case, this concerns the digital archive on <http://www.eduskunta.fi/>. From this archive, documents under *Valtiopäiväasiat ja -asiakirjat*, the archive of Documents of Public Affairs, are used. The Dutch documents originate from the digital archive on <http://www.officielebekendmakingen.nl/>. In this archive, the focus is on documents from the House of Representatives (*Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal*)



the parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs (*Ulkoasiainvaliokunta*), because this committee is rather responsible for approving documents instead of being involved in a public debate on foreign affairs. The Dutch documents include minutes (*handelingen*) from both plenary sessions in the parliament as well as debates in smaller committees (*kamerstukken*) in 2016, in which most parliamentary debates in the Dutch political system take place.<sup>173</sup>

As stated, there is no fixed procedure for sanctions prolonging and discussion within individual member states. In the EU, discussions in the Council of the EU determine whether sanctions are prolonged, tightened or lifted. In the domestic sphere, it is up to each member state to decide how they discuss sanctions.<sup>174</sup> Since there is no fixed procedure, this study used key words to capture all debates addressing sanctions in 2016. First, documents were filtered by using the key words “sanctions”, “Russia”, “Ukraine”, “Putin”, “Crimea” and combinations of these words. To make sure that the debates concern sanctions effects and policies, every document under study includes the word sanctions at least once.<sup>175</sup> This approach resulted in approximately 200 Dutch documents, while approximately 250 documents on the Finnish side came out of the first selection. This first selection still included briefings by the government, to ensure that necessary context for debates is taken into account. Since the goal of this study is to find the political factors determining sanctions continuation, the actual QCA does not include letters and policy documents. The focus is instead on parliamentary sessions, in which different opinions come to the foreground. Therefore, the next step of data selection included taking out all parliamentary letters, formal questions, briefing papers and other policy documents. This resulted in 23 different Finnish debates, while 27 debates reached the final selection of documents to be studied on the Dutch side. Eventually, as will be described in more detail in section 3.3, the final units of analysis included 13 Dutch and 14 Finnish parliamentary debates (see for a full overview of data selection table 2 on page 40).

To avoid creating bias, the next step of the selection of relevant data is using a small coding frame including the categories *relevant* and *irrelevant*, as proposed by Schreier.<sup>176</sup> The relevant material to the research question includes discussions directly related to sanctions in a broad sense. Therefore, whenever sanctions were under discussion, all related data is in this

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<sup>173</sup> “Veelgestelde vragen,” Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, accessed August 30, 2021, [https://www.tweedekamer.nl/zo\\_werkt\\_de\\_kamer/veel\\_gestelde\\_vragen](https://www.tweedekamer.nl/zo_werkt_de_kamer/veel_gestelde_vragen).

<sup>174</sup> General Secretariat of the Council, “Timeline – EU restrictive measures in response to the crisis in Ukraine.”

<sup>175</sup> The key words used in Finnish are *Venäjä, pakotteet, sanktiot, Ukraina, Putin, Krim*, and *Donbass*. The search included noun conjugations. The key words used in Dutch are *Rusland, sancties, Oekraïne, Poetin, Krim*, and *Donbas(s)*.

<sup>176</sup> Schreier, *Qualitative Content Analysis in Practice*, 80-83.

step classified as *relevant*. This includes data that covers sanctions on other countries than Russia, to make sure that any references to the sanctions on Russia are included. Since most debates do not have the discussion of EU sanctions as main subject, data classified as *irrelevant* includes all data unrelated to sanctions. *Irrelevant* data at this stage includes for example discussions about Sudan and the development of nuclear power plants. This irrelevant data usually appeared as part of a long document including different topics, of which sanctions were only one part of the discussion. Some key words, such as “Russia”, resulted in documents not related to sanctions. Separating irrelevant material from relevant data, 20 Dutch and 16 Finnish parliamentary documents remained. Next, according to Schreier, a successful QCA moves to the construction of a coding frame. The exact selection of data useful for the QCA follows on the construction of the coding frame, which is described in the next section.<sup>177</sup>

### 3.3 Constructing the coding frame and units of coding

In QCA, the coding frame “functions as a system that will transform the data into meaningful, manageable, specific, and smaller units of information (also known as codes or categories), and facilitate the ongoing interpretative sense-making process.”<sup>178</sup> In other words, the coding frame helps in making large amounts of data graspable for analysis. Coding frames can be structured in concept-driven and data-driven ways. The QCA in this research combines both methods. This means that the categories in the coding frame reflect on the one hand theory on sanctions implementation and upholding. On the other hand, categories also flow to an important extent out of the data used.<sup>179</sup> Since the research questions concern many aspects of sanctions and European integration, the coding frame is of high complexity. A coding frame of high complexity consists of several dimensions with multiple hierarchical categories connecting to them. The dimensions cover the main aspects deriving from the data relevant for this research. Dimensions are unidimensional, meaning that they only cover one aspect of the material. Within dimensions, different categories make it possible to grasp different opinions of politicians. In most parts of the coding frame, these categories break apart into even smaller categories.<sup>180</sup>

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<sup>177</sup> Schreier, *Qualitative Content Analysis in Practice*, 84.

<sup>178</sup> Ali Fuad Selvi, “Qualitative Content Analysis,” in *The Routledge Handbook of Research Methods in Applied Linguistics*, eds. Jim McKinley and Heath Rose (Routledge 2019): 444.

<sup>179</sup> Schreier, *Qualitative Content Analysis in Practice*, 89-90.

<sup>180</sup> *Ibid.*, 67-72.

As stated earlier, the main goal of this QCA is to get a grasp of how politicians look towards sanctions implementation, continuation, changing circumstances as well as EU integration. In breaking down the material, the coding frame consists of five main dimensions (see table 1). The first dimension concerns what stance politicians have towards continuing the sanctions in place, without taking reasons for doing so into account. This dimension gives an idea of the general opinion of politicians towards the EU sanctions on Russia. Dimensions 2 and 3 consider reasons for sanctions regimes. Dimension 2 concentrates on reasons to lift the sanctions in place, while the third dimension comprises reasons for implementing new sanctions or for keeping the current sanctions in place. The fourth dimension focuses on the way politicians want to deal with the current sanctions in place, and whether they look for solutions on the national or international level. The last dimension looks at the role politicians want their government to play when sanctions are under discussion on the EU level.

While all dimensions are to some extent related, they cover different aspects of the research. Three dimensions (1, 2 and 3) deal with sanctions policy itself. These dimensions cover a general stance towards sanctions and on what ground they make certain decisions about sanctions policies. Two dimensions (4 and 5) cover the tension between different actors in dealing with sanctions. These dimensions look at the interplay between national and international levels, and the way politicians look towards the EU when it comes to sanctions.

<b>Dimension</b>	<b>Aspect of the research</b>
1. Sanctions continuation	Sanctions logic
2. Reasons for implementing new or upholding existing sanctions	Sanctions logic
3. Reasons for lifting sanctions	Sanctions logic
4. Role in EU cooperation	Scale & EU integration
5. Dealing with existing sanctions	Scale & EU integration

*Table 1. The five dimensions and their function in this QCA*

The five dimensions in table 1 cover a wide range of topics related to sanctions relevant to the main goals of this study. Important to note is that the research does not focus on whether the general tool of sanctions is good or bad. In other words, the QCA does not aim to cover opinions of politicians wanting to change the general sanctions tool of the EU, which in the documents under study is not under discussion. In addition, the dimensions do not cover other measures than sanctions. Statements arguing for increasing the budget for an army to stop a perceived threat, for example, are not included in the coding frame.

The concept-driven categories in this study derive from sanctions theory and EU integration theory presented in chapter 2. The fifth dimension, for example, derives directly from EU integration theory. Different EU integration theories represent different behavior of member-states in EU cooperation. Concept-driven categories also come to the foreground in the second and third dimension, which cover reasons to lift, prolong or increase sanctions. These dimensions include categories related to for example the logic of interdependence and primary, secondary and tertiary objectives that are discussed in chapter 2. In the type of sanctions that parliamentarians want to uphold or implement, the theory concerning coercing, constraining and signaling is included.

Besides concept-driven categories, the coding frame includes data-driven categories generated through subsumption. This inductive approach is useful to construct categories once a main dimension is set up. Subsumption starts by reading closely through text and encountering relevant concepts. These concepts can be subsumed under either an existing category or a new subcategory. This process continues until no new concepts appear.<sup>181</sup> Subsumption is an effective way to cover most relevant material in the data and it ensures that two important features of a good coding frame are covered. It makes that the coding frame complies with exhaustiveness, which is the case when all material can be assigned to a code. In addition, subsumption also is helpful in creating saturation, which is reached when each subcategory is used at least once in the main coding.<sup>182</sup>

To distinguish different countries in the analysis of the QCA, units of coding receive a label belonging to either the Netherlands or Finland. In addition, the status of the parliamentarian being part of governmental parties or opposition parties is pointed out. While it is not within the scope of this study to analyze all different opinions of each political party, it is useful to investigate whether there is a significant difference between opposition and the government to understand the strategy of a country within the wider international context. Understanding different opinions of opposition parties can also bring certain opinions that are present in society to the foreground, without the official policy of the country being that way.

Once a preliminary coding frame was constructed, the final steps in selecting the data to be coded are taken by deciding on the so-called units of analysis, the units of coding and the context units. Units of analysis comprise each case on which QCA is performed, which in

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<sup>181</sup> Angela Hackstadt, "Leadership, Development, and Expertise: A Qualitative Content Analysis of Scholarly Communication Librarian Position Announcements," *Journal of Librarianship and Scholarly Communication* 8 (2020): 4-5.

<sup>182</sup> Schreier, *Qualitative Content Analysis in Practice*, 76-77.

this study are the different political debates. The amount of units of analysis in this study is 27, of which 13 come from Dutch debates while 14 are in Finnish. After selecting relevant data in a broad sense from these large units of analysis, as described in section 3.2, the remaining data was divided by using segmentation. Through segmentation, it is possible to divide larger data into smaller units. These smaller units are the units of coding, which can be coded with help of the coding frame.<sup>183</sup>

In segmentation, both formal and thematic criteria are used. Formal criteria comprise formal rules that state how big a unit can be. In this QCA, the most important formal criterion is that units of coding only comprise statements of one politician. Thus, when the chair gives speaking time to someone new, the unit of coding has ended. The main way this study distinguishes relevant material, however, comes through thematic criteria. These criteria make that units of coding only comprise one part of the material and do not cover several subcategories at the same time. The thematic criteria in this study mainly flow out of the coding frame. In addition, units of coding are distinguished when a politician mentions different arguments in one speech or interruption.<sup>184</sup> For example, when a politician first criticizes its own government for sanctions-related speech and thereafter stresses that sanctions cannot be lifted when Ukraine and Russia set steps forward, two different units of coding are constructed.<sup>185</sup>

Steps in data selection	Remaining data
1. Preliminary selection of units of analysis (parliamentary documents) by using key words	Approximately 200 Dutch and 250 Finnish documents
2. Taking out all documents that are not parliamentary sessions (i.e. letters, formal questions, briefing papers)	27 Dutch and 23 Finnish parliamentary sessions (preliminary units of analysis)
3. Selection of relevant material in a broad sense using a simple <i>relevant – irrelevant</i> coding frame	20 Dutch and 16 Finnish parliamentary sessions (preliminary units of analysis)
4. Construction of preliminary coding frame based on theory and data; deciding on the units of coding using segmentation, followed by a trial coding	170-200 units of coding per country
5. Revision of the coding frame followed by main coding, taking out the units of coding considered irrelevant	175 Dutch and 162 Finnish units of coding from 13 Dutch and 14 Finnish parliamentary sessions (units of analysis)

Table 2. Overview of data selection from raw data to final units of analysis and units of coding.

For the parliamentary documents of the Netherlands and Finland, using formal and thematic criteria resulted in 170-200 units of coding per country. Context units accompany these units of coding. A context unit is “that portion of the surrounding material (...) to

<sup>183</sup> Schreier, *Qualitative Content Analysis in Practice*, 126-133.

<sup>184</sup> Ibid., 134-138.

<sup>185</sup> This example is taken from a speech of Eero Heinäluoma in Eduskunta, *Pöytäkirja PTK 27*, March 18, 2016: 12-13, [https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/Documents/PTK\\_27+2016.pdf](https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/Documents/PTK_27+2016.pdf).

understand the meaning of a given unit of coding”.<sup>186</sup> Thus, context units are necessary to be able to code the units of coding correctly. In the case of this study, context units mainly comprise the full paragraph from speeches of politicians. In some cases, it includes previous politicians’ speeches, to understand what the debate is focusing on.<sup>187</sup>

Once a preliminary coding frame is constructed and units of coding are selected, the next step in a successful QCA is the pilot phase, which is the first step of the actual data analysis. The core of the pilot phase is a trial coding, which is complemented by a consistency check and an adjustment of the coding frame. This phase is important for discovering shortcomings in the coding frame as well as finding out additional aspects of meaning in the data.<sup>188</sup> The pilot phase is important to deal with any discrepancies or difficulties in the coding frame, so that it can still be modified for the main analysis process.<sup>189</sup> The pilot phase is thus useful in increasing the reliability of the research. In addition, it decreases the chance for possible shortcomings to occur in later stages.

In selecting material for the trial coding, the first and most important concern is variability. The selection of data for the trial coding must be representative for the material. In this study, for example, both data from the Netherlands and Finland needed to be included in the trial coding. In addition, data from different debates was selected. The diversity in units of analysis was decided upon before starting the trial coding. Secondly, it is important to try out the entire coding frame. If one dimension is completely overlooked, for example, it means the trial coding is not sufficient. The trial coding in this study continued until both concerns were fulfilled. As a result, this means that the trial coding included 61 units of coding from Dutch parliamentary documents, while from the Finnish side 69 units of coding were used. Thus, approximately 39% of the total units of coding were included in the trial coding, making it a significant amount to be able to get a grasp of the reliability of the coding frame.<sup>190</sup>

When reviewing a coding frame, reliability and validity are two of the most common concepts. While reliability is a contested concept, “an instrument is called reliable to the extent that it yields data that is free of error”.<sup>191</sup> Even though it is complicated to assess whether qualitative research is completely reliable because of meaning being context-dependent, it is still important to assess the reliability of coding frames as much as possible.

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<sup>186</sup> Schreier, *Qualitative Content Analysis in Practice*, 133.

<sup>187</sup> Ibid., 133-134.

<sup>188</sup> Ibid., 146-147.

<sup>189</sup> Selvi, “Qualitative Content Analysis,” 446-447.

<sup>190</sup> Schreier, *Qualitative Content Analysis in Practice*, 148-152.

<sup>191</sup> Ibid., 167.

The most important aspect of reliability in QCA is consistency. In assessing consistency, this study uses stability: comparisons of the coding frame across points in time. This means in practice that both the trial coding and main coding were done twice with an interval of a month, after which both coding sessions were compared. This consistency check can cause changes to the coding frame in the pilot phase, to make distinctions between categories clearer. When comparing both sessions during the main coding, it is needed to take a closer look at units of coding that are coded differently, which then are labeled with the most suitable codes.<sup>192</sup>

Related to reliability is the concept of validity. According to Schreier, “an instrument is considered valid to the extent that it captures what it sets out to capture”.<sup>193</sup> For a coding frame used for QCA, this means that the extent of validity depends on whether the categories adequately represent the concepts that are being studied. In this study, this means that the dimensions and categories of the coding frame need to reflect both the theory and data related to sanctions, power and European integration.<sup>194</sup> In assessing validity, the most important criteria are face and content validity. Face validity is “the extent to which a measure (...) seems to tap the desired concept.”<sup>195</sup> In other words, face validity concerns whether the coding frame actually relates to what is under study. Signs of low face validity are, for example, high coding frequencies for residual categories (i.e. the categories “other”) or extremely high coding frequencies for one subcategory, when this is not reflected in the material itself.<sup>196</sup> In the pilot phase of this study, this has not been the case. In assessing validity of QCA, content validity is also important. Content validity is “the extent to which the measure reflects the full domain of the concept being measured”.<sup>197</sup> In other words, content validity in QCA means that the theoretical concepts used are reflected in the coding frame. In this study, content validity is most visible in the different dimensions of the coding frame, which come forth out of the theory.

The construction of a well-grounded QCA is, as this section described, a complicated process. In this study, the coding frame is based on both concept-driven and data-driven methods, through which five different dimensions including subcategories are constructed. The coding in this study includes a division of the Netherlands and Finland as well as a

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<sup>192</sup> Schreier, *Qualitative Content Analysis in Practice*, 166-175.

<sup>193</sup> Ibid., 175.

<sup>194</sup> Ibid., 175-176.

<sup>195</sup> Kimberly Neuendorf, *The Content Analysis Guidebook* (SAGE Publications, 2017), 180.

<sup>196</sup> Schreier, *Qualitative Content Analysis in Practice*, 186-188.

<sup>197</sup> Neuendorf, *The Content Analysis Guidebook*, 183.

distinction between politicians of government parties and those in the opposition. This last distinction is mainly meant to be able to separate clear discrepancies between the opposition and government, without considering them as clear and separate entities. This is undesirable because it generalizes all political parties into one being, and is undesirable because the opposition parties constitute only about one third of all units of coding. Through segmentation, data was divided into units of coding, of which a part was used in the pilot phase to try out the coding frame. In assessing the coding frame, reliability and validity are important concepts this study takes into account. After fulfilling all prerequisites to start with the main coding, the next section concerns the steps used in finalizing the main coding frame and conducting the actual coding.

### 3.4 Final coding frame and main coding

After finishing the pilot phase, it is common that a coding frame needs adjustment in several regards, to ensure its reliability and validity. In this study, the main dimensions stayed the same after completing the pilot phase. The order, structure and amount of subcategories, however, underwent changes. The most important change in the structure of subcategories concerned the third dimension, which is visible in table 3. The coding frame initially did not separate reasons for stricter sanctions and upholding existing sanctions. However, the final coding frame divides these as two subcategories because of clear differences during the trial coding in reasons for upholding sanctions as compared to stricter sanctions. By separating both subcategories, it is possible to interpret these differences.

<b>Trial coding frame</b>	<b>Main coding frame</b>
3. Reasons for new or upholding sanctions a. Strategic culture b. Minsk agreement c. New reasons i. Syria ii. Other d. Existing problems i. MH17/Ukraine ii. Other e. Ineffectiveness f. Escalation prevention (signaling) Etc.	3. Reasons for new or upholding sanctions a. Stricter sanctions i. New reasons 1. Syria 2. MH17 ii. Ineffectiveness iii. Security concerns iv. Escalation prevention (signaling) a. Upholding sanctions i. Strategic culture ii. Minsk agreement Etc.

*Table 3. Differences between the trial coding frame and main coding frame. In the main coding frame, stricter sanctions and upholding existing sanctions are divided into two categories. In addition, to ensure being closer to the data, some categories were renamed and classified differently. To achieve saturation, some categories were left out of the main coding frame (such as 3.c.ii, while 3.a only exists in the main coding frame under “upholding sanctions”).*



In revising the coding frame, the amount of subcategories decreased to ensure saturation. Some categories coming out of sanctions theory were not detectable in the data. This concerns categories that were constructed in a concept-driven way. For example, in the trial coding frame, the first dimension “sanctions continuation” included subcategories distinguishing types of stricter sanctions. These subcategories were based on Giumelli’s division of coercing, constraining and signaling sanctions.<sup>198</sup> However, in the expressions of politicians, calling for stricter sanctions often excluded a specific type classifiable in these three categories. Therefore, the subcategory concerning stricter sanctions in dimension 1 was brought back to a simpler distinction between “specific” (1.a.i) and “general/unclear” (1.a.ii) sanctions. It is still important to include this distinction, to be able to analyze whether politicians have specific proposals for types of sanctions to come into place.

In the QCA, dimension one covers the opinions of politicians on whether they want sanctions to become stricter, continue, or be lifted. This dimension is the most clear-cut dimension and covers the general opinion on what to do with the current sanctions in place. The results in this dimension are mainly useful in showing and analyzing the different national debates regarding sanctions. When many politicians in one country argue for stricter sanctions, for example, this has a reflection on the reasons politicians give for having stricter sanctions, which is covered in the fifth dimension. The logic of interdependence, as used by Silva II and Selden, is also covered in the first dimension. Since Finland and the Netherlands have different relations with Russia, this logic presumably causes differences in the ways countries want to go ahead with sanctions.<sup>199</sup>

# 1. Sanctions continuation

- a. Stricter
  - i. Specific
  - ii. General/unclear
- b. Continuation
  - i. Explicitly in favor
  - ii. Implicitly in favor
- c. Lifting
- d. Indifferent / unclear
- e. Other

*Dimension 1. Sanctions continuation. This dimension covers whether parliamentarians want sanctions on Russia to continue as before, or whether they would like them to be different.*

<sup>198</sup> Giumelli, *Coercing, constraining and signalling*, 1-3.

<sup>199</sup> Silva II & Selden, “Economic interdependence and economic sanctions,” 229-230.

The second and third dimensions of the coding frame cover different reasons politicians raise for sanctions regimes. Whereas the second dimension covers reasons to lift sanctions, the third dimension concerns reasons for implementing new or prolonging the current sanctions. These dimensions make it possible to look at the reasoning of politicians behind sanctions regimes. By separating these reasons, it is possible to analyze what roles politicians play in sanctions regimes and what kinds of power are exercised in sanctions prolonging. As very few politicians in this study call for an immediate lifting of sanctions, the second dimension includes reasons that politicians give for coming closer to lifting the sanctions. This dimension makes it possible to determine what objectives politicians have regarding sanctions, and whether they have different opinions in the lifting of sanctions. These differences are important to take into account, because they have certain influence on the way the countries behave in the international sphere.

## **2. Reasons for (coming closer to) lifting the sanctions**

- a. Economic reasons
- b. United EU
- c. Minsk agreement
  - i. Full implementation
  - ii. Partial implementation
- d. General impact of current sanctions
- e. Ineffectiveness
- f. Other

*Dimension 2. Reasons for (coming closer to) lifting the sanctions. This dimension covers all reasons that politicians give for lifting the sanctions. Statements coded in this dimension do not necessarily reflect that the politician wants to lift the sanctions right away, as speeches stating conditional reasons to lift sanctions are included.*

The third dimension concerns reasons to prolong or implement new sanctions regimes. This dimension is separated into two main subcategories, of which the first concerns reasons for implementing stricter sanctions. The different categories in implementing stricter sanctions are mainly constructed through segmentation, but each connect to different objectives politicians want to reach when implementing sanctions. For example, the subcategories concern new reasons for implementing sanctions, which are constraining sanctions. It also includes reasons stating that new sanctions need to prevent future escalations, which are signaling sanctions.

The second main subcategory concerns reasons to uphold existing sanctions. When analyzing units of codes falling under this subcategory, it is important to note that there is not one way in which politicians want current sanctions to continue. This subcategory includes statements that are against implementing stricter sanctions, but does include opinions against

milder sanctions as well. It also concerns politicians who are not necessarily against a stricter or milder version of sanctions, but actively support the current sanctions in place. The different subcategories thus concern a wide range of reasons for upholding the current sanctions regimes, ranging from keeping unity within the EU to the strategic culture of a country.

### **3. Reasons for implementing new or upholding the existing sanctions**

- a. Stricter sanctions
  - i. New reasons
    - 1. Syria
    - 2. MH17
  - ii. Ineffectiveness of current sanctions
  - iii. Security concerns
  - iv. Prevention of future escalations (signaling)
- b. Upholding existing sanctions
  - i. Strategic culture
  - ii. Minsk agreement
  - iii. Continued involvement
    - 1. Ukraine, Crimea
    - 2. MH17
    - 3. Other / unclear
  - iv. Security concerns
    - 1. Domestic / EU concerns
    - 2. Other regions
  - v. Effectivity of current sanctions
    - 1. Counterproductive/ineffective
    - 2. Other
  - vi. United EU
  - vii. Other

*Dimension 3. Reasons for implementing new or upholding sanctions. This dimension covers all statements that shows parliamentarians wanting to either make the current sanctions stricter or to keep the current sanctions in place.*

The fourth dimension covers the way politicians see that current sanctions should be dealt with. It does not cover whether politicians consider the current sanctions to be good or bad, but instead concentrates on the solutions they see to the current sanctions in place. The goal of this dimension is to show on what level Finland and the Netherlands want to deal with the sanctions, which in essence means that it looks to see whether countries deal with sanctions on a national or international level. Within these different levels, this dimension shows what means of dealing with sanctions politicians propose. Separating the national and international level shows how individual countries behave within EU sanctions regimes that are already in place. It also makes it possible to distinguish what politicians see as methods to lighten the impact of sanctions. The focus on scale and dealing with the sanctions makes it possible to analyze the role of different countries in European integration processes. If a

country, for example, is looking for European solutions to overcome the sanctions, it points towards a neofunctionalist approach of European integration, since it sees sanctions as something to deal with on an international level.<sup>200</sup> Comparing Finland and the Netherlands through this lens makes it possible to see whether there are clear differences between these two relatively small EU countries in dealing with sanctions, or whether both countries act despite their different relationship with Russia relatively the same. While the difference in main subcategories is made through a concept-driven method of constructing the coding frame, the smallest subcategories in this second dimension flow out of the data.

#### **4. Scale/dealing with the sanctions**

- a. National
  - i. Support for domestic actors
  - ii. Dialogue & diplomacy
  - iii. Western compliance
  - iv. Other
- b. International
  - i. EU
    - 1. Dialogue & diplomacy
    - 2. Burden distribution
    - 3. Western compliance
    - 4. Other
  - ii. Other / unclear
    - 1. Dialogue & diplomacy
    - 2. International agreements
    - 3. Other / unclear
- c. Both national and international / unclear

*Dimension 4. Scale / dealing with the sanctions. This dimension covers the level (national or international) on which parliamentarians want to deal with the current EU sanctions in place, and what steps they want to take while the current sanctions regimes are in place.*

Lastly, the fifth dimension of this QCA concerns the opinions of politicians on what role their country should play when sanctions are under discussion on the EU level. In other words, this dimension covers the behavior that politicians want their country to play in the international environment. This dimension relates closely to theory around EU integration and the behavior of small states within the EU. The dimension is divided into two main subcategories. The first subcategory concerns politicians wanting their country to behave in an assertive, intergovernmental way of sanctions. Within this subcategory, there is a division between the type of sanctions that politicians want to discuss on a central level. The second subcategory concerns wishes of politicians for reticent behavior of their country in EU discussions, which means that the government should stay on the background when sanctions

<sup>200</sup> Hooghe and Marks, "Grand theories of European integration in the twenty-first century," 1114-1115.

are under discussion. This subcategory comes forth out of supranational thought on European integration. The third dimension makes it possible to focus on the plurality of perspectives on wishes regarding sanctions, and whether smaller countries do see ways to change the general course of the EU. Thus, it shows if politicians in Finland and the Netherlands see ways of reaching agreement through bargaining, which is typical of the intergovernmental school of thought of European integration.<sup>201</sup> It also unravels in what ways politicians see sanctions discussions more as a neofunctionalist matter, which entails a strong preference. Different than the second dimension of the coding frame, this dimension specifically focuses on preferences in EU discussions instead of differentiating between the national and international level.

## **5. Role in EU cooperation**

- a. assertive (intergovernmental)
  - i. block discussions on sanctions
  - ii. support discussions on sanctions
    - 1. stricter sanctions
    - 2. keeping current sanctions
    - 3. softer sanctions
    - 4. other objectives
- b. reticent (supranational)
  - i. United EU
  - ii. Other

*Dimension 5. Role in EU cooperation. This dimension covers what role politicians want their representatives to play when sanctions are under discussion in the EU. It thus covers the wishes for the behavior of a country within the EU.*

In short, the coding frame in this study concerns five main dimensions, which each cover an important aspect of the main goals of this study. Dimensions one, four and five lay the groundwork for analyzing the opinions of politicians on the operation of sanctions and the underlying goals that politicians have in using sanctions regimes. The second dimension concerns how politicians want to deal with the sanctions in place and makes it possible to analyze the positioning of Finland and the Netherlands in the operation of sanctions. The third dimension specifically focuses on the role countries want to play within the EU, which gives an insight into how countries look at European integration. In the next chapter, this study looks at the results of the QCA and analyzes how these results reflect the literature presented in chapter 2.

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<sup>201</sup> Hooghe & Marks, “Grand theories of European integration in the twenty-first century,” 1115.

## 4. Results and analysis of the QCA

After a thorough selection of data, the construction of a coding frame, a pilot phase and the actual QCA, this chapter presents the results of the QCA following Schreier's steps for conducting a successful QCA. The results in this chapter are presented in qualitative style by using continuous text. It describes cases illustrative for the categories in the coding frame, as well as relevant cases for the analysis. Since the dimensions and categories came into place by both concept-driven and data-driven methods, the results presented here combine both the coding frame and the units of analysis as a result. In other words, the coding frame itself is to some extent part of the result, along with the separate cases in the QCA. Even though this study is not a quantitative study, it does take the frequency of units of coding per category into account in analyzing the results. This is useful to understand whether certain opinions are widely supported, or whether only one party supports them.<sup>202</sup> This chapter presents the results through the frame of the five different dimensions in this study, by distinguishing simultaneously how those dimensions are reflected in the results in Finland and in the Netherlands. The full coding results of the first and second coding, along with the final code, are in appendix 2. All units of coding combined with the final codes are attached in appendix 3, coded in ATLAS.ti 9.

### 4.1 Dimension 1. Sanctions continuation

The first and most simple dimension, concerning sanctions continuation, brings a general idea of the opinions on sanctions in the given countries. In both the Netherlands and Finland, the first dimension is widely coded. This means that politicians do express their opinions on what they would like to happen with the sanctions that are in place. In assessing the continuation of sanctions, the dimension also explores if politicians explicitly or implicitly support this idea.

Most importantly, the codes in this dimension show that both countries lean strongly towards a continuation of the sanctions that are in place. Many politicians from both countries from both the government and opposition express that they “do not see any reason to lift the EU sanctions imposed”<sup>203</sup>. Others express that the sanctions in place “are their own part, and

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<sup>202</sup> Schreier, *Qualitative Content Analysis in Practice*, 219-222.

<sup>203</sup> Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, “Europese top,” *Handeling 2016-2017*, no. 11, item 3, October 12, 2016 (published November 3, 2016): 9, <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20162017-11-3.html>.

they should not be touched”.<sup>204</sup> Besides expressing it this clearly, politicians also state in implicit ways that sanctions should continue as they are:

I believe that Russia's actions must not be accepted, and, as I said in my own speech earlier, I am not in favor of speeches – even we in this House – that talk for example about EU sanctions and that they should be abandoned.<sup>205</sup>

Besides the wide number of politicians wanting to continue the sanctions as they are, several politicians in the Netherlands are calling for sanctions to become stricter, whereas not a single Finnish politician called for these in the documents under study. Most remarkable is that both government and opposition parties in the Netherlands call for stricter sanctions, both actively and in retrospect. Opposition parties are the sharpest in their opinions on stricter sanctions, by proposing motions for stricter sanctions in the debates. In the Dutch parliamentary system, members of parliament submit motions to express an opinion on government policy to do or not do something, or to make a general statement about matters under discussion. Motions are accepted or denied by voting.<sup>206</sup> In these motions, parliamentarians call “on the government to advocate for additional sanctions on Russia (...) in the European Council”.<sup>207</sup> None of these motions ever received a majority of the votes, however. In addition to opinions expressing stricter general sanctions, some call for specific sanctions. These concern economic, diplomatic and individual measures, as well as measures to prevent Russian financial support to Dutch political parties.

In the Finnish documents under study, a few units of coding show a desire to lift the sanctions in place. Remarkable is that these calls come from parties involved in the government. However, no politician directly calls for Finland to immediately lift all the sanctions. Instead, they state that sanctions should be lifted gradually; “by negotiating these sanctions on Russia with the EU, and bilaterally with Russia, we can gradually lift them.”<sup>208</sup>

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<sup>204</sup> Eduskunta, *Pöytäkirja PTK 56*, May 20, 2016: 6, [https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/Documents/PTK\\_56+2016.pdf](https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/Documents/PTK_56+2016.pdf).

<sup>205</sup> Eduskunta, *Pöytäkirja PTK 27*, March 18, 2016: 12, [https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/Documents/PTK\\_27+2016.pdf](https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/Documents/PTK_27+2016.pdf).

<sup>206</sup> “Kamerstukken, Moties,” Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, accessed August 30, 2021, <https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/moties>.

<sup>207</sup> Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, “Europese top,” *Handeling 2016-2017*, no. 11, item 3, October 12, 2016 (published November 3, 2016): 26, <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20162017-11-3.html>.

<sup>208</sup> Eduskunta, *Pöytäkirja PTK 74*, June 22, 2016: 40, [https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/Documents/PTK\\_74+2016.pdf](https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/Documents/PTK_74+2016.pdf).

As regards to the general opinions on sanctions continuation, the documents show that politicians from different parties express that they directly or indirectly support the sanctions in place. In the Netherlands, some call for stricter sanctions, while some voices in Finland call for sanctions to be lifted.

#### 4.2 Dimension 2. Reasons for (coming closer to) lifting the sanctions

The second and third dimensions of the QCA go deeper into the reasons behind participation in sanctions regimes. In the second dimension, reasons to lift sanctions are under discussion. As became clear in the first dimension, almost no politicians are directly in favor of lifting all sanctions. However, some express a conditional wish for lifting the sanctions. This dimension takes all opinions leaning towards lifting sanctions into consideration.

In general, the QCA shows that Finnish politicians show a stronger desire for looking towards lifting the sanctions than their Dutch counterparts do. Reasons for Finnish politicians to address lifting the sanctions vary. An important reason for politicians to state intentions to work towards lifting the sanctions are economic reasons, a reason not mentioned by Dutch politicians. Many Finnish politicians, however, do not want to lift sanctions directly. Instead, they mention that Finland should be ready once sanctions can be lifted: “It is important (...) to wait for the day when the Russian food market opens up”.<sup>209</sup> Some opposition politicians criticize Finland for agreeing on EU sanctions too quickly due to the economic impact, by criticizing Finland for being “the first model student to accept measures that affect the Finnish food industry the hardest”.<sup>210</sup> One politician, from the Finns Party (*Perussuomalaiset*), argues for Finland leaving the EU. By doing so, sanctions could be lifted and the economic impact would be reduced:

Leaving the EU would give back national decision-making power to agriculture as well. Trade with Russia is really important for agriculture, and Finland is a big victim because of the current sanctions.<sup>211</sup>

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<sup>209</sup> Eduskunta, *Pöytäkirja PTK 138*, December 20, 2016: 58, [https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/Documents/PTK\\_138+2016.pdf](https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/Documents/PTK_138+2016.pdf).

<sup>210</sup> Eduskunta, *Pöytäkirja PTK 3*, February 5, 2016: 8, [https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/Documents/PTK\\_3+2016.pdf](https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/Documents/PTK_3+2016.pdf).

<sup>211</sup> Eduskunta, *Pöytäkirja PTK 68*, June 14, 2016: 50, [https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/Documents/PTK\\_68+2016.pdf](https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/Documents/PTK_68+2016.pdf).



This statement fits the general line of the Finns Party, which has been described as “a constant promoter of organizational Euroscepticism”, which uses Euroscepticism as “a defining image of the party”. It is nonetheless interesting that a government party expresses such explicit language for leaving the EU, instead of phrasing it in different ways.<sup>212</sup>

Besides mentioning the economic impact as important for eventually lifting the sanctions, Finnish politicians also stress the importance of implementing the Minsk agreement. Some find it necessary to implement the complete agreement, by stating that “the uncompromising implementation of the Minsk agreement is the key to lifting sanctions”.<sup>213</sup> Some are less clear in whether the full agreement needs to be implemented before discussions about lifting the sanctions can start; according to these politicians, there needs to be “substantial progress”.<sup>214</sup>

Apart from the economic impact and the Minsk agreement, other reasons come to the foreground as well. Under category 2.d (general impact), politicians state as reasons to discuss how sanctions can be lifted the general impact on Finnish and Russian citizens, the unfair distribution of how sanctions hit EU countries, and the impact sanctions might have on the situation in Ukraine. In addition, the ineffectiveness of the sanctions in place (category 2.e) is mentioned as well.

The willingness of Dutch politicians to discuss lifting sanctions is weaker than in Finland. Many politicians stress the need to implement the Minsk agreement as the only reason to lift the sanctions in place. However, in the documents under study, firm discussions take place about the moment to start negotiations for lifting sanctions. One opposition party states that it is not needed to fulfill the complete Minsk agreement to lift sanctions:

My line is that substantial steps need to be taken, such as withdrawing heavy weapons to the designated limits. I think that's a substantial step. That step has not yet been taken.<sup>215</sup>

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<sup>212</sup> Juha Herkman, “The Finns Party: Euroscepticism, Euro Crisis, Populism and the Media,” *Media and Communication* 5, no. 2 (2017): 1.

<sup>213</sup> Eduskunta, *Pöytäkirja PTK 73*, June 21, 2016: 19, [https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/Documents/PTK\\_73+2016.pdf](https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/Documents/PTK_73+2016.pdf).

<sup>214</sup> Eduskunta, *Pöytäkirja PTK 56*, 5.

<sup>215</sup> Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, “Begroting Buitenlandse Zaken,” *Handeling 2016-2017*, no. 26, item 3, November 23, 2016 (published December 15, 2016): 3, <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20162017-26-3.html>.

In other words, according to some members of the opposition, a partial implementation of the Minsk agreement should lead to opening talks on lifting sanctions. However, both government and other opposition parties disagree with this stance.

Nevertheless, a member of one of the two government parties expresses that sanctions could be partially lifted to reach other objectives, for example related to the war in Syria. This is important, because it surpasses the Minsk agreement completely. It is noted that “if the sanctions are eased, the Russians will have to pay a very high price”, but one of the two government parties leaves this option as a possible way to lift sanctions.<sup>216</sup>

In short, some overlap is detectable in approach to coming closer to lifting sanctions in the Netherlands and Finland. In both countries, politicians support the full implementation of the Minsk agreement as reason to lift sanctions. However, in both places, there are politicians in favor of gradually lifting the sanctions when the Minsk agreement is partially implemented. Besides the Minsk agreement, many Finnish politicians stress the impact of sanctions on both the economy and the country in general as important reasons to work towards lifting the sanctions. Remarkably, despite the economic impact sanctions have on the Netherlands as well, politicians do not consider it insofar important to argue that it is a reason to work towards lifting sanctions.

#### 4.3 Dimension 3. Reasons for implementing new or upholding existing sanctions

The third dimension shows different reasons for politicians to support existing sanctions regimes, as well as reasons to implement stricter sanctions. This dimension is the most extensive dimension of the coding frame in this study. Since many politicians express support for upholding sanctions, as shown in dimension 1, it is perhaps unsurprising that the reasons for upholding sanctions are frequently coded. On the other hand, since no Finnish politician is in favor of stricter sanctions (see dimension 1.a.i & 1.a.ii), the categories under 3.a of this dimension only includes codes from Dutch politicians.

In coming up with stricter sanctions on Russia, most politicians in the Netherlands see new reasons as main driver to implement additional sanctions. These reasons concern for example the suspected involvement of Russia in the downing of flight MH-17, which in 2014 already led to a second wave of sanctions, including strong economic sanctions.<sup>217</sup> However,

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<sup>216</sup> Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, “Kamerstuk 21501-02 Raad Algemene Zaken en Raad Buitenlandse Zaken,” *Vergaderjaar 2015-2016*, no. 1649, June 9, 2016 (published August 12, 2016): 6-7, <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-21501-02-1649.html>.

<sup>217</sup> Szep, “New intergovernmentalism meets EU sanctions policy,” 859-861.

according to some opposition politicians in the Netherlands, these sanctions are not enough. They state that “after the Joint Investigation Team demonstrated Russian involvement, the cabinet should have expelled the Russian ambassador and implemented tougher economic sanctions”.<sup>218</sup>

Another major reason for many Dutch politicians to argue for stricter sanctions is the involvement of Russia in the war in Syria, of which they criticize Russian involvement in bombings. In category 3.a.i.1, it is remarkable that politicians from both opposition and government parties give Syria as reason to implement stricter sanctions. Besides arguing for stricter sanctions, one of opposition politicians argues for stricter sanctions through a motion, which was not accepted by the parliament:

Noting that Russia very recently vetoed a resolution in the UN Security Council calling for an end to the bombing of Aleppo in Syria and a ceasefire to allow humanitarian aid; calls on the government to advocate additional sanctions on Russia on behalf of the European Union in the European Council on 20 and 21 October 2016.<sup>219</sup>

In addition to direct support for stricter sanctions, it is curious that politicians from different sides argue that sanctions should have been implemented earlier. A politician from one of the government parties states that “threats for stricter sanctions should have been made”.<sup>220</sup>

Besides new reasons for having sanctions, Dutch politicians also note the ineffectiveness or limited effect of the current sanctions as reason to implement stricter sanctions. Some politicians seem convinced of the effectiveness of sanctions on Russia:

It is precisely the pressure on Russia, for example with the possibility of doing more with sanctions, that makes the Russians sit down at the table and not - just to bring out those peace symbols that Mr. Van Bommel is once again exhibiting today - to take those sanctions off the table?<sup>221</sup>

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<sup>218</sup> Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, “Stand van zaken MH17,” *Handeling 2016-2017*, no. 14, item 8, October 26, 2016 (published November 16, 2016): 6, <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20162017-14-8.html>.

<sup>219</sup> Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, “Europese top,” *Handeling 2016-2017*, no. 11, item 3, October 12, 2016 (published November 3, 2016): 26, <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20162017-11-3.html>.

<sup>220</sup> Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, “Debat over Syrië,” *Handeling 2016-2017*, no. 38, item 10, December 21, 2016 (published January 6, 2017): 12, <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20162017-38-10.html>.

<sup>221</sup> Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, “Begroting Buitenlandse Zaken,” *Handeling 2016-2017*, no. 26, item 3, November 23, 2016 (published December 15, 2016): 3, <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20162017-26-3.html>.

In addition to politicians from government parties, opposition politicians also support this stance. They state for example that “the sanctions we have imposed as a result of the situation in eastern Ukraine have worked quite well”, as a justification for stricter sanctions.<sup>222</sup> Lastly, in addition to the mentioned reasons, some argue that sanctions should be implemented to ensure security in the EU, as well as for the prevention of future escalations.

In reasons for upholding existing sanctions, there are both differences and similarities between the Netherlands and Finland. Politicians express that they want to keep the current sanctions in place in different ways, posing different reasons as well. Showing support for sanctions is done in explicit and implicit ways, as is highlighted in the first dimension. In some cases, it is clear that the discussion is about implementing stricter sanctions. This causes that some politicians express their implicit support for sanctions; they do not directly express that they are in favor of upholding sanctions, but give reasons why they do not want to implement stricter sanctions.

As comes to the foreground in reasons to lift sanctions, the Minsk agreement is also a reason to keep the current sanctions in place. Many express that “in view of the fact that the Minsk agreements are not going anywhere, it seems to me that there can be no question of easing sanctions”.<sup>223</sup> At the same time, several Finnish politicians stress that besides being in favor of the sanctions, they want the situation to “get back on the path to the Minsk agreement”.<sup>224</sup> In other words, they highlight in a stronger way than their Dutch counterparts that something needs to be done in order to fulfill the Minsk agreement, instead of leaning back and looking that nothing has been done.

Tied to continuing the sanctions because of the Minsk agreement are the reasons given in the categories under 3.b.iii, concerning continued involvement in existing conflicts. These conflicts were the initial trigger for implementing sanctions, making it unsurprising that this is given as a reason to continue sanctions. Those expressing their support for upholding sanctions and posing continued involvement in the Ukraine conflict (category 3.b.iii.1) pose statement such as “sanctions are their own thing and should not be touched until we have peace in eastern Ukraine and the situation on Crimea is resolved”.<sup>225</sup> In the Netherlands, some

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<sup>222</sup> Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, “Debat over Syrië,” 9.

<sup>223</sup> Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, “Kamerstuk 21501-02 Raad Algemene Zaken en Raad Buitenlandse Zaken,” *Vergaderjaar 2015-2016*, no. 1649, June 9, 2016 (published August 12, 2016): 4, <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-21501-02-1649.html>.

<sup>224</sup> Eduskunta, *Pöytäkirja PTK 27*, March 18, 2016: 9, [https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/Documents/PTK\\_27+2016.pdf](https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/Documents/PTK_27+2016.pdf).

<sup>225</sup> Eduskunta, *Pöytäkirja PTK 56*, 6.

opposition politicians raise MH17 as reason to uphold the sanctions. Government parties, however, express that “the current sanctions package has nothing to do (...) with MH17”.<sup>226</sup>

Other reasons expressed in both the Netherlands and Finland are about security concerns. These concerns apply to Ukraine, the EU, as well as the domestic sphere. In concerns about Ukraine, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs states for example that “we must not lose sight of the humanitarian consequences of this conflict. We must not let Ukraine fall”.<sup>227</sup> Between the Netherlands and Finland, there are visible differences in category 3.b.iv.1 about domestic or EU security concerns. Dutch politicians focus more on concerns about the EU in general, noting that the behavior of Russia close to the borders of the EU threatens the security of the EU. When expressing security concerns, Finnish politicians add besides a threat to the EU more focus to domestic security concerns by adding, for example, that this “security tension is also reflected in the Baltic Sea region”.<sup>228</sup>

In Finnish discussions on sanctions, strategic culture is mentioned as a reason to keep existing sanctions in place. Several politicians raise that Finland has always been an actor in international relations that bases its identity on sticking to international agreements and law. For some, this perceived ‘traditional’ role is important in keeping sanctions in place:

We are known around the world for the fact that when we commit to an agreement, we abide by it and also require others to abide by it. It is part of our identity, and every foreign decision-maker and person who deals with us knows that it is an important part of Finnish politics.<sup>229</sup>

Others note the traditional role of Finland as a bridge-builder, emphasizing that Finland should behave as a country bridging the gap between Russia on the one hand and the Western world on the other hand. Timo Heinonen, for example, finds that “it has been positive that, in accordance with a long tradition, Finland has played a very important role here as a bridge builder (...) held consultations and discussions and, above all, opened that dialogue”.<sup>230</sup>

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<sup>226</sup> Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, “Europese top,” *Handeling 2016-2017*, no. 11, item 3, October 12, 2016 (published November 3, 2016): 16, <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20162017-11-3.html>.

<sup>227</sup> Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, “Kamerstuk 21501-02 Raad Algemene Zaken en Raad Buitenlandse Zaken,” *Vergaderjaar 2015-2016*, no. 1598, March 9, 2016 (published March 29, 2016): 19, <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-21501-02-1598.html>.

<sup>228</sup> Eduskunta, *Pöytäkirja PTK 139*, December 21, 2016: 63, [https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/Documents/PTK\\_139+2016.pdf](https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/Documents/PTK_139+2016.pdf).

<sup>229</sup> Eduskunta, *Pöytäkirja PTK 2*, February 4, 2016: 30, [https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/Documents/PTK\\_2+2016.pdf](https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/Documents/PTK_2+2016.pdf).

<sup>230</sup> Eduskunta, *Pöytäkirja PTK 56*, 6.

Several politicians thus highlight the role that Finland has played in international relations with Russia in the past as reason to continue with sanctions.

Besides reasons to support sanctions continuation explicitly, reasons for implicitly supporting sanctions come to the foreground in the data as well. This implicit support is mainly clear in discussions in the Netherlands, where some are in favor of stricter sanctions. As counterargument for stricter sanctions, many parliamentarians state that they find stricter sanctions counterproductive or ineffective. Illustrative for the ineffectiveness is this reaction from a member of the government as reaction to an opposition politician:

I am not very confident that it will lead to any behavioral change. On the contrary, it will probably strengthen their counter policy, because the very introduction of the sanctions has led to the Russian reaction: we do not want to work with you because you anyways imposed sanctions. We do not have to adapt to this completely, but I do have doubts about the effectiveness of additional sanctions. However, I say again tonight, that I do not rule out anything.<sup>231</sup>

The reason to be against additional sanctions, thus, is that they are supposedly counterproductive. Some members of parliament go even further and state that EU sanctions only escalate the situation more: “we have seen that strong language towards Putin only makes that we escalate things further”.<sup>232</sup>

In addition to not implement different sanctions for (in)effectivity reasons, politicians in both the Netherlands and Finland state that the same sanctions regime should be prolonged to ensure a united EU. In Finnish debates, this is mainly expressed in that despite the fact that Finland looks to increase dialogue, it is “strongly behind the EU’s common foreign policy – including its sanctions decisions”.<sup>233</sup> Several politicians stress the strong support for the united EU policies, and find it important to continue with it. Dutch politicians also stress the importance of keeping the EU united in sanctions decisions. According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, “the most important thing in Europe is that the European Union remains a

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<sup>231</sup> Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, “Kamerstuk 21501-02 Raad Algemene Zaken en Raad Buitenlandse Zaken,” *Handeling 2016-2017*, no. 1686, October 5, 2016 (published October 30, 2016): 14, <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-21501-02-1686.html>.

<sup>232</sup> Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, “Debat over Syrië,” *Handeling 2016-2017*, no. 38, item 10, December 21, 2016 (published January 6, 2017): 9, <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20162017-38-10.html>.

<sup>233</sup> Eduskunta, *Pöytäkirja PTK 4*, February 9, 2016: 4, [https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/Documents/PTK\\_4+2016.pdf](https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/Documents/PTK_4+2016.pdf).

unity”.<sup>234</sup> Another member of the government parties finds it even dangerous to do anything else than prolonging the sanctions that are in place; “It seems to me extremely harmful and a great victory for Russia if Europe were to have a whole discussion about sanctions for the action in Syria and if it subsequently failed”.<sup>235</sup>

In short, politicians in both the Netherlands and Finland pose different reasons for continuing with the sanctions in place, or actively supporting stricter EU sanctions on Russia. No Finnish politician expresses support for stricter sanctions, whereas Dutch parliamentarians want stricter sanctions as punishment for new actions of Russia, ineffective existing sanctions, security concerns or prevention of future escalations. In upholding the sanctions in place, politicians in both of the countries under study have partly similar reasons to continue; the Minsk agreement, continued involvement in conflicts, EU unity and security concerns. However, politicians mention strongly differing reasons as well, such as strategic culture in Finland. In the Netherlands, the counterproductive effect of different sanctions and the involvement in the downing of flight MH-17 are also important reasons to keep the sanctions in place.

#### 4.4 Dimension 4. Scale/dealing with the sanctions

The fourth dimension, focusing on both the scale to deal with the sanctions in place as well as what to do during the current measures, shows clear differences in the approach to dealing with the sanctions in place. In the coding, the general opinion on whether sanctions should continue is not taken into account. This dimension considers both the national and the international aspect, through which it is possible to analyze what role both countries see themselves play in the international sphere. This dimension does not focus solely on the EU level; the fifth dimension, focusing on the role of countries in EU cooperation when sanctions are under discussion, gives a fuller view of the role of Finland and the Netherlands on the European level.

The results of the coding of this dimension shows that Finnish politicians have a strong determination to do something with the current sanctions in place. On the national level, politicians see several steps focal points to take into account. Firstly, it is clear that

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<sup>234</sup> Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, “Kamerstuk 21501-02 Raad Algemene Zaken en Raad Buitenlandse Zaken,” *Vergaderjaar 2015-2016*, no. 1598, March 9, 2016 (published March 29, 2016): 19, <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-21501-02-1598.html>.

<sup>235</sup> Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, “Europese top,” *Handeling 2016-2017*, no. 11, item 3, October 12, 2016 (published November 3, 2016): 16, <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20162017-11-3.html>.

politicians want to find solutions for the domestic actors hit by sanctions. Politicians from different sides stress that domestic actors suffered from the sanctions and need help:

The acute problems of agriculture (...) are not the fault of farmers. Countersanctions tied to EU sanctions imposed by Russia are reflected in farmer's livelihoods. We must take responsibility for the effects of sanctions, they should not be pushed to one professional group.<sup>236</sup>

Besides supporting domestic actors, Finnish politicians also strongly stress the need for dialogue and diplomacy with Russia, both on a bilateral as well as an international level. Politicians mention that "Finland should do everything in its power to promote (...) political dialogue and diplomacy, for many reasons, not only because of the general security situation but also because of its own security policy."<sup>237</sup> Many stress that even though Finland supports the general EU line, it is important to continue the relatively good relationship with Russia. In addition, all politicians in the documents under study support high political meetings between Russia and Finland, for example between the president of Russia and the president of Finland.

Finnish politicians also find it important to take measures to ensure that the "Western" side complies with sanctions, which is expressed by criticism on Finland as well as on Ukraine. They do not specifically criticize other the behavior of other EU countries in sticking to the sanctions regimes. An important moment in which the internal dynamics become clear is in the strong reaction of politicians to a statement of the Finnish Minister of Foreign affairs, who stated that Crimea was a lost case. In addition, politicians from different parties express that Finland needs to support Ukraine in complying with the sanctions. The importance of dealing with sanctions on a national level is also stressed in the codes under 2.a.iv. Some parties express the importance of not surpassing the national parliament when sanctions are under discussion on a European level.

Besides an active way of dealing with the sanctions on a national level, Finnish parliamentarians also see ways to deal with sanctions on an international scale. In supporting dialogue and diplomacy, they state for example that "even if it seems distant, it is in Finland's interest to eventually get Russia back into normal relations with the EU".<sup>238</sup> In addition, Finnish politicians express the need for the EU to distribute the burden of sanctions more

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<sup>236</sup> Eduskunta, *Pöytäkirja PTK 68*, June 14, 2016: 73, [https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/Documents/PTK\\_68+2016.pdf](https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/Documents/PTK_68+2016.pdf).

<sup>237</sup> Eduskunta, *Pöytäkirja PTK 2*, 22-23.

<sup>238</sup> Eduskunta, *Pöytäkirja PTK 139*, 58.



evenly across the EU member states. As one of the politicians from the government parties expresses it:

And now that the situation has dragged on and may continue to go on for a long time, has there been - in my opinion there should be - a debate within the EU on these burden-sharing issues, so that European countries can bear the burden of these sanctions more evenly?<sup>239</sup>

Finnish politicians thus express support for dealing with the sanctions on an international level through dialogue, diplomacy, and burden distribution. However, they do not express much need to discuss Western compliance on a European scale. This is remarkable, since they do stress this as important when discussing sanctions on a national level. Lastly, several Finnish parliamentarians express the importance of following international agreements. As stated by a politician part of a government party, “it is particularly important that small countries comply with the agreements.”<sup>240</sup>

In the Netherlands, as opposed to Finland, dealing with sanctions on a national level is not discussed as vividly. Both governmental and opposition parties agree that diplomatic relations with Russia should be maintained, but draw stronger conditions than their Finnish counterparts do. They state that diplomacy should go hand in hand with a strict policy towards Russia; “respect is of course achieved through serious diplomacy (...) but above all with muscles and the fist of economic sanctions”.<sup>241</sup> Some opposition parliamentarians raise the question of Western compliance, and urge the government to pressure Ukraine to stick to the Minsk agreement. They want this pressure to both come from the Netherlands bilaterally as well as from the EU. However, not many politicians echo this urge to put pressure on Ukraine. While they note that Ukraine does not comply completely, they do not express that something should actively be done about it. Peculiar is that, differently than in Finland, support for domestic actors suffering from sanctions has not been under discussion at all in parliamentary debates in 2016.

Internationally, Dutch politicians express different ways to deal with the sanctions. Within the EU specifically, they do not actively express much about ways to deal with the sanctions in place. Perhaps unsurprisingly, as domestic actors do not seem to be under

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<sup>239</sup> Eduskunta, *Pöytäkirja PTK 2*, 26.

<sup>240</sup> Ibid., 25.

<sup>241</sup> Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, “Begroting Buitenlandse Zaken,” *Handeling 2016-2017*, no. 26, item 3, November 23, 2016 (published December 15, 2016): 11, <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20162017-26-3.html>.

discussion, Dutch politicians do not talk about burden distribution within the EU. Nevertheless, they express international dealing with the sanctions in place also through other international systems, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the UN. In the units coded, politicians express that they are in favor of keeping talks open through these organizations. However, it is noticeable that these talks should always take place in a wider international context; wide support is given to talks under the flag of NATO, or in cooperation with countries such as France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States, “to determine a firm position vis-à-vis the Russian Federation”.<sup>242</sup>

In short, Finland and the Netherlands do have different ways to deal with the sanctions in place. Finland looks for solutions in the domestic sphere, by supporting domestic actors, keeping a strong dialogue with Russia and by making sure that they themselves also comply with the agreements made. Internationally, Finnish politicians look for ways to establish dialogue and to foster diplomacy with Russia, while they also look for burden distribution to spread the impact of the current sanctions in the EU more evenly. Dutch politicians, on the other hand, express dealing with the sanctions in different ways. In general, a domestic way to deal with the impact sanctions is less under discussion than in Finland. While Dutch politicians support the idea of keeping diplomatic channels with Russia open, they often do so in cooperation with international institutions. This cooperation happens besides the EU through other organizations as well, such as NATO.

#### 4.5 Dimension 5. Role in EU cooperation

The fifth and last dimension of the coding frame is the dimension most focused on how politicians of EU member states look at the role their country plays in the international framework. It specifically looks at the way Dutch and Finnish politicians want their government to act when sanctions are under discussion on a European level. As sanctions need to be prolonged on a regular basis, it is regularly under discussion what member states want to reach in these meetings.<sup>243</sup> This dimension takes into account what type of objectives politicians want their governments to reach in assertive EU cooperation, as well as objectives for reticent behavior in EU cooperation. By combining the results from the second and third

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<sup>242</sup> Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, “Kamerstuk 27925 Bestrijding internationaal terrorisme,” *Vergaderjaar 2016-2017*, no. 600, September 29, 2016 (published October 25, 2016): 25, <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-27925-600.html>.

<sup>243</sup> Korhonen, Simola and Solanko, “Sanctions, counter-sanctions and Russia,” 3-4.

dimension, it is possible to analyze what roles Finnish and Dutch politicians see fit for their countries in European cooperation.

Both Dutch and Finnish politicians see different roles for their government to play when sanctions are under discussion in the EU. Most Finnish politicians do not give strong opinions on whether their government should support discussions for stricter, softer or the same sanctions in the EU. Unsurprisingly, no Finnish politicians are looking for their government to promote stricter sanctions, which is in line with the Finnish opinions on sanctions in dimension 1. Some politicians from government parties express indirect ways to lift some sanctions in EU discussions, by stating that the line of the government in the EU will be that “sanctions are too harsh”.<sup>244</sup> Remarkably many Finnish politicians do not directly want Finland to say something about the current sanctions in place, but stimulate Finland to achieve other objectives in sanctions discussions in the EU (category 5.a.ii.4). Some call for discussions to assess the current sanctions, while others look for an exit strategy to sanctions. Several argue for discussions on burden distribution, which relates to the findings in dimension 4.

In the Netherlands, some politicians from the opposition have stronger opinions on what their country should do in EU discussions about stricter, similar, or softer sanctions. Especially those in favor of stricter sanctions find that the Netherlands should be assertive in the EU. For different reasons, they urge the government to open the discussion on stricter sanctions by asking if they will pressure the EU to do so. MP Louis Bontes, for example, sees a wide support in the Dutch parliament for stricter sanctions:

My question is then: can the sanctions (...) not be extended? I also heard this reflected in the contributions by MP Omtzigt and from MP Verhoeven. They, too, are urging for more pressure, for an intensification of sanctions. Is there any way to address this to the colleagues in Brussels?<sup>245</sup>

Most politicians supporting discussions in the EU about stricter sanctions note that it is unlikely that the EU agrees on stricter sanctions. Nevertheless, they still argue that it is important to have a discussion on it. In addition to support for stricter sanctions, politicians

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<sup>244</sup> Eduskunta, *Pöytäkirja PTK* 68, 30.

<sup>245</sup> Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, “Europese top,” *Handeling 2016-2017*, no. 11, item 3, October 12, 2016 (published November 3, 2016): 18, <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20162017-11-3.html>.

from both the opposition and governmental parties stress the need for the Netherlands to be assertive in discussions about the continuation of the sanctions in place.

Politicians from both countries express worries about the unity of the EU, which makes that a few units of coding in both Finland and the Netherlands voices show politicians calling for blocking sanctions discussions. When having a discussion on sanctions, these politicians argue that it is dangerous for EU unity. For the same reason, the units of coding in category 5.b.i (reticent – united EU) show that especially many Dutch politicians are in favor of a reticent stance in the EU, meaning that they hold back on criticism. They do so to make sure that the EU stays united. In this case, it is noteworthy that only government parties call for this reticent stance. In the debates involved in this study, they often respond to politicians looking to initiate sanctions discussions in the EU. As Han ten Broeke, a politician from one of the two governmental parties in the Netherlands, states:

If the Netherlands on its own argues for something that is not going to happen, you will only demonstrate once again that the European Union cannot reach agreement on this. So, the method might be sympathetic, but failure is possibly just as damaging.<sup>246</sup>

In another debate, the Dutch prime minister states that “as a national government you cannot say: this is what I think. I have just said that it is important that Europe speaks with one voice”.<sup>247</sup> In the Finnish documents under study, the opinion on refraining from sanctions discussions in the EU is less on the foreground, likely because of the fact that most politicians do not want Finland to take a stronger stance in the EU. However, in some codes, politicians from government parties express their disagreement with discussing sanctions on a wider scale. In a few cases, they do so as response to voices in the EU calling for sanctions discussions by stating for example: “I believe that this is not the way to go (...) we, as the EU and all the other countries, must be together to condemn the annexation of Crimea”.<sup>248</sup>

In short, politicians from the Netherlands and Finland have both similar and different opinions on what their country should do in sanctions discussions. In the Netherlands, this dimension shows a clear divide between opposition parties and parties in the government. Where opposition parties want the Netherlands to clearly state their opinion in Europe, the

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<sup>246</sup> Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, “Uitslag van het Oekraïnerferendum,” *Handeling 2016-2017*, no. 19, item 37, November 8, 2016 (published November 24, 2016): 14-15, <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20162017-19-37.html>.

<sup>247</sup> Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, “Europese top,” *Handeling 2016-2017*, no. 11, item 3, October 12, 2016 (published November 3, 2016): 17, <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20162017-11-3.html>.

<sup>248</sup> Eduskunta, *Pöytäkirja PTK 27*, 12.

government is more hesitant to do so with the argument that EU unity should be preserved. In Finland, several politicians want to discuss the sanctions in the EU, but mainly to look for ways to achieve other objectives than purely a change of the sanctions regime in place. Instead of assertively trying to change the sanctions package in place, Finnish politicians deem it more important to make dealing with the current sanctions as trouble-free as possible.

## 5. Discussion

So far, this work has focused on a discussion of theory, the research design and the results of the QCA on Dutch and Finnish parliamentary documents. These different elements all contribute to getting an understanding of the dynamics of sanctions in EU member states and the influence of these countries on the operation of sanctions. By investigating how politicians want their countries to maneuver themselves within the EU, this study adds to the academic debate on how EU members look towards European integration and how EU sanctions are prolonged. This research makes a start in understanding how smaller countries influence EU sanctions and what politicians consider as important when sanctions prolonging is on the table. This fifth chapter analyzes the results of the QCA presented in chapter 4 in more detail and considers them in light of the theory presented in chapter 2. First, the discussion concentrates on the way sanctions policy is reflected in Finland and the Netherlands. I argue that politicians in these countries show clear differences in their reasons and objectives for participating in sanctions regimes. However, both countries eventually align in supporting the continuation of signaling sanctions. The second part of the discussion sheds light on the way these countries position themselves in the international context, mainly focusing on their behavior within the EU. As I argue, both the Netherlands and Finland maneuver themselves in a way closely aligned with postfunctionalist theory on European integration. Nevertheless, both countries are not as united as they may present themselves, which could cause friction in future discussions.

### 5.1 Dynamics of sanctions policy in different member states

Both the data and context parts in this study show that EU sanctions on Russia affect Finland and the Netherlands in different manners. The different relationship with Russia with regard to, for example, history, economy and geographical location, makes it not surprising that reasons to participate in sanctions regimes are distinctive in different EU countries. Despite differences on the domestic level, however, since 2014 all countries in the EU unanimously and continuously agree on upholding the sanctions on Russia. They do so until at least the end of 2021.<sup>249</sup> The QCA in this study shows that this joint approach is below the surface not always self-evident. In prolonging sanctions in the Netherlands and Finland, several mechanisms play a role that make both countries comply with the EU; however, it is at the

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<sup>249</sup> “Timeline – EU restrictive measures in response to the crisis in Ukraine,” General Secretariat of the Council, accessed January 30, 2021, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/nl/policies/sanctions/ukraine-crisis/history-ukraine-crisis/>.

same time important to identify differences in these countries for understanding how sanctions are eventually prolonged. In general, Finland is a country that is more leaning towards softer sanctions, while several politicians in the Netherlands want to implement stricter sanctions. As this section shows, these differences align with a part of the sanctions theory, while both countries also show similarities in prolonging signaling sanctions.

In Finland, many politicians highlight the economic impact of sanctions on important sectors in the country. In their opinions on sanctions, some express these as a driver for attempting to make the impact of sanctions lighter. These attempts result in politicians discussing support packages for these sectors, but also make that some argue for lifting the sanctions sooner rather than later. Many express their concerns about the position of Finnish farmers, of whom some were before 2014 heavily dependent on export to Russia. A way to explain why Finnish politicians do not want to impose stricter sanctions or work towards lifting the sanctions is through the logic of interdependence. This logic assumes that when countries have close economic relations, the willingness to implement sanctions is less.<sup>250</sup> In expressing economic ties as reason to make the impact of sanctions lighter, the difference with the Netherlands is striking. The logic of interdependence partly explains this difference; as shown, the Netherlands is less dependent on trade with Russia. Therefore, it is less likely that politicians express their concern about the influence of sanctions on their economy. It is nevertheless remarkable that politicians do not discuss the impact on Dutch sectors at all, given that Dutch exports to Russia suffered from sanctions as well, albeit less than in Finland.

In contrast to Finland, some politicians in the Netherlands go even as far as wanting stricter sanctions. This is explainable by the theory of ‘more pain, more gain’.<sup>251</sup> In their view, the only way to make Russia comply is by implementing stricter sanctions, which then work in a constraining way. The objective in these sanctions is not to make Russia do something that they otherwise would not start doing, as is the case in Lukes’ decision-making power.<sup>252</sup> Alternatively, the goal is to make Russia stop doing something that is already happening, as for example applies to sanctions tied to bombings in Syria. Despite several politicians actively trying to implement sanctions in the Netherlands, most politicians in the Netherlands do not eventually vote for stricter sanctions. Instead, they want to keep the sanctions in place. Thus, while the theories of economic interdependence and ‘more pain, more gain’ in domestic reasons for participating in EU sanctions on Russia have their impact, it is at the same time

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<sup>250</sup> Silva II and Selden, “Economic interdependence and economic sanctions,” 229-230.

<sup>251</sup> Veebel and Markus, “At the Dawn of a New Era of Sanctions,” 129.

<sup>252</sup> Lukes, *Power: A Radical View*, 23-25.

clear that these theories are not the key factor in implementing new or lifting the existing sanctions when prolonging is under discussion. In the end, notwithstanding firm discussions, most Finnish and Dutch politicians see sanctions continuation as the right way to move on.

In analyzing how sanctions mechanisms work in these countries, therefore, it is necessary to look further than solely the economic impact, which sanctions theory discussed in chapter 2 suggests as well. In general, as shown in the context section (2.1.3), EU sanctions on Russia are implemented with the idea of constraining and coercing Russia for its involvement in the crisis in Ukraine in 2014. On the one hand, there was the broadly supported idea for stopping Russia in its exercise of power in Ukraine, which comprises constraining sanctions. On the other hand, at the same time there was a desire to get Russia out of Ukraine altogether, which comprises coercing sanctions.<sup>253</sup> In the documents from 2016, the exercise of power expressed by Finnish and Dutch politicians for participating in sanctions policy differs significantly, when purely looking at the way they want to use different types of power. As becomes clear from the QCA results, several Dutch politicians see new sanctions as a punishment for Russian behavior in new conflicts. In their ideas on sanctions, they highlight the expectation that Russian involvement can be stopped by using different kinds of power. In the best scenario, Russia will do something that they otherwise would not do, but the rock-bottom objective is making sure that certain new strategic moves by Russia are not taken. In other words, these politicians try to use decision-making power and agenda-setting power in constructing sanctions policies.<sup>254</sup> In addition, the data in the QCA is noteworthy in that some express regret that sanctions were not imposed earlier, as reaction to previous developments. This shows a retrospective idea of constraining sanctions, which should have stopped attempts to implement new policies.

In the reasons given for implementing these stricter sanctions, aspects of the naïve theory by Galtung are clearly visible.<sup>255</sup> As shown in the fourth chapter, politicians from both the government and the opposition state that previous sanctions on Russia have worked very well. However, as discussed in chapter 2, the effect of a retreat of Russia from Ukraine or of domestic political disintegration has not occurred. In implementing stricter sanctions, thus, one could state that these politicians do this in a “naïve” way, meaning that instead of reaching compliance they reach the opposite. This is because the objectives they state for sanctions, comprising a change of behavior concerning flight MH-17 and the war in Syria,

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<sup>253</sup> Giumelli, *Coercing, constraining and signaling*, 1-5.

<sup>254</sup> Lukes, *Power, A Radical View*, 16-19; 23-25.

<sup>255</sup> Galtung, “On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions,” 388-393.



have not been reached in previous sanctions regimes. While some could look at these expressions as naïve, it can also point to objectives that are different from purely constraining or coercing. The objectives of these politicians for implementing stricter sanctions thus do not align with the official goals of the sanctions in place. Rather, the reasons for politicians to argue for these stricter sanctions need to be based on different objectives.

In the Finnish documents under study, no parliamentarian is in favor of implementing stricter sanctions. To the contrary, some politicians express a desire to lift sanctions as soon as they see progress in the situation. Most state, however, that they support the current sanctions in place. Noticeable is that many Finnish politicians express a wish to establish dialogue with Russia. This behavior is instead of exercising coercing or constraining sanctions, which Dutch politicians express, closer towards signaling sanctions; the current sanctions express a message, but there is no active attempt to implement sanctions triggering a behavioral change of Russia.

So far, this chapter has focused on analyzing how and for what reasons politicians want their country to participate in sanctions regimes, and what type of sanctions these politicians are actually looking for. As becomes clear from the QCA results, several Dutch politicians seem to have a stance that is stricter towards the sanctions policy in place. At the same time, many support the sanctions in place for, as they express it, constraining and coercing objectives. Finnish politicians, on the other hand, see the sanctions in place as draining on the country and do not attempt to strengthen constraining and coercing objectives of sanctions. Despite these differences and opposition to the current sanctions, it is important to note that politicians in Finland and the Netherlands generally show support for existing sanctions. Based on the analysis of the results and theory so far, this united stance does not necessarily flow logically out of the effects sanctions have on the different countries. In addition, the agreement on how to continue with sanctions does not necessarily align with the opinions expressed either. The question that remains, then, is how both countries decide to comply with the sanctions in place.

On the surface, in their strong support for upholding the existing sanctions because of the Minsk agreement and the continued involvement of Russia in the conflict in Ukraine, there seems to be a strong support for a constraining type of sanctions in the Netherlands and Finland. In the beginning, these sanctions started as how Giumelli describes constraining sanctions. However, the results of the QCA show that to some extent these have evolved into signaling sanctions as well. In expressions of both Finnish and Dutch politicians, there is little doubt about sticking to the Minsk agreement, even when some note that the chance that the

Minsk agreement is complied with is very small. In a way, by continuing the sanctions when they do not seem to have the effect previously hoped for, they evolve into a signaling type of sanctions showing disapproval of certain behavior. As the situation does not actively change anymore, thus, formerly constraining sanctions change into signaling sanctions. Despite the strong differences in expressing opinions, therefore, the objective of sanctions is thus at least partly the same in the Netherlands and Finland; both countries use signaling sanctions.<sup>256</sup>

One of the possible explanations for the agreement of keeping current sanctions in place is through constructivist theory of compliance with international agreements. This theory assumes that states follow a logic of appropriateness in their policies, which is the idea that they have to do something because it is morally right.<sup>257</sup> In explaining why politicians support signaling sanctions despite good reasons to change them, this theory is useful. When politicians talk about security concerns as reasons to uphold the existing sanctions, for example, the logic of appropriateness is applicable. Some politicians express the feeling that something needs to be done in order to support Ukraine, while others express that upholding the sanctions sends a signal that the border regions of the EU are being protected. In Finland, upholding signaling sanctions for moral reasons also is visible in reasons to continue with sanctions because of the country's strategic culture. This stress on strategic culture is a good example of using sanctions to create a certain norm, namely the norm of a rights-respecting country working as a bridge-builder between East and West. Finnish politicians express this identity as their 'traditional' role. Thus, in a way, both countries partly overlap in what kind of sanctions they support, while some politicians at the same time maintain strong differences in their approach to sanctions.

In short, reasons and objectives in sanctions policies are both different and similar in the Netherlands and Finland. Finnish politicians, on the one hand, mostly want to keep the current sanctions in place or try to find solutions for making the impact of sanctions lighter. This is partly explained through the logic of interdependence, but this logic does not tell the complete story. In their exercise of power through sanctions, Finnish politicians often express a preference for establishing dialogue, meaning that power is not used to change certain behavior; instead, signaling sanctions are enough. Dutch politicians generally take a stricter stance regarding EU sanctions on Russia, but do eventually support prolonging the current sanctions without arguing for new sanctions packages. In their sanctions objectives, several Dutch politicians argue for coercing and constraining sanctions, despite the perceived naïve

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<sup>256</sup> Giumelli, *Coercing, constraining and signaling*, 1-5.

<sup>257</sup> March and Olsen, "The Logic of Appropriateness," 478-479.

way of dealing with the sanctions. Eventually, however, most politicians in both Finland and the Netherlands agree on the continuation sanctions without attempting to actively change the current package. As argued, throughout the years of this package of sanctions being in place, the objectives behind sanctions have moved for both countries towards signaling sanctions. Other reasons for complying can be normative, which is explainable through constructivist theory on sanctions.

## 5.2 Small-state positioning on the international (EU) level

What remains is the question how countries deal with the current sanctions in place and how politicians want their country to behave on an international level. This discussion section goes deeper into the positioning of Dutch and Finnish politicians within EU integration theories, as well as a discussion on the general role of “smaller” states in the CFSP of the EU. As this section shows, both the Netherlands and Finland prefer an approach towards sanctions typical for smaller states in the EU; they generally consider the EU as the main decision-making body, without attempting to put forward their own wishes too strongly. Of the EU integration theories under discussion, I argue, this aligns most closely with postfunctionalist ideas of European integration.

In dealing with the existing sanctions in place (dimension 4), Finland and the Netherlands both look for different solutions. Finland is looking actively for ways to deal with the impact of sanctions, while Dutch politicians discuss this less actively. These differences are visible on both the national and international level. In Finland, many debates concerning sanctions discuss the impact of sanctions on the national scale. The main way to deal with this impact is by discussing support packages for domestic actors. When discussing ways to deal with sanctions on the international level, Finnish politicians often highlight that the impact of sanctions is unevenly distributed among EU states. The QCA results show that in attempting to distribute its impact more evenly, several Finnish politicians want burden distribution measures from the EU. When sanctions are under discussion on the EU level, this is the main topic that Finnish politicians want to put forward. However, this attempt to achieve objectives on the EU level does not culminate into a strong desire to change the main cause of the burden on Finland. Instead, as the QCA results show, Finnish politicians do not want their country to proactively argue for changing the existing sanctions. The behavior concerning burden distribution fits somewhat into an idea of European integration from the perspective of

new intergovernmentalism; politicians try to put their national interests forward and stimulate their government to engage in EU sanctions discussions to achieve burden distribution.<sup>258</sup>

However, the absence of an active discussion on wanting to change EU sanctions is remarkable, since this change is needed to stop the unfair burden in the first place. Thus, while Finnish politicians express their desire to achieve objectives on the European level, they simultaneously refrain from doing so. This fits into a postfunctionalist idea of European integration as well; while sanctions are accepted with skepticism domestically, the decisions are made on a centralized level. According to postfunctionalists, this is potentially disruptive, leading to weaker preferences for integration.<sup>259</sup> In their ways of dealing with the sanctions in place, some of these weaker preferences for integration come to the foreground. This is especially visible in, as the QCA results show, the strong Finnish preference for bilateral dialogue and diplomacy between Finland and Russia; instead of establishing this on a European level, Finnish politicians want to do this on the national level.

As opposed to their Finnish counterparts, Dutch politicians do not discuss dealing with sanctions on a national level as vividly. In dealing with the sanctions, they argue that dialogue and diplomacy with Russia should be maintained. Instead of looking for this proactively, as Finnish politicians want to, they want dialogue to go hand in hand with strict policies. Internationally, most remarkable is that Dutch politicians look for ways to deal with sanctions that are besides the EU level also on the scale of NATO and the UN. Noticeable is that Dutch politicians do not enthusiastically support the establishment of bilateral dialogues between the Netherlands and Russia. This is partly explainable through the impact of flight MH-17, which clearly influences Dutch stances towards cooperation with Russia. In dealing with the sanctions in place, thus, Dutch politicians see a supranational way of establishing dialogue as the right way to go.

When Dutch politicians discuss Dutch stances in sanctions discussions on the European level, there are significant differences visible within Dutch domestic politics. Some opposition politicians, as the QCA results show, want the Dutch government to actively open discussions on stricter sanctions in the EU. These politicians, looking for new coercing sanctions, approach EU sanctions in alignment with new intergovernmentalist theory on EU integration. Even though they understand that their opinions do not receive support in the EU, they still want the Netherlands to express them internationally. According to these politicians,

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<sup>258</sup> Hodson and Puetter, "The European Union in disequilibrium," 1154-1155.

<sup>259</sup> Hooghe and Marks, "Grand theories of European integration in the twenty-first century," 1116.

state preferences can be clearly distinguished in EU cooperation, resulting in a bargaining way of achieving consensus.<sup>260</sup>

Other politicians, including the ministers responsible in the government, express a very different approach to EU cooperation in sanctions. Many refuse the idea that the Netherlands should independently open EU discussions on sanctions, noting the importance of EU unity. According to them, the most important way of upholding sanctions effectively is by not showing any disagreement within the EU. This results in some politicians wanting to block sanctions discussions in the EU, while others find it enough to express their approval of the current sanctions in EU discussions. Even when these politicians express the need to do something about Russian behavior, they do not support stricter sanctions because it might disrupt EU unity. The majority of Dutch politicians support this stance. By going in this way, politicians thus go about sanctions in a way that is best explained through the postfunctionalist theory of European integration. While there is dissatisfaction with the sanctions in place, which could be called “constraining dissensus”, they still support the centralized approach for going about the sanctions.<sup>261</sup> As the Netherlands is not strong enough to change the general policy, they decide to stick to the general EU approach, which is in line with theory on the behavior of small countries.<sup>262</sup>

Despite domestic differences in preferences for dealing with sanctions on the EU level, thus, the eventual stance towards changing sanctions in both Finland and the Netherlands is limited. Seen through European integration theory, the positions of both countries are explainable through a postfunctionalist lens: both countries participate in sanctions through some sort of constraining dissensus, without actively trying to influence the discussion on sanctions regimes. This stance towards EU cooperation aligns with theory on the behavior of small states. As inclined in the definition of small states used in this study, both the Netherlands and Finland are not able to change the “basic contours” of the EU.<sup>263</sup> In attempting to influence matters, mainly Finland shows attempts to make small changes in sanctions policy. However, both countries leave the eventual decision-making to the centralized level. Based on this case study, thus, small states cannot make major changes to the EU’s CFSP. They nevertheless go through a process of evaluating the domestic and

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<sup>260</sup> Hodson and Puetter, “The European Union in disequilibrium,” 1153-1154.

<sup>261</sup> Hooghe and Marks, “A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration,” 1-6.

<sup>262</sup> Haugevik and Rieker, “Autonomy or Integration?” 215-216.

<sup>263</sup> Thorhallsson and Wivel, “Small States in the European Union,” 652-655.

international impact of decisions. This means that small states are involved in the process of prolonging sanctions and maintain accountability for them as well.

In short, both the Netherlands and Finland lean towards a supranational, neofunctionalist approach of European integration as it comes to continuing sanctions regimes. This does not necessarily mean that the centralized way of going about sanctions is cast in concrete. As postfunctionalist theory argues as well, centrally organized sanctions can lead to weaker preferences for integration domestically.<sup>264</sup> Domestic parliamentary debates in both countries show that not all politicians are in favor of continuing the sanctions as before, which over time could lead to a change in the debate of continuing sanctions. Some politicians want their country to take a firmer position in EU sanctions discussions, which would lead to a disruption of the EU's united stance. In the debates under study, however, the preference for a united EU and sticking to the Minsk agreement prevails.

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<sup>264</sup> Kuhn, "Grand theories of European integration revisited?" 1224.

## 6. Conclusion

By conducting a QCA on documents from Finnish and Dutch parliamentary debates in 2016, this thesis has shown how different EU countries participate in EU sanctions regimes. This research sets an important step forward in understanding the peculiarities of the mechanism that is part of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the way it is perceived differently in each member state. This work is especially useful in getting a better view on smaller EU countries that rarely stand in the spotlights when EU matters are under discussion. The study has considered both the internal, domestic dynamics of sanctions regimes, as well as their impact on the participation of the Netherlands and Finland in the international sphere.

Considering the results of this QCA, it is safe to state that clear differences exist between countries in the way they deal with prolonging EU sanctions. Finnish and Dutch politicians do not consider the sanctions mechanism of the EU to be a tool of only one type of sanctions; different politicians argue for coercing, constraining, or signaling sanctions. Important in the differences between countries is their general stance towards a certain sanctions package. Coming to the foreground in this QCA is that Finnish politicians in general focus more on the negative impact on the sender of sanctions, in this case Finland. Dutch politicians focus more on the negative impact of sanctions on the receiver of EU sanctions, in this case Russia. This is explainable through the high degree of interdependence between Finland and Russia, making it less likely for Finland to actively support these sanctions. Dutch politicians wanting stricter sanctions, on the other hand, express more often new reasons for implementing certain sanctions, because of for example the war in Syria or the downing of flight MH-17. In a way, some politicians express themselves in line with the naïve theory by Galtung: they see reasons for stricter coercing sanctions, while the effectiveness of these particular sanctions is not completely clear. In general, several Dutch politicians are actively in favor of coercing and constraining types of sanctions, while no Finnish politicians express a desire to implement new sanctions of these types.

Despite differences, as the discussion section has shown, both countries generally support the prolonging of a similar type of signaling sanctions. These sanctions, which the whole EU supports, show disapproval of certain behavior. Reasons for supporting these sanctions are manifold. When considering domestic explanations, these reasons can develop through the idea that politicians want their country to do what is morally right. In upholding EU sanctions, different countries find prolonging sanctions important because they perceive it as the appropriate thing to do. These reasons are particularly logical when understanding that

the sanctions in place did not have the desired effect when they were implemented; whereas countries first had the expectation that the Minsk agreements could be reached, it was clear in 2016 that this would not be the case.

Other important reasons for countries to prolong existing sanctions are, as can be concluded, the attributed importance of EU unity. Small countries in the EU do not see themselves as influential enough to change the general course of the EU. Instead, many politicians express it as important to avoid public disagreement with other EU countries, to make sure that the EU functions as one entity. In general, Finland and the Netherlands do not seem to actively interfere in EU decision-making on sanctions. When relating their behavior to European integration theories, the mechanisms working in both countries fit in postfunctionalist ideas of European integration. Both countries stress the importance of dealing with sanctions in a supranational manner, despite having domestic voices arguing otherwise. This stance means that it is not guaranteed that these countries always agree on sanctions in the future; below the surface, frustration and disagreement do exist. However, as this study underlines, the general way to go for small countries in the EU is to align themselves with the prevailing policy in the EU. The risks for becoming isolated are simply larger for smaller countries, causing that they are careful in having strongly differing opinions. In the EU, the sanctions mechanism is thus a tool that, once established, is not used by small countries as a way to enhance intergovernmentalism. Instead, it is a tool used to show EU unity. This unity, however, is in every country expressed in different ways. To understand how decisions on the CFSP are made, it is therefore important to study how small states participate in the CFSP. Small countries do not follow the EU blindly, and differ in the way they go about the EU's foreign policy.

Based on the conclusions in this work, future research on the role individual countries in EU sanctions regimes should consider several important issues. To get a better understanding of the differences within countries, party-specific behavior in sanctions discussions needs more consideration. This study made a distinction between governmental and opposition parties, but the differences within especially opposition parties can be enormous as well. Further research is also needed to understand the long-term dynamics of sanctions in particular countries, by comparing different years during which sanctions were under discussion. This type of research can also identify how domestic changes, such as a change of government, influence the positioning of countries towards sanctions. Finally, to better understand the implications of sanctions on countries, other domestic factors



influencing sanctions need to be researched. Besides the political sphere considered in this study, public opinion and business lobbies influence positions on sanctions as well.

All in all, this research shows that different countries in the EU participate in sanctions regimes in different ways. On some countries, such as Finland, sanctions have a strong influence in domestic matters. For several reasons, this makes that Finnish politicians generally attempt to find alternative ways to deal with them, which comprise keeping good bilateral relations with Russia and supporting domestic actors hit by the sanctions. Other countries have a completely different approach towards sanctions: the debates in the Netherlands, as shown in this study, focus on different topics related to sanctions. As a country less directly related to Russia, Dutch politicians more clearly show disapproval of Russian behavior. On top of the existing sanctions, some even want to implement stricter sanctions, while dialogue and diplomacy should take place through international institutions. However, in prolonging sanctions, the pressure of the EU as a whole and the idea to act morally right seem to prevail over domestic reasons to change sanctions in place. Rather than intervening in the unity of EU, countries look for other ways to deal with the existing situation. Small countries in the EU thus use sanctions as a tool to stand united, but clearly do so through different means.

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## Appendix 1. Full coding frame with dimension and category definitions

1. **Sanctions continuation:** do parliamentarians want the sanctions on Russia to continue? This dimension includes whether parliamentarians call for a specific type of sanctions or whether they just want “stricter sanctions”.
  - a. **Stricter:** Willing to implement stricter sanctions compared to the existing situation
    - i. **Specific** sanctions (for example clear preferences for coercing, constraining or signaling sanctions)
    - ii. **General/unclear** sanctions (no specific sanctions)
  - b. **Continuation:** willing to keep the current sanctions in place
    - i. **Explicitly in favor** of the current sanctions (for example, when people say “we don’t want to lift the sanctions in place” or “we are in favor of the current package”)
    - ii. **Implicitly in favor** of the current sanctions, denying stricter sanctions (i.e. “we are not in favor of a stricter package right now”)
  - c. **Lifting** the sanctions that are in place, against the current package
  - d. **Indifferent / unclear** in their opinion
  - e. **Other**
2. **Scale/dealing with the sanctions:** on what level (national or international) do parliamentarians express ways to deal with the EU sanctions? This dimension does not cover whether parliamentarians are in favor or against the sanctions, but rather covers on what level they want to find solutions for the sanctions that are currently in place. This dimension also covers what kind of actions parliamentarians want to have taken while the sanctions are still in place.
  - a. **National**
    - i. Discuss **support for domestic actors** that are hit by the sanctions
    - ii. **Dialogue & diplomacy:** establish or continue bilateral relations (i.e. dialogue, diplomacy and trade relations) with the target country
    - iii. **Western compliance:** Take measures to make the “Western” (Ukraine, EU) side comply & critique on Western behavior
    - iv. **Other**
  - b. **International**
    - i. **EU**
      1. **Dialogue & diplomacy:** try to establish dialogue or through diplomacy
      2. **Burden distribution:** distribute the burden between countries more evenly
      3. **Western compliance:** Take measures to make the “Western” (Ukraine, EU) side comply
      4. **Other**
    - ii. **Other / unclear**
      1. **Dialogue & diplomacy:** Try to establish dialogue or through diplomacy

2. **International agreements:** follow or stress international agreements
  3. **Other / unclear**
  - c. **Both national and international / unclear**
3. **Role in EU cooperation:** what role do politicians want their country to play when sanctions are under discussion on the EU level? This dimension covers the behavior of the country within the international environment. It covers what role the parliamentarians see their countries play in EU integration.
- a. **assertive** (intergovernmental)
    - i. **block** discussions on sanctions
    - ii. **support** discussions on sanctions
      1. call for **stricter sanctions**
      2. call for **keeping** the **current sanctions** in place
      3. call for **softer sanctions**
      4. try to achieve **other objectives** related to sanctions
  - b. **reticent** (supranational)
    - i. Stressing the need for a **united EU**
    - ii. **Other**
4. **Reasons for (coming closer to) lifting the sanctions:** reasons parliamentarians give to (come closer to) lifting sanctions. This dimension covers both reasons that are important to the country as such, as well as reasons that parliamentarians attribute to a wider (i.e. EU) interest. When statements are included in this dimension, this does not necessarily mean that the parliamentarians want to lift the sanctions right away. If a statement notes “if this happens... then this...”, it is included in this dimension. This dimension also covers speculations about lifting sanctions in the future.
- a. **Economic reasons** (impact on trade possibilities existing before the sanctions, sanctions hitting certain countries in the EU more than others)
  - b. Stressing the need for a **united EU** / other countries wanting to lift sanctions
  - c. **Minsk agreement**
    - i. **Full implementation** of Minsk II
    - ii. **Partial implementation** of Minsk II
  - d. **General impact** of current sanctions (duration, countersanctions, etc.)
  - e. **Ineffectiveness** of sanctions
  - f. **Other**
5. **Reasons for implementing new or upholding the existing sanctions:** this dimension covers all statements that point towards parliamentarians wanting to keep the current sanctions in place, or support stricter sanctions. When parliamentarians state for example that they want to keep the sanctions in place because the Minsk agreement has not been fulfilled, they are part of this

dimension. When parliamentarians state that when the Minsk agreement is fulfilled sanctions can be lifted, they are part of dimension 4. This dimension also involves statements that want sanctions to stay in place when they are as a response to statements calling for stricter sanctions.

**a. Stricter sanctions**

i. **New reasons** for having sanctions (constraining)

1. Involvement in the war in **Syria**

2. **MH17**

ii. **Ineffectiveness** or limited effect of **current sanctions**

iii. **Security concerns** (concerns about security, so for that reason stricter sanctions)

iv. **Prevention of future escalations** (signaling)

**b. Upholding existing sanctions:** this category includes statements that are both against implementing stricter measures, as well as statements that are actively in favor of keeping the current measures in place.

i. **Strategic culture** (attributing upholding sanctions to a perceived “national” way of dealing with such measures)

ii. **Minsk agreement** (as reason to keep the sanctions)

iii. **Continued involvement** in already existing conflicts

1. **Ukraine, Crimea** (violation of international law, initial reason for the sanctions)

2. **MH17**

3. **Other / unclear**

iv. **Security concerns** (concerns about security when lifting sanctions/making sanctions stricter)

1. **Domestic / EU concerns**

2. Concerns about **other regions** (Ukraine, other)

**v. Effectivity of current sanctions**

1. **Counterproductive/ineffective:** new sanctions as counterproductive or ineffective

2. **Other**

vi. Need for a **united EU**, concerns about EU unanimity when changing or lifting sanctions

**vii. Other**

## Appendix 2. Coding sheet containing first, second and final codes

The coding sheet below consists of images of the full coding sheet, coded in Microsoft Excel.

A textual version is in possession of the author, and is available upon request.

### Finnish documents

#### First coding

Unit no.	Category for dim. 1	Category for dim. 2	Category for dim. 3	Category for dim. 4	Category for dim. 5
1			b.ii.1		
2			b.ii.1		
3			b.ii.2		
4		b.iv.1			
5		b.iv.1	b.ii.1		
6		b.i.4	b.i.4	a.ii.4	
7			a.ii		
8		b.i.4	b.i.4	a.ii.4	
9	f				
10			a.iv		
11			a.iii		
12	b.i				
13	b.i	b.ii			
14	d		a.iv		
15			b.ii.1		
16			b.ii.1	b.ii	
17			b.ii.2		
18		b.i			
19		b.iv.1	a.iv		
20	c.i				
21			b.i.2		
22			b.i.2	a.ii.4	
23			b.i.2	a.ii.4	
24	e				
25		b.i.2			
26	c.i				
27			b.ii.1		
28			a.ii		
29			a.i	b.ii	
30			a.iv		
31			a.iv		
32	f				
33			b.i.1		
34			b.ii.1		
35			b.i.4	a.ii.4	
36	b.i				
37				a.ii.4	
38				a.ii.4	
39	b.ii	c.i			
40			b.i		
41			b.ii		
42	a		a.i		

#### Second coding

Unit no.	Category for dim. 1	Category for dim. 2	Category for dim. 3	Category for dim. 4	Category for dim. 5
1			b.ii.1		
2			b.ii.1		
3			b.ii.2		
4		b.iv.1			
5		b.iv.1	a.ii		
6		b.i.4	b.i.4	a.ii.4	
7	a.ii				
8	d			a.ii.4	
9	f		b.ii.3		
10			a.iii		
11			a.iii		
12	b.i				
13	b.i	b.ii			
14	d				
15			b.ii.1		
16			b.ii.2	b.ii	
17			b.ii.2		
18		b.i			
19		b.iv.1	a.iv		
20	c.i				
21			b.i.2		
22			b.i.2	a.ii.4	
23			b.i.2	a.ii.4	
24	d				
25			b.i.2		
26	c.i				
27			b.ii.1		
28			a.ii		
29			a.i	b.ii	
30			a.iv		
31			a.iv		
32	f				
33			b.i.1		
34			c		
35				a.ii.4	
36	b.i	b.vi			
37				a.ii.4	
38				a.ii.4	
39	b.ii	c.i	b.ii		
40					
41		b.ii			
42	a				

#### Final code

Unit no.	Category for dim. 1	Category for dim. 2	Category for dim. 3	Category for dim. 4	Category for dim. 5	Government / Opposition
1			b.ii.1			Government
2			b.ii.1			Government
3			b.ii.2			Government
4		b.iv.1				Government
5		b.iv.1	a.ii			Government
6		b.i.4	b.i.4	a.ii.4		Government
7	a.ii					Government
8	d		b.i.4	a.ii.4		Government
9	f		c			Government
10			a.iii			Opposition
11			a.iii			Opposition
12	b.i					Government
13	b.i	b.ii				Government
14	d		a.iv			Government
15			b.ii.1			Government
16			b.ii.2	b.ii		Government
17			b.ii.2			Government
18		b.i				Government
19	a.iv	b.iv.1				Opposition
20	c.i					Government
21			b.i.2			Government
22			b.i.2	a.ii.4		Government
23			b.i.2	a.ii.4		Government
24	d					Government
25			b.i.2			Government
26	c.i					Government
27			b.ii.1			Government
28			a.ii			Government
29			a.i	b.ii		Government
30			a.iv			Opposition
31			a.iv			Opposition
32	f					Government
33			b.i.1			Government
34			c			Government
35			b.i.4	a.ii.4		Opposition
36	b.i	b.vi				Government
37				a.ii.4		Government
38				a.ii.4		Government
39	b.ii	c.i				Government
40			b.i			Opposition
41		b.ii				Opposition
42	a		a.i			Opposition







92			a.ii		
93			a.i		
94		a	a.i		
95			a.i		
96			a.i		
97			a.i		
98			b.i.2		
99			a.i		
100 e			a.iv		
101			a.ii		
102 c		d		a.ii.3	
103			b.i.2	a.ii.4	
104			a.ii		
105		c.ii			
106			b.ii		
107		d	a.i		
108		a	a.iv		
109			a.i		
110 c		a			
111			a.i		
112			b.ii.1		
113		c.i	b.i.4		
114			a.ii		
115		b.ii			
116			a.iv		
117			a.iv		
118 b.ii			b.iii.1		
119		c.i			
120			a.ii		
121		a			
122				b.ii	
123			b.i.1		
124		e			
125 b.ii		c.i			
126			b.ii.3		
127 b.ii		c.i			
128		f			
129		a			
130			a.iii		
131			a.iv		
132 b.i				b.v.2	
133		c.i			
134		a	a.iv		
135 c		d	b.i.1	a.ii.3	
136		a			
137			a.ii		
138		a	a.ii		
139			a.i		
140			a.i		

92	b.ii		b.vi	a.ii	
93				a.i	
94		a		a.i	
95				a.i	
96				a.i	
97				a.i	
98				b.i.2	
99				a.i	
100 e				a.iv	
101				a.ii	
102 c		d			a.ii.3
103				b.i.2	a.ii.4
104				a.ii	
105		c.ii			
106			b.ii		
107		f		a.i	
108		a		a.iv	
109				a.i	
110 c		a			
111				a.i	
112				b.ii.1	
113		c.i		b.i.4	
114				a.ii	
115 b.i			b.ii		
116				a.iv	
117				a.iv	
118 b.ii			b.iii.1		
119		c.i			
120				a.ii	
121 d				a.iv	
122				a.iv	b.ii
123				b.i.1	
124		e			
125 b.ii		c.i			
126				b.ii.3	
127 b.ii		c.i			
128		f			
129		a			
130				a.iii	
131				a.iv	
132 b.ii			b.v.2		
133		c.i			
134		a		a.ii	
135 c		d		a.iv	a.ii.3
136		a			
137				a.ii	
138 b.ii		a		a.ii	
139				a.i	
140				a.i	

92	b.ii		b.vi	a.ii		Government
93				a.i		Government
94		a		a.i		Government
95				a.i		Opposition
96				a.i		Government
97				a.i		Government
98				b.i.2		Government
99				a.i		Opposition
100 e				a.iv		Opposition
101				a.ii		Opposition
102 c		d			a.ii.3	Government
103				b.i.2	a.ii.4	Government
104				a.ii		Opposition
105		c.ii				Government
106			b.ii			Government
107		d		a.i		Government
108		a		a.iv		Government
109				a.i		Government
110 c		a				Government
111				a.i		Opposition
112				b.ii.1		Government
113		c.i		b.i.4		Government
114				a.ii		Government
115			b.ii			Government
116				a.iv		Government
117				a.iv		Opposition
118 b.ii			b.iii.1			Government
119		c.i				Government
120				a.ii		Government
121 d				a.iv		Government
122				a.iv	b.ii	Government
123				b.i.1		Government
124		e				Government
125 b.ii		c.i				Government
126				b.ii.3		Government
127 b.ii		c.i				Opposition
128		f				Opposition
129		a				Opposition
130				a.iii		Opposition
131				a.iv		Opposition
132 b.ii			b.v.2			Opposition
133		c.i				Opposition
134		a		a.ii		Government
135 c		d		a.iv	a.ii.3	Government
136		a				Government
137				a.ii		Government
138		a		a.ii		Government
139				a.i		Government
140				a.i		Government

141	d				
142	a				
143	b.i	b.iii.3			
144		a.ii			
145	b.ii				
146		a.iv			
147	b.i	a.ii	a.ii.2		
148		b.iii.1			
149		b.vii			
150		c			
151		a.ii			
152		a.ii			
153		a.ii			
154	b.ii		a.iv		
155		b.iii.1			
156	c.i				
157		b.iii.1			
158		b.i.1			
159		a.iv			
160		b.iv.1			
161		b.iii.1			
162		b.iv.1			

141	f				
142	a				
143	b.i	b.iii.3			
144		a.ii			
145	b.ii	c.ii			
146		a.iv			
147	b.ii	a.ii	a.ii.2		
148		b.iii.1			
149		b.vii			
150		c			
151		a.ii			
152		a.ii			
153		a.ii			
154	b.ii		a.iv		
155		b.iii.1			
156	b.ii	c.i			
157		b.iii.1			
158		b.i.1			
159		a.iv			
160		b.iv.1			
161		b.iii.1			
162		b.iv.1			

141	f				Government
142	a				Government
143	b.i	b.iii.3			Government
144		a.ii			Government
145	b.ii	c.ii			Government
146		a.iv			Government
147	b.ii	a.ii	a.ii.2		Government
148		b.iii.1			Government
149		b.vii			Government
150		c			Government
151		a.ii			Government
152		a.ii			Government
153		a.ii			Government
154	b.ii	a.iv			Government
155		b.iii.1			Government
156	b.ii	c.i			Government
157		b.iii.1			Opposition
158		b.i.1			Opposition
159		a.iv			Government
160		b.iv.1			Government
161		b.iii.1			Government
162		b.iv.1			Government



## Dutch documents

### First coding

Unit no.	Category for dim. 1	Category for dim. 2	Category for dim. 3	Category for dim. 4	Category for dim. 5
1					a.ii.2
2	b.i				a.ii.2
3	a.i	a.i.1			a.ii.1
4	b.i				a.j
5	a.i	b.vii			a.j
6	b.ii				
7			a.iv		
8	b.i	b.v.2			
9		b.ii			a.ii.2
10		b.ii			
11			b.i.3		
12			b.ii.3		
13			b.ii.3		
14			a.iv		
15		b.vi			b.j
16	b.ii	b.v.1			
17	b.i	b.ii			a.ii.2
18	b.ii	b.vi			
19	b.i				
20		b.vi			
21	b.i	b.ii			
22		b.vi			
23	b.i	b.iii.1			
24	b.i	b.ii			
25	b				
26	f				
27	b.ii				
28	b.i				
29		b.vi			b.i
30					
31		b.ii			b.i.3
32	b.ii				a.ii.2
33	b.i				
34			a.iii		
35	b.i				
36	c.ii				
37	b.ii	b.iv.2			
38	a.ii		a.ii		
39	a.ii				a.ii.1
40	a.ii	a.i.2			a.ii.1
41	b.i		a.ii		

### Second coding

Unit no.	Category for dim. 1	Category for dim. 2	Category for dim. 3	Category for dim. 4	Category for dim. 5
1				b.i.4	a.ii.2
2	b.i				a.ii.2
3	a.i	a.i.1			a.ii.1
4	b.i				
5	b.ii				a.i
6	b.ii				
7			a.iv		
8	b.i	b.v.2			
9		b.ii			a.ii.2
10			b.i.3		
11			b.ii.3		
12			b.ii.3		
13		b.iv.2	b.ii.3		
14			a.iv		
15		b.vi		b.i	
16	b.ii	b.v.1	b.ii.1		
17	b.i	b.ii			a.ii.2
18	b.ii	b.vi			
19	b.i				
20		b.vi			
21	b.i	b.ii			
22		b.vii			
23	b.i	b.iii.1			
24		b.ii			
25	b				
26	f				
27	b.ii				
28	b.i				
29		b.vi	b.i.4		a.ii.4
30					
31		b.ii			
32	b.i		b.i.3		a.ii.2
33	b.i				
34			a.iii		
35	b.i				
36	c.ii				
37	b.ii	b.iv.2			
38	a.ii		a.iv		
39	a.ii				a.ii.1
40	a.ii	a.i.2			
41	b.i		a.ii		

### Final code

Unit no.	Category for dim. 1	Category for dim. 2	Category for dim. 3	Category for dim. 4	Category for dim. 5
1					Opposition
2	b.i			a.ii.2	Opposition
3	a.i	a.i.1		a.ii.1	Opposition
4	b.i				Government
5	b.ii			a.i	Government
6	b.ii				Government
7			a.iv		Government
8	b.i	b.v.2			Government
9		b.ii		a.ii.2	Government
10			b.ii	b.i.3	Government
11				b.i.3	Government
12				b.ii.3	Government
13		b.iv.2	b.ii.3		Government
14			a.iv		Government
15		b.vi		b.i	Government
16	b.ii	b.v.1	b.ii.1		Government
17	b.i	b.ii			Government
18	b.ii	b.vi		a.ii.2	Government
19	b.i				Opposition
20		b.vi			Opposition
21	b.i	b.ii			Opposition
22		b.vii			Opposition
23	b.i	b.iii.1			Government
24		b.ii			Government
25	b				Government
26	f				Government
27	b.ii				Government
28	b.i				Government
29		b.vi			Government
30				a.ii.4	Government
31		b.ii		b.i.3	Government
32	b.i				Government
33	b.i			a.ii.2	Government
34			a.iii		Opposition
35	b.i				Opposition
36	c.ii				Opposition
37	b.ii	b.iv.2			Opposition
38	a.ii		a.iv		Opposition
39	a.ii			a.ii.1	Opposition
40	a.ii	a.i.2		a.ii.1	Opposition
41	b.i		a.ii		Government







89	a.ii		b.vi		b.i
90	a.ii		a.ii		a.ii.1
91	b.i		b.ii		
92			a.iii		
93			a.i.1		
94	a.ii				a.ii.1
95			b.vi		
96	b.i		b.iii.1		
97			b.vi		b.i
98	b.ii		b.vi		b.i
99			b.vi		
100	b.ii			b.i.4	
101	b.ii		b.vi		
102	d				a.ii.1
103			b.vi		
104	b.ii		b.vi		
105				b.i.3	
106	b.i				
107	b.ii		b.iii.1		
108			b.v.1		
109				b.ii.1	
110	b.i		b.ii		
111		c.ii			
112		c.ii			
113		c.ii			
114		f			
115				b.ii.3	a.ii.4
116		c.ii			
117			a.iv		
118				b.i.3	
119				b.i.3	
120	b.ii		b.iv.2		
121	b.i				
122	b.i		b.v.2		
123			a.ii		
124	b.i				
125				b.ii.3	
126				b.ii.1	
127	a.i			a.iv	
128	b.ii		b.ii		
129				c	
130			b.iv.1		b.ii.1
131				a.ii	
132		c.ii			
133		d			
134	b.ii	c.i			
135				b.i.3	

89	b.ii		b.vi		b.i
90	d		a.ii		a.ii.4
91	b.i		b.ii		
92			a.iii		
93			a.i.1		
94	a.ii				a.ii.1
95	b.ii		b.vi		b.i
96	b.i		b.iii.1		
97			b.vi		b.i
98			b.vi		b.i
99			b.vi		
100	b.ii			b.i.4	
101	b.ii		b.vi		
102	d				a.ii.1
103			b.vi		
104	b.ii		b.vi		
105				b.i.3	
106	b.i				a.i
107	b.ii		b.iii.1		
108			b.v.1		
109				b.ii.1	
110	b.i		b.ii		
111		c.ii			
112		c.i			
113		c.ii			
114		d			
115				b.ii.3	a.ii.4
116		c.ii			
117	a.ii		a.ii		
118				b.i.3	
119				b.i.3	
120	b.ii		b.iv.1		
121	b.i				
122	b.i		b.v.2	a.ii	
123			a.ii		
124	b.i				
125				b.ii.3	
126				b.ii.1	
127			b.iv.1	a.iv	
128	b.ii		b.ii	c	
129					
130			b.iv.1	b.ii.1	
131				a.ii	
132		c.ii			
133		d			
134	b.ii	c.i			
135				b.i.3	

89					b.i	Government
90	d		a.ii		a.ii.4	Government
91	b.i		b.ii			Government
92			a.iii			Opposition
93			a.i.1			Opposition
94	a.ii				a.ii.1	Opposition
95	b.ii		b.vi		b.i	Government
96	b.i		b.iii.1			Government
97			b.vi		b.i	Government
98			b.vi		b.i	Government
99			b.vi			Government
100	b.ii			b.i.4		Government
101	b.ii		b.vi			Government
102	d				a.ii.1	Opposition
103			b.vi			Government
104	b.ii		b.vi			Government
105				b.i.3		Opposition
106	b.i					Opposition
107	b.ii		b.iii.1			Opposition
108			b.v.1			Opposition
109				b.ii.1		Opposition
110	b.i		b.ii			Opposition
111		c.ii				Opposition
112		c.i				Opposition
113		c.ii				Opposition
114		d				Opposition
115				b.ii.3	a.ii.4	Opposition
116		c.ii				Opposition
117	a.ii		a.ii			Government
118				b.i.3		Opposition
119				b.i.3		Opposition
120	b.ii		b.iv.1			Opposition
121	b.i					Government
122	b.i		b.v.2	a.ii		Opposition
123			a.ii			Government
124	b.i					Government
125				b.ii.3		Government
126				b.ii.1		Government
127			b.iv.1	a.iv		Opposition
128	b.ii		b.ii			Government
129				c		Government
130			b.iv.1	b.ii.1		Government
131				a.ii		Opposition
132		c.ii				Opposition
133		d				Opposition
134	b.ii	c.i				Government
135				b.i.3		Government



136		c.ii				Opposition
137		c.i				Government
138				b.ii.1		Government
139 a.i				a.iv		Opposition
140				b.i.4		Government
141 a.i			a.iii	a.iv		Opposition
142			b.vii			Government
143 b.ii				b.i.4		Government
144					a.ii.2	Government
145			b.ii			Government
146 b.i				b.ii.1		Government
147				b.ii.1		Government
148 a.ii			a.i.1			Government
149 a.ii			a.i.1			Government
150 a.ii				a.ii.1		Government
151			a.i.1			Opposition
152 a.ii						Opposition
153			a.i.1			Opposition
154 b.ii			b.v.1			Opposition
155			a.ii			Opposition
156			b.v.1			Opposition
157 b.ii			b.v.1			Opposition
158 a.ii			a.i.1			Government
159 a.ii			a.iv		a.ii.1	Government
160 b.ii			b.iv.2			Government
161 b.ii			b.vii			Government
162			a.ii			Government
163			a.i.1			Government
164 d			a.i.1			Government
165 b.ii			b.vi		b.i	Government
166 b.ii			b.v.1			Government
167			b.v.2			Government
168					a.ii.1	Government
169 b.i					b.i	Government
170			b.v.2			Government
171			b.v.1			Government
172					b.ii	Government
173 b.ii			b.vi		a.ii.4	Government
174 b.ii			b.v.1			Government
175 b.ii			b.v.1			Government

136		c.ii				
137		c.i				
138				b.ii.1		
139 a.i				a.iv		
140				b.i.4		
141 a.i			a.iii	a.iv		
142 b.ii			b.vii			
143 b.ii				b.i.4		
144					a.ii.2	
145			b.ii			
146 b.i				b.ii.1		
147				b.ii.1		
148 a.ii			a.i.1			
149 a.ii			a.i.1			
150 a.ii					a.ii.1	
151			a.i.1			
152 a.ii						
153			a.i.1			
154 b.ii			b.v.1			
155			a.ii			
156 b.ii			b.v.1			
157 b.ii			b.v.1			
158 a.ii			a.i.1			
159 a.ii			a.iv		a.ii.1	
160 b.ii			b.iv.2			
161 b.ii			b.vii			
162 a.ii			a.ii			
163			a.i.1			
164 d			a.i.1			
165 b.ii			b.vi		b.i	
166 b.ii			b.v.1			
167			b.v.2			
168					a.ii.1	
169 b.i					b.i	
170			b.v.2			
171			b.v.1		b.ii	
172					a.ii.4	
173 b.ii			b.vi			
174 b.ii			b.v.1			
175 b.ii			b.v.1			

136		c.ii				
137		c.i				
138				b.ii.1		
139 a.i				a.iv		
140				b.i.4		
141 a.i				a.iv		
142			b.vii			
143 b.ii				b.i.4		
144					a.ii.2	
145			b.ii			
146 b.i				b.ii.1		
147				b.ii.1		
148 a.ii			a.i.1			
149 a.ii			a.i.1			
150 a.ii					a.ii.1	
151			a.i.1			
152 a.ii						
153			a.i.1			
154 b.ii			b.v.1			
155			a.ii			
156			b.v.1			
157 b.ii			b.iv.2			
158 a.ii			a.i.1			
159 a.i			a.iv		a.ii.1	
160 b.ii			b.iv.2			
161 b.ii			b.vii			
162			a.ii			
163			a.i.1			
164 a.i			a.i.1			
165 b.ii			b.vi		b.i	
166 b.ii			b.v.1			
167			b.v.2			
168					a.ii.1	
169					b.i	
170		f				
171			b.v.1			
172					a.ii.1	
173			b.vi		b.ii	
174			b.vii			
175 b.ii			b.v.1			

## Appendix 3. Units of coding including the final codes

The units of coding including their final codes below are images of a file originating from Atlas.ti 9. The Finnish units of coding start with an eight (8), followed by the number of the unit. The Dutch units of coding start with a nine (9), followed by the number of the unit. A textual version is in possession of the author, and available upon request.

1	1. Eduskunta. <i>Pöytäkirja PTK 2</i> . February 4, 2016. <a href="https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/Documents/PTK_2+2016.pdf">https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/Documents/PTK_2+2016.pdf</a>	
2		
3	Antti Kaikkonen kesk: Dialogi ja diplomatia ovat nyt tärkeämpiä kuin pitkään aikaan.	8.1 D... 0.2 FIN - governmen... 4.b.ii.1 International: ...
4		
5	Järjestöt ovat olleet foorumeina jopa poikkeuksellisia siksi, että paikalla ovat olleet sekä EU, Venäjä että Ukraina. Vuoropuhelua venäläisparlamentaarikkojen ja muiden toimijoiden kanssa on tärkeää jatkaa rakentavien ratkaisujen löytämiseksi.	8.2 Järjestöt ovat o... 0.2 FIN - governmen... 4.b.ii.1 International: ...
6		
7	Keskusteluyhteyden aktivoiminen ei kuitenkaan voi tapahtua kansainvälisen oikeuden ja sääntöpohjaisen kansainvälisen järjestelmän keskeisten periaatteiden kustannuksella. Se ei olisi varsinkaan pienten maiden etujen mukaista.	8.3 Keskusteluyhte... 0.2 FIN - governmen... 4.b.ii.2 International: ...
8		
9		
10	17.14 Ilkka Kanerva kok: Puhun tästä sen vuoksi, että me olemme vähän turtuneet kuvitelmissamme uutisvirran vertailussa Syyrian, Lähi-idän tapahtumiin ja jättäneet vähemmälle huomiolle sen, että itse asiassa matka Helsingistä Ukrainan rajalle on lyhyempi kuin matka Helsingistä Suomen pohjoisrajalle. Se on lähellä, ja se tuntuu monin eri tavoin meidän turvallisuusympäristössämme. Me tiedämme, että Ukrainan kriisi ei suinkaan ole vain Ukrainan kriisi, vaan se luonnollisesti kertoo siitä, että Euroopassa turvallisuusintressit konfrontoivat toisiaan tavalla, joka vakavasti luo uuden turvallisuushaasteen myöskin meidän omassa turvallisuusympäristössämme.	8.4 Puhun tästä sen vuoksi, että me olemme vähän turt... 0.2 FIN - governmen... 3.b.iv.1 Upholding ex...
	Tämä kaikki kertoo siitä, että työtä on tehtävä, ja se myös kertoo tietysti siitä, että Suomen kannattaa kaikista syistä, paitsi yleisistä turvallisuuspoliittiseen tilanteeseen liittyvistä myöskin omasta turvallisuuspolitiikastaan juontuvista seikoista johtuen, tehdä kaikkensa rauhanvälityksen ja sovun, poliittisen dialogin ja diplomatian hyväksi.	8.5 Tämä kaikki kertoo siitä... 0.2 FIN - governmen... 3.b.iv.1 Upholding ex... 4.a.ii National: dialog...



12

- 13 Euroopan unioni uudistaa tällä hetkellä ulkopoliittista strategiaansa. Toivon todella, että Euroopan unionissa myöskin tuon strategian uudistamisen yhteydessä
- 23 mietitään hyvin tarkoin, minkälaisia myönteisiä ja minkälaisia kielteisiä vaikutuksia on taloudellisella sanktiopolitiikalla. Sanktioita ei tänä päivänä käytetä ensimmäistä kertaa, niistä on kohtuullisen laaja kokemus olemassa, ja on perusteltua pyytää, olettaa ja odottaa, että Euroopan unioni arvioi sanktiopolitiikkansa tehokkuutta ulkopoliittisen keinovalikoiman joukossa.

14

- 15 Aila Paloniemi kesk: Ja olen ehdottomasti samaa mieltä tuosta vuoropuhelun ja dialogin syventämisen tarpeesta. Sitä on syvennettävä myös Venäjän kanssa.
- 16

17

- Ja pakotepoliitikalle on löydettävä jonkinlainen exit-ohjelma. Se on ihan oikeasti tärkeitä, ja siitä pitää keskustella EU:ssa todella vakavasti.
- 18
- 19

20

- Se apu ei saavuta läheskään kaikkia, sen ihan selkeästi kuulin ja haastattelin siellä ihmisiä. Ruokaa, vettä, lämpöä, kaikkea tätä, tietysti puuttuu, suojaa, talvi on armoton. Ja ketkä kaikkein eniten kärsivät tietenkin tästä valtavan hankalasta tilanteesta? Tietenkin
- 21 haavoittuvimmassa asemassa olevat ihmiset eli esimerkiksi lapset ja vanhukset. Meidän on pakko saada ratkaisu tähän Ukrainan tilanteeseen, ja vaikka se kuulostaa nyt kuinka naiivilta, niin kaikki keinot on otettava käyttöön.

Eero Heinäluoma sd: Minusta olisi tarve samalla, kun esitämme vaatimuksia muille, pohtia myös omaa toimintaamme, ja siksi kysynkin: Onko Etyjin suomalaisessa delegaatiossa miten käyty lävitse tämä Venäjän duuman puhemiehen Suomeen-tuloviisumin epääminen?

8:6 Euroopan unioni uudistaa tällä hetkellä ...	0.2 FIN - governmen...
	4.b.i.4 International: ...
	5.a.ii.4 Assertive: sup...

8:7 Ja olen...	0.2 FIN - governmen...
	4.a.ii National: dialog...

8:8 Ja pak...	0.2 FIN - governmen...
	1.d Indifferent / uncl...
	4.b.i.4 International: ...
	5.a.ii.4 Assertive: sup...

8:9 Se apu ei saavuta läheskään kaikkia...	0.2 FIN - governmen...
	2.f Other
	4.c Both national an...

8:10 Minusta olisi tarv...	0.1 FIN - opposition
	4.a.iii National: West...

24 Ymmärsin, että sitä perusteltiin ulkoministeriössä  
nimenomaan laillisuusnäkökohdilla, että on  
pilkuntarkasti noudatettava näitä EU:n  
33 pakotesäännöksiä — asia, josta tosin eurooppalaisten  
kumppaniemme keskuudessa oli toisia mielipiteitä,  
34 muun muassa Saksassa. He katsoivat, että olisi tullut  
myöntää lupa.

8:11 Ymmärsin, että sitä pe...  
0.1 FIN - opposition  
4.a.iii National: West...

25

26 Antti Kaikkonen kesk: Mitä tulee pakotekysymykseen,  
minkä edustaja Heinonen otti täällä esille,  
henkilökohtaisesti tuen tietenkin hallituksen ja  
Suomen yhteistä linjaa ja yksituumaista linjaa tässä  
asiassa.

8:12 Mitä tulee pa...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
1.b.i Continuation: e...

27

28 On tietysti hyvä muistaa, että pakotteet eivät tulleet  
aivan syyttä, niille oli tietty syynsä. Ja niiden  
tulevaisuus on sidottu etenemiseen Minskin  
sopimuksen toteuttamisessa. Siinä on jonkinlaista  
edistystä, tulitauko on kohtuullisesti pitänyt, mutta  
henkeä pidätellen pitää päivittäin seurata edelleenkin  
tilanteen kehittymistä.

8:13 On tietysti hyvä muist...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
1.b.i Continuation: e...  
3.b.ii Upholding exist...

29

30 Mutta kaikkien etu olisi, että tässä asiassa päästään  
myönteisellä tavalla eteenpäin. Se on tietysti Suomen  
näkövinkelistä todettava, että nämä pakotteet ja  
vastapakotteet kohtelevat eri EU-maita eri tavalla. Me  
tällä Suomessa itse kärsimme niistä enemmän kuin  
Portugalissa tai jossain vähän kaukaisemmassa EU-  
31 maassa, ne täällä hyvin kouriintuntuvalla tavalla  
tuntuvat.

8:14 Mutta kaikkien etu olisi, e...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
2.d General impact o...  
4.a.iv National: other

Senkin takia pidän tärkeänä, että diplomatian ja  
vuoropuhelun keinoin työskennellään kovasti kohti  
poliittista ja rauhanomaista ja kestävää ratkaisua  
Ukrainan kriisin ja muiden eurooppalaisten  
jännitteiden suhteen.

8:15 Senkin takia p...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
4.b.ii.1 International: ...

Ilkka Kanerva kok: jonka mukaan pienelle maalle on  
äärettömän tärkeää noudattaa kansainvälisiä  
sopimuksia mutta myös tukea kansainvälisten  
järjestöjen tekemiä päätöksiä, niiden asemaa ja  
vaikutusvaltaa, jonka kaltainen luonnollisesti Etyj mitä  
suurimmalla mitalla on.

8:16 Ilkka Kanerva mu...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
4.b.ii.2 International: ...  
5.b.ii Reticent: other

35

43 Pauli Kiuru kok: Niin kuin tässä on käynyt useammankin edustajan suulla ilmi, on erityisen tärkeää, että sopimuksia noudatetaan, ja erityisen tärkeätä nimenomaan, että pienet maat noudattavat sopimuksia.

44

37 Tämä on Suomelle mitä lähintä historiaa jo ihan tuolta Venäjän vallan loppuvuosilta, jolloin Suomen talous, kulttuuri ja identiteetti perustuivat lakiin, sopimuksiin, niiden noudattamiseen ja ehdottomaan kunnioittamiseen.

38

39 Eero Heinäluoma sd: Nyt olen hivenen huolestunut siitä, että vaikka puhutaan näin merkittävästä asiasta, että yksi unionin maa sanoo olevansa hyökkäyksen kohteena, kokee olevansa hyökkäyksen kohteena, pyytää apua ja Suomi ilmoittaa auttavansa, niin tästä asiasta ei tässä salissa puhuta ollenkaan eikä hallitus ole kertonut, mitä se aikoo tehdä, koko eduskunnalle. Kun puhutaan näin järeistä asioista, jotka ovat myös meidän turvallisuuden asia, että miten tätä unionin perussopimuksen artiklaa tulkitaan, niin olettaisin, että koko eduskunnan intressi olisi saada tieto, mitä hallitus on tekemässä, mihin Suomea näillä nyt tehtävillä päätöksillä konkreettisesti sidotaan, kuinka pitkälle tässä tuessa ollaan valmiit menemään, ja myös arvio siitä, mitä se tarkoittaa jatkossa vastaavissa tilanteissa.

40

41

Timo Heinonen kok: Onneksi valiokunnan puheenjohtaja, edustaja Kaikkonen kertoi tien pois näistä pakotteista. Se on Minskin sopimuksen noudattaminen ja paluu niihin yhteisiin sopimuksiin ja itsenäisten valtioiden kunnioittamiseen, mitä Venäjä on nyt rikkonut esimerkiksi Krimin osalta.

Oikeastaan yksi, mitä pitäisi pohtia ja mistä varmasti ollaan aika lailla yhtä mieltä, on se, että nämä pakotteet kohtelevat hyvin eri tavalla eri maita EU:ssa.

8:17 Niin kuin tässä...	0.2 FIN - governmen...
	4.b.ii.2 International: ...
8:18 Tämä on Suo...	0.2 FIN - governmen...
	3.b.i Upholding existi...

8:19 Nyt olen hivenen huolestunut siitä, että vaikka puhutaan n...	0.1 FIN - opposition
	3.b.iv.1 Upholding ex...
	4.a.iv National: other

8:20 Onneksi valiokun...	0.2 FIN - governmen...
	2.c.i Minsk agreeme...

8:21 Oikeastaa...	0.2 FIN - governmen...
	4.b.i.2 International: ...



46

47 Ja nyt kun tilanne on pitkittynyt ja se saattaa pitkittyä  
vielä reilustikin, niin onko EU:n sisällä käyty ja  
56 pitäisikö — minusta pitäisi — käydä keskustelua  
57 näistä taakanjaoista myös tässä kysymyksessä, jotta  
Euroopan maat kantaisivat tasaisemmin taakkaa  
58 näiden pakotteiden vaikutuksista? Nyt ne kohdistuvat  
Suomeen poikkeuksellisen rajusti, siitä varmasti  
59 olemme yhtä mieltä.

60

61 Toivon, että meidän maan ulkopolitiikan johto ja EU-  
politiikan johto käyvät myös tätä keskustelua ja  
avaavat sitä siihen, että taakkaa jaettaisiin  
tasapuolisemmin myös tässä kysymyksessä.

50

51 Ritva Elomaa ps: Nämä pakotteet Venäjälle —  
haluaisinkin tiedustella, miten ne ovat vaikuttaneet  
tämänhetkiseen Ukrainan tilanteeseen, nämä  
pakotteet, jotka Venäjälle on asetettu. Suomelle ne  
ovat myös hyvin raskaat.

52 Ja kuten edustaja Heinonen tässä totesi, niin onko  
ajateltu, että tätä taakanjakoa suoritettaisiin EU:n  
välillä, koska Suomen kohdalla ne ovat erittäin  
raskaat, myös taloudellisesti?

53

54

Ilkka Kanerva kok: Juuri tähän perustuen ulkoministeri  
Steinmeier tuli tänään julkisuuteen vedoten  
tulitaukosopimukseen, ja se on erittäin keskeinen  
periaate — Minskin sopimus on ainoa tie ulos  
Ukrainan kriisistä.

Se tulee vaatimaan pitkän ajan ja paljon  
diplomaattisia toimenpiteitä.

Ja myöskin toivon voimakkaasti Suomen omaa  
panosta jatkossakin.

Antti Kaikkonen kesk (varsinainen puheenvuoro):  
Edustaja Heinonen kysyi tästä pakotteiden

8:22 Ja nyt kun tilanne on pitki...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
4.b.i.2 International: ...  
5.a.ii.4 Assertive: sup...

8:23 Toivon, et...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
4.b.i.2 International: ...  
5.a.ii.4 Assertive: sup...

8:24 Nämä pakott...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
2.d General impact o...

8:25 Ja kuten ...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
4.b.i.2 International: ...

8:26 Juuri tähän p...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
2.c.i Minsk agreeme...

8:27 S...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
4.b.ii.1 International: ...

8:28 J...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
4.a.ii National: dialog...

8:29  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
4.a.i National: suppo...  
5.b.ii Reticent: other

61 taakanjaosta. No, se ei välttämättä nyt päälimmäisiä  
 69 ulkoasiainvaliokunnan asioita ole, mutta toki  
 kiinnostaa myös ulkoasiainvaliokuntaa, mikä näitten  
 tilanne ja tulevaisuus on. Itse asiassa, kun valiokunta  
 oli viime viikolla kaksi päivää Brysselissä ja tapasi  
 toisena päivänä EU-instituutioiden edustajia, otimme  
 70 tämän epäriilun taakanjaon kyllä esille  
 71 useammassakin otteessa, mutta ensisijaisesti tämän  
 asian hoitaminen on kyllä maan hallituksen asia.

8-29

62

63 Eero Heinäluoma sd: Kun puhutaan näin järeistä  
 asioista, joista sanotaan, että ne ovat sodan ja rauhan  
 72 kysymyksiä, niin on tärkeitä, että eduskunta pitää  
 73 huolta siitä, että Suomen kansanvallan korkein elin on  
 mukana arvioimassa sitä, mitä hallitus tekee.

8-30 Kun puhutaan...

0.1 FIN - opposition

4.a.iv National: other

64

65 Pia Viitanen sd: Pitäisin hyvin tärkeänä ja  
 merkittävänä nimenomaisesti sitä, että hallitus oma-  
 aloitteisesti pikaisesti eduskunnalle toisi tästä tietoa.

8-31 Pitäisi...

0.1 FIN - opposition

4.a.iv National: other

66

67 Aila Paloniemi kesk: Arvoisa puhemies! Edustaja  
 Heinosenle haluan nyt selventää, että totta kai  
 kansainvälistä oikeutta pitää kunnioittaa, totta kai  
 avaimet pakotepolitiikan lopettamiselle Venäjällä ovat  
 Venäjän käsissä.

8-32 Arvoisa puhe...

0.2 FIN - governmen...

2.f Other

Mutta kyllä minä nyt kuitenkin uskallan tässä  
 keskustelussa sanoa, että jotakin on kuitenkin pahasti  
 pielessä, jos ei minkäänlaista luottamusta eikä  
 semmoista selkeää, syvää vuoropuhelua pystytä  
 synnyttämään esimerkiksi EU:n ja Venäjän välillä.

8-33 Mutta kyllä m...

0.2 FIN - governmen...

4.b.i.1 International: ...

Silloin ne avaimet pysyvät venäläisten taskussa, ja he  
 eivät aio noudattaa Minskin sopimusta. Sitä minä vain  
 tarkoitin nyt tällä puheenvuorollani äsken, että  
 meidän pitää nyt tarkastella sitä Venäjän  
 asennoitumistakin tähän ja sitä, mistä se johtuu, ja  
 niin edelleen. Meidän pitää käydä syvempää ja  
 monipuolisempaa dialogia.

8-34 Silloin ne avaimet pys...

0.2 FIN - governmen...

4.c Both national an...

Ville Skinnari sd: Me hyvin tiedämme, että EU:n  
 pakotteet ovat yhteiset, mutta kuitenkin esimerkiksi

8-35...

0.1 FIN - opposition

4.b.i.4 International: ...

5.a.ii.4 Assertive: sup...

73 me talousvaliokunnan jäsenet viime vuoden puolella  
Saksanmatkalla huomasimme, että monet EU-maat  
78 tästä huolimatta käyvät kauppaa Venäjän kanssa, itse  
asiassa Euraasian tulliliiton avulla. Tämä tulliliittohan  
79 käsittää kolme maata: Venäjän, Valko-Venäjän ja  
Kazakstanin. Näistä syistä Valko-Venäjästä muun  
muassa on tullut yksi maailman johtavista  
maitotuotteiden viejistä. Näin ollen kysynkin teiltä,  
80 arvoisat ulkoasiainvaliokunnan johtohenkilöt: onko  
teillä ollut tämä kysymys esillä Brysselinmatkallanne,  
81 ja jos ei, niin aiotteko keskustella EU-maiden  
kollegoidenne kanssa tästä kauppapoliittisesti varsin  
mielenkiintoisesta ilmiöstä?

8:35

74  
82 Ilkka Kanerva kok: Nyt kun EU on asettanut pakotteet,  
83 on luonnollisesti selvää, että niitten pakotteitten  
filosofiasta pidetään kiinni,

8:36 Nyt ...

0.2 FIN - governmen...  
1.b.i Continuation: e...  
3.b.vi Upholding exis...

76

mutta samalla kun EU myöskin miettii omaa  
ulkopoliittista strategiaansa, globaalistrategiaansa,  
kyllä kannattaa miettiä, että käydään läpi — ei tähän  
Ukrainan tilanteeseen liittyen vaan yleisesti — se,  
mitkä ovat tällaisten pakotteitten myönteiset ja  
kielteiset vaikutukset, mitkä vaikutukset niillä on  
taloudessa ja mitkä vaikutukset niillä on  
turvallisuudessa ja ulkopoliitikassa.

8:37 mutta samalla kun EU my...

0.2 FIN - governmen...  
5.a.ii.4 Assertive: sup...

Sen vuoksi tänään viimeksi on keskusteltu siitä, onko  
Suomen viisasta — niin kuin on — ottaa tämä  
kysymys käsiteltäväksi Euroopan unionin puitteissa,  
kun nyt käydään EU:n sisällä ulkopoliitiikan strategian  
uudistamista tarkoittavaa keskustelua.

8:38 Sen vuoksi tä...

0.2 FIN - governmen...  
5.a.ii.4 Assertive: sup...

Tässä suhteessa Ukrainasta juontuvat talouspakotteet  
ja EU:n strategian uudistaminen ovat hyvin kaukaista  
sukua toisilleen. Ainoa tapa Suomelle toimia ja ainoa  
tapa EU:lle toimia on luonnollisesti mennä  
pakotteiden kanssa eteenpäin ja sitä myöten niitä  
purkaen, kun Minskin sopimusta toteutetaan.

8:39 Tässä suhteessa U...

0.2 FIN - governmen...  
1.b.ii Continuation: i...  
2.c.i Minsk agreeme...

Eero Heinäluoma sd: Me olemme tunnettuja  
maailmalla siitä, että kun me sitoudumme johonkin  
sopimukseen, me noudatamme sitä ja edellytämme

8:40 Me...

0.1 FIN - opposition  
3.b.i Upholding existi...



83 myös muilta, että sitä noudatetaan. Se on osa meidän  
identiteettiämme, ja jokainen ulkomaanpäättäjä ja  
meidän kanssamme asioiva tietää sen olevan Suomen  
politiikan tärkeä osa.

8-40

84

91 Minskin sopimus on tästä hyvä esimerkki, että kun  
johonkin on sitouduttu, niin on lupa kaikilta odottaa,  
että he toimivat sen mukaisesti.

8-41 Mins...

0.1 FIN - opposition

3.b.ii Upholding exist...

86

87 2. Eduskunta. *Pöytäkirja PTK 3*. February 5,  
2016.  
[https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja](https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/Documents/PTK_3+2016.pdf)  
94 [/Documents/PTK\\_3+2016.pdf](https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/Documents/PTK_3+2016.pdf).

88

Markus Mustajärvi vas (vastauspuheenvuoro): Ja  
yhtenä isona asiana on kyllä Venäjä-pakotteet, joissa  
Suomi on ampunut itse itseään jalkaan ja on  
ensimmäisenä mallioppilaana ollut hyväksymässä  
sellaiset toimet, jotka kaikista rankimmin koskettavat  
esimerkiksi suomalaista elintarviketeollisuutta. Ei ole  
tarvinnut käydä kovinkaan monella maitotilalla, kun  
on nähnyt, mikä se karmea tilanne siellä on.

8-42 Ja yhtenä isona asiana on ...

0.1 FIN - opposition

2.a Economic reasons

4.a.i National: suppo...

3. Eduskunta. *Pöytäkirja PTK 4*. February 9,  
2016.  
[https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja](https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/Documents/PTK_4+2016.pdf)  
/Documents/PTK\_4+2016.pdf.

Pääministeri Juha Sipilä: Hallitus pitää myös  
kahdenvälisten Venäjä-suhteiden hoitoa erittäin  
tärkeänä. Samalla tiedämme, että olemme vahvasti  
EU:n yhteisen ulkopolitiikan takana — mukaan lukien  
sen pakotepäätökset

8-43 Hallitus pitää ...

0.2 FIN - governmen...

1.b.i Continuation: e...

3.b.vi Upholding exis...

4.a.ii National: dialog...

Sampo Terho ps: Ulkosuhteissa meidän on niin  
vaalittava tarkkaan Venäjä-suhteitamme kuin  
osallistuttava aktiivisesti EU:n sisäisten ja ulkoisten  
kriisien ratkaisemiseen. EU:n kehittämisen suhteen  
ainoa kestävä tie on jäsenmaiden itsenäisyyden

8-44 Ulkosuhteis...

0.2 FIN - governmen...

4.a.ii National: dialog...

5.a.ii.4 Assertive: sup...

95 kunnioittaminen ja niiden taloudellisesta  
101 omavastuusta kiinni pitäminen.

96

97 Pekka Haavisto vihr (vastauspuheenvuoro): Te,  
pääministeri, nostitte puheenvuorossanne esille myös  
102 Suomen ja Venäjän suhteet ja viittasitte tietysti  
103 siihen, että noudatamme EU:n yhteistä politiikkaa ja  
sanktioita. Itse olen huolissani siitä, miten tämä  
kehitty nimenomaan meidän idänkauppamme ja  
104 idänsuhteidemme kannalta. Suomen  
maataloustuotanto ja monet muut asiat ovat olleet  
105 tästä idänviennistä ja -kaupasta riippuvaisia.

106

107 Tietysti tästä seuraa sitten kysymys — kun tiedän,  
108 että sanktiot riippuvat Ukrainan kehityksestä —  
voimmeko me millään tavalla itse tukea tai vauhdittaa  
109 sitä, että jonkinlainen järkevä ratkaisu Ukrainan  
110 tilanteessa syntyy.

Toinen asia, josta olen huolissani, on se, että kun  
taloussuhteet ovat hiipuneet, niin samalla tällainen  
kansalaisyhteiskunnan yhteydenpito Venäjän  
suuntaan vähenee ja ikään kuin ihmisten tuntemus ja  
tietämys Venäjän asioista vähenee. Mielestäni tämä  
olisi asia, johon myöskin pitäisi kiinnittää huomiota.

Juha Sipilä: Toin keskustelussa esille sen, että Minskin  
sopimusta on noudatettava,

ja toki siinä on myös toimia Ukrainan puolelta, jotka  
ovat vielä pahasti kesken.

4. Eduskunta. Pöytäkirja PTK 27. March 18,  
2016.

[https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/](https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/Documents/PTK_27+2016.pdf)  
/Documents/PTK\_27+2016.pdf.

8:44

8:45 Te, pääministeri, nostitte puhe...

0.1 FIN - opposition

2.a Economic reasons

8:46 Tietysti tästä ...

0.1 FIN - opposition

4.a.iv National: other

8:47 Toinen asia, josta ...

0.1 FIN - opposition

2.f Other

4.a.iv National: other

8:48 Toin kes...

0.2 FIN - governmen...

3.b.ii Upholding exist...

8:49 ja toki s...

0.2 FIN - governmen...

4.a.iii National: West...

111

117 Timo Heinonen kok (vastauspuheenvuoro): Hieman  
118 huolestuneena olen seurannut sitä keskustelua, että  
Venäjän pakotteista oltaisiin nyt luopumassa tämän  
kaiken sorron keskellä, ja kysyisin nyt valtuuskunnan  
puheenjohtaja Guzeninalta: minkälaista keskustelua  
Euroopan neuvostossa tästä on käyty?

113

114

115 Antti Lindtman sd (vastauspuheenvuoro): Tämä  
121 Ukrainan tapaus: on päivänselvä asia, että nyt olisi  
122 tärkeää, että palattaisiin Minskin sopimuksen tielle, ja  
kaikkien osapuolien pitää tehdä töitä sen eteen, ja  
olisi hyvä, että tähän löydettäisiin pysyvä ratkaisu.

123

124 Päivi Räsänen kd (vastauspuheenvuoro): Kiinnitän  
vain huomiota siihen, että päätöslauselmassa  
125 selkeästi todetaan tästä Krimin tilanteesta, että siellä  
edellytetään ja kehoitetaan Venäjää perumaan Krimin  
laiton liittäminen, samoin kuin sitten on lukuisa  
126 joukko muita asioita, joita Venäjää kehoitetaan  
127 tekemään. Ja kyllä itsekkin pidän tuota  
128 valtiovarainministerin lausuntoa virheenä. Suomen  
linjan tulee olla edelleen se, (Puhemies koputtaa) että  
Venäjän tulee Krimiltä lähteä.

Timo Heinonen kok: Minä olen sitä mieltä, että  
Venäjän toimia ei saa hyväksyä, ja niin kuin tuossa  
omassa puheenvuorossani totesinkin, itse en kannata  
sellaisia puheenvuoroja, joissa puhutaan esimerkiksi  
— meilläkin täällä parlamentissa — EU:n pakotteista  
ja siitä, että niistä pitäisi lähteä luopumaan.

Kuitenkin pahaa pelkään, että siinä vaiheessa, jos Itä-  
Ukrainaan tulisi aito rauha, niin myös äänenpainot  
Euroopassa vahvistuisivat sen suuntaan, että  
pakotteita ryhdyttäisiin purkamaan. Itse en sitä  
kannata.

Itse olen sitä mieltä, että näin ei pidä toimia, vaan  
meidän pitää EU:na ja kaikkien muiden maiden  
kanssa olla yhdessä tuomitsemassa Krimin valtaus  
eikä hyväksyä sitä tässä tilanteessa eikä  
tulevaisuudessa eikä koskaan.

8:50 Hieman huol...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
1.b.ii Continuation: i...  
5.a.ii.2 Assertive: sup...

8:51 Tämä Ukr...  
0.1 FIN - opposition  
3.b.ii Upholding exist...  
4.b.ii.3 International: ...

8:52 Kiinnitän vain huomiota siih...  
0.1 FIN - opposition  
1.b.i Continuation: e...  
3.b.iii.1 Upholding ex...  
4.a.iii National: West...

8:53 Minä olen sit...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
1.b.ii Continuation: i...  
3.b.iii.3 Upholding ex...  
5.a.i Assertive: block

8:54 Kuitenkin ...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
1.b.i Continuation: e...  
5.a.i Assertive: block

8:55 Itse olen ...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
1.b.i Continuation: e...  
3.b.iii.1 Upholding ex...  
5.b.i Reticent: united ...



129

130

131 Maria Guzenina sd (vastauspuheenvuoro): Minskin  
sopimus on kaiken ydin, ja sitä pitää saada noudattaa,  
mutta tällä hetkellä tilanne on vielä kriittinen  
135 emmekä ole päässeet sellaiseen tilanteeseen, että  
136 voisimme kaikki hengähtää helpotuksesta ja sanoa,  
137 että nyt vihdoinkin Ukrainan tilanteeseen saadaan  
ratkaisu.

8:56 Minskin sopimus...	0.1 FIN - opposition
	1.b.ii Continuation: i...
	2.c.i Minsk agreeme...
	3.b.iv.2 Upholding ex...

133

Me olemme vielä aika kaukana tästä  
138 ratkaisutilanteesta. Ukrainalta odotetaan myöskin  
139 toimia oman sisäisen reformiprosessin edistämiseksi.  
140 Ukraina on investoitu valtavasti resursseja mukaan  
lukien Euroopan neuvoston laajin toimintaohjelma, ja  
korruptionvastaiset toimet esimerkiksi etenevät aivan  
liian hitaasti.

8:57 Me olemme vielä...	0.1 FIN - opposition
	4.b.i.3: International: ...

141

142

143 Eero Heinäluoma sd: No, nyt kun ministeri Stubb on  
sanonut, että tämä on menetetty tapaus, niin  
siinähan tavallaan tullaan sitten sille ulottuvuudelle,  
että nämä Krimin tilanteesta, Krimin liittämisestä  
144 Venäjään johtuvat pakotteet poistettaisiin, ja se on  
145 kyllä aika nurinkurinen ajattelu.

146

8:58 No, nyt kun ...	0.1 FIN - opposition
	1.b.i Continuation: e...
	3.b.iii.1 Upholding ex...
	4.a.iii National: West...

Euroopassa selvästi kasvaa se ajatus, että pitäisi  
painaa lujasti, jotta sekä Venäjä että Ukraina tekevät  
oman osuutensa Minskin sopimuksessa, ja jos siinä  
tapahtuu positiivista kehitystä, niin pakotteita voidaan  
purkaa. Mutta pidän selvänä, (Puhemies koputtaa)  
että Krimin pakotteet jäävät voimaan näissäkin  
olosuhteissa.

8:59 Euroopassa selvä...	0.1 FIN - opposition
	1.b.i Continuation: e...
	2.c.i Minsk agreeme...
	3.b.iii.1 Upholding ex...

Ben Zyskowicz kok: Samoin tämä ministeri Soinin  
yhdessä Pohjoismaiden ja Baltian ulkoministerien  
kanssa lausuma Suomen näkemys siitä, että Venäjän  
vastaisista pakotteista ei pidä luopua, on täysin  
yhteinen linjaus hallituksessa ja käsittääkseni hyvin  
laajasti kannatettu myös täällä eduskunnassa.

8:60 Samoin tämä...	0.2 FIN - governmen...
	1.b.i Continuation: e...

5. Eduskunta. Pöytäkirja PTK 46. April 29,  
2016.

[https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja  
/Documents/PTK\\_46+2016.pdf](https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/Documents/PTK_46+2016.pdf).

147

Ben Zyskowicz kok: Minun mielestäni tätä asiaa pitää korostaa vielä enemmän, koska en voi kuvitella, että Euroopan turvallisuus- ja yhteistyökokouksella olisi ollut sen keskeisempää tosiasiallista päätöstä kuin päätös siitä, että Euroopan rajoja ei voida väkivaltaa käyttäen väkisin lähteä muuttamaan. Tätä keskeisintä periaatetta Venäjä on räikeästi rikkonut, ja tämä on hyvä pitää mielessä. Kannatan yhteydenpitoa Venäjään monella eri tasolla, mutta kun puheet pakotteiden lopettamisesta ja muusta saavat jalansijaa, niin tämä mainitsemani asia kannattaa kyllä pitää mielessä.

151

8:61 Minun mielestäni tätä asiaa pitää korostaa...

0.2 FIN - governmen...
3.b.iv.1 Upholding ex...
4.b.i.1 International: ...

Eero Heinäluoma sd: Ongelmahan oli, että Suomi erilaisten soutamisten ja huopaamisten jälkeen päätyi siihen, että ei annettu Venäjän valtuuskunnalle ja erityisesti sen vetäjäksi kaavaillulle Venäjän duuman puhemiehelle mahdollisuutta tulla Suomeen. Tämä päätös oli jälkeenkäpäin katsoen ikävä eikä vastannut meidän perinteistä roolia eikä näytä myöskään vastaavan sitä, mitä useimmat pakotteita kommentoineet ovat sanoneet.

Muun muassa saksalaiset ovat todenneet aika selvään, osin julkisestikin, että nykyiset säännöt mahdollistavat juuri vuoropuhelun edistämiseksi henkilöiden sisääntulon Euroopan unioniin. Nyt kannattaa lukea tämä Mogherinin vastaus, koska se on tässä suhteessa paljonpuhuva. Hänhän tosiasiaa sanoo, että jo nykyiset säännökset mahdollistavat, ei tarvita muutoksia pakotelistaan, vaan ne mahdollistavat (Puhemies koputtaa) vuoropuhelun ja tilaisuuksien järjestämisen.

155

156

8:62 Ongelmahan oli, että Suomi e...

0.1 FIN - opposition
3.b.i Upholding existi...
4.a.iii National: West...

8:63 Muun muassa saksalaiset ovat tod...

0.1 FIN - opposition
4.b.i.1 International: ...

Antti Kaikkonen kesk: On selvää, että EU:n piirissä, eikä lännessä laajemminkaan, voida hyväksyä Krimin liittämistä Venäjään. Mitä tulee pakotteisiin, niin ei pakotteiden purkamisen tielle pääse ennen kuin edetään Minskin sopimuksen viitoittamalla tiellä. On tärkeää työskennellä sen puolesta, että tässä edetään.

8:64 On selvää, että EU...

0.2 FIN - governmen...
1.b.i Continuation: e...
3.b.ii Upholding exist...



157 Itsekin olen pahoillani tästä Etyj-kokouksesta, koska  
159 jotta eteenpäin päästään, tarvitaan vuoropuhelua,  
tarvitaan keskustelua ja tarvitaan foorumeita, joissa  
parlamentaarikot voivat tätä harjoittaa.

8:65 Itsekin ol...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
4.b.ii.1 International: ...

160 Ilkka Kanerva kok: Ja sellaiset takeet ovat meillä tällä  
161 hetkellä olemassa, mikä kertoo tietysti siitä, että  
olkoot kuinka huonot olosuhteet poliittisesti tahansa,  
niin on voitava käydä avointa ja suoraa vuoropuhelua  
kaikkien Etyjin osanottajavaltioiden kanssa.

8:66 Ja sellaiset ta...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
4.b.ii.1 International: ...

162 Ja erityisen selvää on se, että Etyjin periaatteet,  
163 Euroopan ulkopoliittikan hyvät pöytätavat, tulevat  
myöskin noteeratuiksi mahdollisimman  
voimaperäisesti, niin että kaikki osanottajavaltiot,  
tässä tapauksessa erityisesti Venäjä, joutuvat kaikkien  
164 muiden valtioiden taholta noteeraamaan, että Etyj on  
165 näissä asioissa enemmän kuin tosissaan.

8:67 Euroopan unionin vel...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
4.b.ii.2 International: ...

6. Eduskunta. Pöytäkirja PTK 56. May 20,  
2016.

166 [https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/](https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/Documents/PTK_56+2016.pdf)  
[Documents/PTK\\_56+2016.pdf](https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/Documents/PTK_56+2016.pdf).

Timo Heinonen kok: Onneksi yleiskokous on  
yksiselitteisesti tuominnut Venäjän toimet Ukrainan  
alueelliseen koskemattomuuteen liittyen, Krimin  
liittämisen Venäjään sekä sotatoimet Itä-Ukrainassa.  
Yleiskokous on jatkanut päätöstä Venäjän  
valtuuskunnan äänestysosoikeuden jäädyttämisestä,  
eikä Venäjän valtuuskunta osallistunut yleiskokouksen  
toimintaan tuona kertomusvuonna.

8:68 Onneksi yleiskokous on...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
1.b.ii Continuation: i...  
3.b.iii.1 Upholding ex...  
4.b.ii.3 International: ...

Me hyvin ymmärrämme ja tiedämme Suomessa, että  
Venäjän pakotteet ovat iskeneet kovalla kädellä  
ennen muuta meihin suomalaisiin ja Suomeen,  
esimerkiksi meidän ruuan tuotantomme on kärsinyt  
merkittäväällä tavalla. Ymmärrän sen tuskan, mikä  
meidän maataloudellamme on. Sen takia on hyvä,  
että hallitus on syksyllä palaamassa myös  
suomalaisen maatalouden poikkeuksellisen vaikeaan  
tilanteeseen, vaikka itse näkisin kyllä tarpeelliseksi

8:69 Me hyvin ymmärrämme ja ti...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
4.b.i.2 International: ...  
5.a.ii.4 Assertive: sup...

167 sen, että tätä taakkaa jaettaisiin Euroopan tasolla  
183 yhdessä niin, että kun pakotteet ovat yhteisiä, niin  
168 myös ne haitat voitaisiin jakaa tasaisemmin eri EU-  
169 maiden kesken.

8:69

Paine kuitenkin on kasvanut pakotteiden  
keventämiseksi monessa maassa. Kysyisinkin  
valiokunnan puheenjohtajalta, edustaja Kaikkoselta,  
etteihän Suomessa ole tällaista keskustelua herännyt,  
että katsoisimme läpi sormien Venäjän toimia  
170 Ukrainassa, Krimin pakkoliittämistä ja Itä-Ukrainan  
171 sotaa, ja olisimme purkamassa näitä pakotteita,  
172 vaikka ne kovalla kädellä meidän maattamme  
koskettavatkin, koska ei tällaista toimintaa missään  
tapauksessa saa hyväksyä.

8:70 Paine kuitenkin on kasvanut pakot...

0.2 FIN - governmen...  
1.b.i Continuation: e...  
3.b.iii.1 Upholding ex...  
5.a.ii.2 Assertive: sup...

173 Antti Kaikkonen kesk: Sikäli kuin minä tiedän, niin  
174 Suomessa ollaan kyllä sitouduttu EU:n yhteiseen  
pakotelinjaan.

8:71 Sikäli ...

0.2 FIN - governmen...  
5.b.i Reticent: united ...

175  
176 En ole siitä mitään ainakaan merkittävämpää rakoilua  
177 nähnyt, mutta varmasti moni toivoo, että näistä  
pakotteista jossain vaiheessa päästään eroon tai niitä  
178 voidaan purkaa,

8:72 En ole siitä...

0.2 FIN - governmen...  
1.e Other

179

180

181 mutta ehtona siinä on se, että pitää päästä aivan  
oleellisesti eteenpäin Minskin sopimuksessa.

8:73 ...

0.2 FIN - governmen...  
2.c.ii Minsk agreeme...

Valitettavasti sitä näkymää meillä ei ainakaan vielä  
ole, mutta omasta mielestäni Suomen kyllä  
kannattaisi ponnistella, että siinä todella  
edistyttyäisiin.

8:74 Valitettav...

0.2 FIN - governmen...  
4.a.iv National: other

Siinä pienellä Suomellakin voi joku merkitys olla,  
koska näistähän on iso haitta Suomellekin, ja varsinkin

8:75...

0.2 FIN - governmen...  
2.d General impact o...  
4.a.iv National: other

183 Suomelle. Pakotteet ja vastapakotteet ovat hankala asia.

8:75

184

197 Olisi erittäin tärkeää, että Itä-Ukrainan tilanne  
198 saataisiin rauhoitettua, Minskin sopimusta  
noudatettaisiin ja päästäisiin parempaan suuntaan  
tässä kehityksessä.

8:76 Olisi eritt...

0.2 FIN - governmen...

2.c.ii Minsk agreeme...

186

187 Eero Heinäluoma sd: Sen takia olenkin todella  
hämmästynyt siitä, että niinkin arvovaltaiselta taholta  
kuin Suomen hallituksesta valtiovarainministeri Stubb  
käytti julkisen puheenvuoron, jossa hän hyväksyi de  
facto Krimin liittämisen Venäjään.

8:77 Sen takia olen...

0.1 FIN - opposition

4.a.iii National: West...

188

189 Ben Zyskowicz kok: Suomen linja suhteessa Venäjän  
toimintaan Krimillä ja Itä-Ukrainassa on täysin selvä:  
emme hyväksy Venäjän toimintaa. Se rikkoo  
kansainvälistä oikeutta, se rikkoo Venäjän solmimia  
190 kansainvälisiä sopimuksia.

8:78 Suomen linja ...

0.2 FIN - governmen...

3.b.iii.1 Upholding ex...

191

192

Samalla Suomessa on laaja yhteisymmärrys, voisi  
sanoa yksimielisyys, siitä, että tasavallan presidentti ja  
muu valtionjohto tekevät tärkeää työtä, kun kaiken  
193 kesellä pyrkivät ylläpitämään ja vahvistamaan  
dialogia myös Venäjän johdon kanssa, koska tätä  
194 dialogia tarvitaan, jotta aikanaan ratkaisuun päästään.

8:79 Samalla Suomess...

0.2 FIN - governmen...

4.a.ii National: dialog...

195 Krista Kiuru sd. Ei ole hyväksi tälle maalle se, että  
vastuuministerit toisten tonteilla ottavat kantoja,  
jotka antavat viitteitä siitä, että Krim on  
lähitulevaisuudessa ainakin menetetty.

8:80 Ei ole hyv...

0.1 FIN - opposition

4.a.iii National: West...

Ja tässä minusta edustaja Heinonen otti ihan aidosti  
esiin sen oikean pointin, että (Puhemies koputtaa)  
Euroopan neuvosto tarvitsee myös Venäjää mukaan,  
niin kuin Etyj.

Timo Heinonen kok (vastauspuheenvuoro): Minun  
mielestäni on ollut myönteistä se, että Suomi on

8:81

0.2 FIN - governmen...

3.b.i Upholding existi...

4.a.ii National: dialog...



198 pitkän perinteen mukaisesti ollut tässä sellaisena  
sillanrakentajana, edustaja Kanerva erittäin  
merkittävässä roolissa mutta myös tasavallan  
presidentti Sauli Niinistö, joka on käynyt neuvonpitoa  
ja keskustelua ja avannut ennen muuta sitä  
keskusteluyhteyttä.

8:81

199

200

201 Pakotteet ovat oma osansa, ja niihin ei pidä koskea  
ennen kuin pääsemme rauhaan Itä-Ukrainassa ja  
Krimin tilanne tulee ratkaistua,

8:82 Pakot...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
1.b.i Continuation: e...  
3.b.iii.1 Upholding ex...

202

203

204 mutta samaan aikaan pitää jatkaa avointa  
keskustelua, keskustelua Venäjän kanssa,

8:83 ...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
4.a.ii National: dialog...

205

206

207 ja myös niin, että toimimme yhtenäisenä EU:na,

208

209

210

211 jokainen maa, jolla on poikkeuksellisen hyvät  
mahdollisuudet olla tällainen sillanrakentaja, käyttää  
myös niitä.

8:85 Jokai...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
3.b.i Upholding existi...  
4.a.ii National: dialog...

212

Susanna Huovinen sd: On ihan selvää, että tämä  
Ukrainan sota on vaikuttanut oikeastaan Euroopan  
neuvoston keskusteluissa kaikkeen siihen, mistä siellä  
areenalla puhumme. Olisi tietenkin suotavaa, että  
tällaisissa aika herkissä kysymyksissä myös kansalliset  
linjat olisivat tarkoin harkittuja, ja mielestäni on aivan  
selvää, että Suomi ei voi irrottautua kansainvälisestä  
rintamasta, jossa tuomitaan nämä toimet, joita  
Venäjä on Ukrainassa harjoittanut.

8:86 On ihan selvää, että tämä Ukr...  
0.1 FIN - opposition  
1.b.ii Continuation: i...  
4.b.i.4 International: ...

Kyllä yleiskokouksenviestit tässä asiassa ovat olleet  
aivan selkeitä. Totta kai jaamme sen huolen, että  
dialogia täytyy pystyä käymään, jotta löytyisi jokin  
ratkaisu.

8:87 Kyllä yleis...  
0.1 FIN - opposition  
4.b.ii.1 International: ...

216

217 Toisaalta kyllä ajattelen niin, että tässä erityisesti on  
224 merkitystä sillä, mitä tapahtuu tulevana kuukausina  
225 suurvaltojen välillä tässä keskustelussa, ja en nyt olisi  
aivan toivoton tämän ratkaisun löytymisen suhteen.

218

219

226 Ben Zyskowicz kok: Minun mielestäni se viesti, mitä  
227 tulee Ukrainan tilanteeseen, on yksiselitteisen selvä:  
Suomessa me, sen enempää kansalaiset kuin  
228 hallitukseen, emme hyväksy sitä, että Venäjä on  
rikkonut kaikkia perustavaa laatua olevimpiakin  
kansainvälisiä sopimuksia ja muuttanut väkisin tai  
229 väkivallalla uhkamalla Euroopan rajoja ja liittänyt  
Krimin itseensä. Me emme hyväksy Venäjän toimintaa  
Itä-Ukrainassa. Me olemme Suomessa sitä mieltä,  
että myös Ukrainan suvereniteettia tulee kunnioittaa.





221

222

Olli-Poika Parviainen vihr: ainakin tässä salissa  
istuvien käsitys Krimin tilanteesta on yhtenevä ja me  
emme hyväksy miehitystä, joka tällä tavalla on tehty.  
Tätä me tuomme myös Euroopan neuvostossa esiin,  
ja se on tärkeää, että EN-delegaatio myös matkustaa  
Moskovaan ja jatkaa Suomen ulkopoliittikan  
toivottavasti yhtenäisen ja ison kuvan edistämistä  
siellä sitten omalta osaltaan.

Pia Viitanen sd: Kyllä minustakin on hyvin tärkeää,  
että Suomen kansallinen linja on hyvin selkeä, ja siksi  
se toden totta on kyllä hämmentävää, että täällä  
valtiovarainministeri Stubbin tietyistä lausunnoista  
jää epä selväksi, mitä niillä on tarkoitettu.

Timo Heinonen kok: Minun mielestäni — tämä on  
vakava asia, eikä kannata naureskella — Venäjä on  
toiminut kansainvälisten oikeuksien vastaisesti, ja on  
hyvä, että EU ja Suomi ovat Venäjän toimet  
tuominneet.



230

239

Suomi on mukana EU:ssa, ja me olemme mukana EU:n päätöksissä, mutta on erittäin tärkeää, että me pidämme yllä keskusteluyhteyttä myös Venäjään tässä tilanteessa, vaikka emme vähääkään hyväksy emmekä ymmärrä heidän toimintaansa Itä-Ukrainassa, saatikka Krimin miehitystä ja valloittamista.

232

245

7. Eduskunta. Pöytäkirja PTK 61. May 31, 2016.

[https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/Documents/PTK\\_61+2016.pdf](https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/Documents/PTK_61+2016.pdf).

246

247

248

235

236 Sirkka-Liisa Anttila kesk (vastauspuheenvuoro): Totuus on se, että Venäjä-pakotteet yhdistettynä kaupan halpuuttamiseen ovat johtaneet siihen, että viljelijän elinkeino on erittäin kannattamatonta.

237 Mentions the pain that the sanctions have caused to Finnish agriculture.

Viljelijöitä ei saa rangaista siitä, että meillä on Venäjä-pakotteet ja kaupan halpuuttaminen.

Sirkka-Liisa Anttila kesk: Mutta, arvoisa puhemies, varsinaisesti tulín tänne puhumaan maatalouden tilanteesta siitä yksinkertaisesta syystä, että viljelijät ovat joutuneet tahtomattaan Venäjä-pakotteiden maksajiksi.

Hannu Hoskonen kesk: On hyvin murheellista sinänsä, että tähän lisätalousarvioon ei sisältynyt suomalaisen maatalouden kriisipakettia, jota varmasti hyvin moni odotti. On selvä asia, että Venäjän pakotteet ovat iskeneet suomalaiseen maatalouteen kaikista kovimmalla kädellä, mitä Euroopassa on tämän asian tiimoilta tapahtunut.

8. Eduskunta. Pöytäkirja PTK 68. June 14, 2016.

8:92 Suomi on mukana EU...	0.2 FIN - governmen...
	1.b.ii Continuation: i...
	3.b.vi Upholding exis...
	4.a.ii National: dialog...

8:93 Toru...	0.2 FIN - governmen...
	4.a.i National: suppo...

8:94	0.4 NL - government...
	2.a Economic reasons
	4.a.i National: suppo...

8:95 Mutta, ar...	0.1 FIN - opposition
	4.a.i National: suppo...

8:96 On selvä asia, ett...	0.2 FIN - governmen...
	4.a.i National: suppo...



248 [https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja](https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/Document/PTK_68+2016.pdf)  
249 [/Documents/PTK\\_68+2016.pdf](https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/Document/PTK_68+2016.pdf).

250 Markku Eestilä kok: Suomalaiset viljelijät ovat  
256 joutuneet pakotteiden ja Venäjän vastapakotteiden  
257 takia maailmanpolitiikan maksumiehiksi.  
251

8:97 Suom...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
4.a.i National: suppo...

252  
258 Euroopan unionin velvollisuus on korvata viljelijöille  
259 pakotteista aiheutuneet taloudelliset tappiot  
260 huomattavasti paremmin, varsinkin kun EU itse  
varoituksista huolimatta sekoitti maitomarkkinat  
poistamalla ylituotantoa hillitsevät maitokiintiöt.

8:98 Euroopan uni...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
4.b.i.2 International: ...

254  
261 Sari Essayah kd: Emme vaadi, että hallitus ratkaisee  
262 Ukrainan kriisin, Venäjän pakotteet,  
263 ilmastonmuutoksen, maidon ylituotannon EU:ssa ja  
globaalit elintarviketuotannon vääristymät. Ei, me  
kristillisdemokraatit ainoastaan vaadimme hallitusta  
turvaamaan suomalaisen ruuantuotannon  
tulevaisuuden ja suhtautumaan kriisiin sen vaatimalla  
vakavuudella.

8:99 Emme vaadi, että hallitus ...  
0.1 FIN - opposition  
4.a.i National: suppo...

Jari Myllykoski vas: Olisin kuitenkin kysynyt  
pääministeri Sipilältä ja ministeri Tiilikaiselta,  
minkälaisia ponnisteluja on tehty Venäjän  
vastapakotteiden purkamiseksi Suomen osalta.

8:100 Olin ku...  
0.1 FIN - opposition  
1.e Other  
4.a.iv National: other

Mikään ei ilmeisesti kiellä käymästä näitä  
neuvotteluja, ja olisikin hienoa kuulla, millä tavoin  
Suomi pyrkii edistämään sitä mahdollisuutta, että  
keskustelut Venäjän osalta  
elintarvikvastapakotteiden purkamiseksi olisivat  
mahdollisia.

8:101 Mikään ei ilmeis...  
0.1 FIN - opposition  
4.a.ii National: dialog...

Maatalous- ja ympäristöministeri Kimmo Tiilikainen:  
Juuri siksi, että kun EU:n tulevaa ohjelmaa  
valmistellaan ja nyt käydään läpi sitä, miten tässä

8:102 Ju...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
1.c Lifting  
2.d General impact o...  
5.a.ii.3 Assertive: sup...

263 välitarkastelussa voidaan menetellä, niin kyllä  
 269 Suomen viestit ovat nimenomaan sitä, että a)  
 täydentäviä ehtoja on liikaa, b) sanktiot ovat liian  
 kovia, c) kotieläinrikkomuksista ei saa tulla sanktioita  
 peltopuolelle ja päinvastoin.

264

265

270

Kaj Turunen ps: Kysyn pääministeriltä: onko meillä  
 271 minkäännäköisiä mahdollisuuksia, kun me  
 272 neuvottelemme näistä maatalousasioista EU:n kanssa,  
 saada jonkinnäköistä erillissopimusta, koska nämä  
 kohtelevat meitä epäoikeudenmukaisesti?

267

274

Markus Mustajärvi vas: Miten on, joko  
 275 sektoriministeri tai arvoisa pääministeri, onko  
 Suomella poliittista liikkumatilaa kahdenkeskiseen  
 vaikuttamiseen, ennakointiin, yhteistyöhön, jotta  
 276 Suomi on valmiina sillä hetkellä, kun ennemmin tai  
 myöhemmin pakotteista ja vastapakotteista  
 277 luovutaan, kun kuitenkin kaikkien tiedossa on se, että  
 278 Suomi näistä vastuista ja seuraamuksista kantaa  
 kaikkein kovimman taakan?

Pääministeri Juha Sipilä: Saksan ulkoministeri nosti  
 pakotteiden poistamisen asteittain sitä mukaa, kun  
 Minskin sopimus etenee. Tällaista keskustelua siis  
 Euroopassa käydään tämän ympärillä.

Hyvin todennäköistä on, että pakotteet kuitenkin  
 tulevat jatkumaan seuraavan puoli vuotta. Te kaikki  
 hyvin tiedätte, että nämä pakotteet on sidottu  
 Minskin sopimuksen etenemiseen ja yksimieliseen  
 päätökseen EU:ssa.

Maria Tolppanen ps: vetositte äsken Minskin  
 sopimukseen, ja nyt kuitenkin tiedämme sen, että

8-102

8-103 Kysyn päämi...

8-104 Miten on, joko sektoriminist...

8-105 Saksan ...

8-106 Hyvin toden...

8-107

0.2 FIN - governmen...

4.b.i.2 International: ...

5.a.ii.4 Assertive: sup...

0.1 FIN - opposition

4.a.ii National: dialog...

0.2 FIN - governmen...

2.c.ii Minsk agreeme...

0.2 FIN - governmen...

3.b.ii Upholding exist...

0.2 FIN - governmen...

2.d General impact o...

4.a.i National: suppo...



278 Venäjä ei ole kauhean halukas koko Minskin  
sopimusta edes myöntämään. Jos Minskin sopimusta  
odotetaan, niin tuskin maatalouteen saadaan  
Suomessa minkäänlaista apua. Jos siitä on kiinni se,  
282 että pakotteita voidaan purkaa, niin sitä purkua  
saadaan näillä näkymin näköjään odottaa kauan.

283

284

Laura Huhtasaari ps: EU:sta irtautuminen antaisi  
kansallisen päätäntävällän takaisin myös maatalouden  
osalta. Venäjän-kauppa on maataloudelle todella  
tärkeää, ja Suomi on isona kärsijänä tämänhetkisten  
285 pakotteiden vuoksi. — Ollaan niin EU:n ytimessä ja  
286 kärsitään!

287

288 Lea Mäkipää ps: Hallitusohjelmaan on kirjattu  
linjaukset maatalouden kannattavuuden  
parantamiseksi muun muassa tukijärjestelmiä  
yksinkertaistamalla. Ne ovat oikean suuntaiset, mutta  
eivät nyt pelkästään riitä, kun EU:n ja Venäjän  
289 keskinäiset pakotteet ja EU:n maatalousuudistus ovat  
290 sotkeneet markkinoita.

290

291

Sinne meidän pitää nyt pyrkiä voimakkaasti  
vaikuttamaan. Pakotepolitiikka olisi saatava  
loppumaan.

Krista Mikkonen vihr: Maatalouden akuutit ongelmat  
— tukimaksatusten ja viennin tökkiminen — eivät ole  
maanviljelijöiden syytä. EU-pakotteiden vuoksi  
Venäjän asettamat vastapakotteet näkyvät  
viljelijöiden toimeentulossa. Meidän pitää yhteisesti  
ottaa vastuu pakotteiden vaikutuksista, niitä ei pidä  
sysätä yhden ammattiryhmän niskoille.

8:107

8:108 EU:sta irtautumi...

8:109 Hallitusohjelmaan o...

8:110 Sinn...

8:111 Maatalouden akuuti...

0.2 FIN - governmen...  
2.a Economic reasons  
4.a.iv National: other

0.2 FIN - governmen...  
4.a.i National: suppo...

0.2 FIN - governmen...  
1.c Lifting  
2.a Economic reasons

0.1 FIN - opposition  
4.a.i National: suppo...

291	<a href="https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/Document/PTK_73+2016.pdf">https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja</a>	
295	<a href="https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/Document/PTK_73+2016.pdf">/Documents/PTK_73+2016.pdf.</a>	
292		
293	Matti Vanhanen kesk: Käytännönläheistä yhteistyötä	8:112 Käyt... 0.2 FIN - governmen... 4.b.ii.1 International: ...
296	ja vuoropuhelua Venäjän kanssa tulee edistää niin	
297	EU:ssa kuin kahdenvälisestäkin.	
298		
299	Suomi toimii yhdessä muiden EU-maiden kanssa	8:113 Suomi t... 0.2 FIN - governmen... 2.c.i Minsk agreeme... 4.b.i.4 International: ...
300	tavoitteenaan Ukrainan kriisin ratkaisu Minskin	
	sopimuksen mukaisesti, jolloin myös pakotteita	
	voitaisiin purkaa. Mutta järjestys on tämä.	
301		
302	Simon Elo ps: Perussuomalaisten eduskuntaryhmä	8:114 Peru... 0.2 FIN - governmen... 4.a.ii National: dialog...
	katsoo, että Venäjän kanssa on pidettävä rakentava	
	keskusteluyhteys.	
303		
304	Pakotteet ovat sidotut Minskin sopimuksessa	8:115 Pakotte... 0.2 FIN - governmen... 3.b.ii Upholding exist...
	saavutettaviin edistysaskeliin, joissa eteneminen	
	helpottaisi Venäjän kanssa käytävän keskustelun	
	edellytyksiä.	
305		
306	Perussuomalaiset katsoo, että eristetty Venäjä ei ole	8:116 Perussu... 0.2 FIN - governmen... 4.a.iv National: other
	kenenkään etujen mukainen. Suomen on myös	
	syvennettävä ja monipuolistettava Venäjä-	
307	tuntemustaan.	
	Erkki Tuomioja sd: Toivomme, että hallituksen ulko- ja	8:117 Toivomme, että ... 0.1 FIN - opposition 4.a.iv National: other
	turvallisuuspoliittinen selonteko olisi hyvin selvästi	
	ottanut etäisyyttä sotapuheisiin ja painottanut	
	sellaista aktiivista vakauseritystä, joka pyrkii	
	konfliktien ennaltaehkäisemiseen ja jännitteiden	
	purkamiseen.	
	Pääministeri Juha Sipilä: Mitä Venäjään tulee, Suomi	8:118 Mitä Venäjä... 0.2 FIN - governmen... 1.b.ii Continuation: i... 3.b.iii.1 Upholding ex...
	on vastannut koko Euroopan unionin tavoin	
	päätäväisesti Ukrainan kriisiin ja seisoo yhteisessä	
	rintamassa. Toimet Krimin niemimaalla ja Itä-	
	Ukrainassa tuomitaan.	

308

Minskin sopimuksen tinkimätön toimeenpano on  
310 avain sanktioista luopumiselle.

311

312

Mutta kriisinkin aikana on käytävä dialogia. Tuen  
presidentti Niinistön perusteluja, miksi hän on  
313 kutsunut presidentti Putinin Suomeen. Myös hallitus  
314 on tietoisesti lisännyt dialogia Venäjän kanssa.

Lea Mäkipää ps: Toiseksi: Suomea ei uhkaa tällä  
hetkellä mikään valtio. Mielestäni Venäjä on edelleen  
meidän hyvä naapuri ja kauppakumppani pakotteiden  
315 myötä. Mutta on kysyttävä, koska nyt eilen illalla  
316 suomalainen Eurooppa-neuvoston jäsen on esittänyt,  
että nyt pitäisi Venäjä-pakotteista luopua: onko tämä  
hallituksen tahto?

317

318 Ja loppujen lopuksi: Olen sitä mieltä, että Suomi on  
319 liittoutumaton valtio ja meidän on hyvä seurata  
sivusta.

320 Elsi Katainen kesk: On kuitenkin hyvä muistaa, että  
321 meillä on hyvääkin yhteistä historiaa Venäjän kanssa  
käytännönläheisessä yhteistyössä ja muun muassa  
rajaohjelmissa, joissa Venäjä on takavuosina ollut  
innokkaastikin mukana. Tuon vuoropuhelun  
322 edistämiseksi EU:n ja Venäjän kesken olisi nyt kyllä  
ihan huutava tarve.

Yksi merkittävä tulppa on Venäjälle langetut  
talouspakotteet — ne toimivat näin — jotka eivät  
kuitenkaan saisi estää kanssakäymistä EU:n ja Venäjän  
välillä sillä tavalla kuin ne nyt tekevät.

Ulkoasiainministeri Timo Soini: Sitten Venäjä-  
pakotteista: Totta kai me haluamme, että pakotteista  
päästään eroon, ja niistä päästään eroon heti sillä

8:119 ...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
2.c.i Minsk agreeme...

8:120 Mutta kr...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
4.a.ii National: dialog...

8:121 Toiseksi: Suomea ei ...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
1.d Indifferent / uncl...  
4.a.iv National: other

8:122 Ja lo...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
4.a.iv National: other  
5.b.ii Reticent: other

8:123 On kuitenkin hyvä m...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
4.b.i.1 International: ...

8:124 Yksi mer...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
2.e Ineffectiveness of...

8:125 Si...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
1.b.ii Continuation: i...  
2.c.i Minsk agreeme...



323 punaisella minuutilla, kun Minskin sopimus  
337 toteutetaan. Sitä ennen niistä ei eroon päästä.

324

325 Sen takia me tarvitsemme tässä kansainvälistä  
yhteistoimintaa.

326

327

328

329 Antti Rinne sd: Ulkoministeri puhui tuosta Ukrainan  
tilanteesta ja totesi aivan oikein, että kun Minskin  
sopimus tulee täytettyä, niin näistä pakotteista  
voidaan nopeasti luopua.

330

331 Itämeren ympäristön näkökulmasta on tärkeää, että  
jännitteitä saadaan purettua, ja tämä Minskin  
sopimuksen täyttäminen on siinäkin mielessä tärkeä  
332 asia.

333

334 Sama koskee tietenkin suomalaisten tilallisten,  
maitotilallisten, maidonvientiä, ja sitten erityisesti  
myöskin sianlihan puolella on ongelmia tällä hetkellä.

335

Eri puolilta tulee viestiä, nyt tällä hetkellä Kiovan  
suunnasta, että myöskään siellä ei ole kovin suurta  
halukkuutta Minskin sopimuksen ehtojen  
täyttämiseen. Ja nyt kysynkin teiltä, ulkoministeri  
Soini: onko Suomen intresseissä tehdä ja onko Suomi  
tehnyt jotakin myös sen edistämiseksi, että myöskin  
Kiovan taholta ollaan Minskin sopimuksen ehtoja  
valmiita täyttämään? Sehän on sekä Venäjän että  
Ukrainan velvollisuus niitä ehtoja lähteä täyttämään.

Heli Järvinen vihr: Ministeri Soini, teillä on pitkä  
kokemus ulkopolitiikan seurannasta monissa eri  
rooleissa, ja siksi kysyn teiltä, miten tämä meidän  
erityinen Venäjä-suhteemme on Euroopan unionin  
yhteisten pakotteiden myötä muuttunut ja miten  
toisaalta voisimme kehittää sitä siihen suuntaan, että

8:125

8:126 Sen ta...

8:127 Ulkomin...

8:128 Itämere...

8:129 Sam...

8:130 Eri puolilta tulee viestiä, nyt t...

8:131 Ministeri Soi...

0.2 FIN - governmen...

4.b.ii.3 International: ...

0.1 FIN - opposition

1.b.ii Continuation: i...

2.c.i Minsk agreeme...

0.1 FIN - opposition

2.f Other

0.1 FIN - opposition

2.a Economic reasons

0.1 FIN - opposition

4.a.iii National: West...

0.1 FIN - opposition

4.a.iv National: other

338 se edistäisi demokratiaa, rauhanomaisia prosesseja ja  
yhteistyötä.

8-131

339

340

341 Paavo Arhinmäki vas: Euroopan unionin asettamat  
pakotteet ovat olleet ymmärrettävä seuraus Venäjän  
352 toimista. On parempi mitteloïdä euroilla kuin aseilla.

8-132 Euro...  
0.1 FIN - opposition  
1.b.ii Continuation: i...  
3.b.v.2 Upholding exi...

342

343

344 Pakotepolitiikalla ei kuitenkaan saada kriisiä  
ratkaistua. Venäjän ja EU:n välien normalisointi  
etenee vain Minskin sopimusta noudattamalla, ja kun  
Ukraina saadaan kestävä rauha, silloin pakotteista  
voidaan päästä eroon.

8-133 Pakotepoliti...  
0.1 FIN - opposition  
2.c.i Minsk agreeme...

345

346 Kauko Juhantalo kesk: Viitataan hyviin  
puheenvuoroihin, kun muun muassa edustaja  
Korhonen, Hoskonen ja viimeksi Pakkanen puhuivat  
Venäjä-yhteistyöstä, edustaja Kiviranta puhui meidän  
kaupasta. Se kaupankäynti on Suomelle hyvin  
tärkeätä, ja pakotteet ovat meille hyvin viheliäisiä.

8-134 Viitataan hyviin p...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
2.a Economic reasons  
4.a.ii National: dialog...

347

348 10. Eduskunta. Pöytäkirja PTK 74. June 22,  
2016.

[https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja  
/Documents/PTK\\_74+2016.pdf](https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/Documents/PTK_74+2016.pdf).

349

Kaj Turunen ps: Nyt on avautunut keskustelu  
Euroopassa siitä, onko tämä Venäjä-pakotehomma  
ihan reilu. Minä haluaisin, että me kävisimme  
myöskin Suomessa tätä keskustelua sillä tavalla, että  
voitaisiin näitä Venäjä-pakotteita neuvottelemalla  
EU:n kanssa ja kahdenvälisesti Venäjän kanssa  
pikkuhiljaa lähteä kuitenkin riisumaan.

8-135 Nyt on avautunut ke...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
1.c Lifting  
2.d General impact o...  
4.a.iv National: other  
5.a.ii.3 Assertive: sup...

11. Eduskunta. Pöytäkirja PTK 86. September  
20, 2016.

[https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja  
/Documents/PTK\\_86+2016.pdf](https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/Documents/PTK_86+2016.pdf).

353

354 Esko Kiviranta kesk: Selvää on, että Venäjä-pakotteet  
ovat rokottaneet Suomea enemmän kuin muita  
Euroopan unionin jäsenvaltioita.

8:136 Selv...

0.2 FIN - governmen...

2.a Economic reasons

355

356 12. Eduskunta. Pöytäkirja PTK 136. December  
12, 2016.

363 <https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja>

364 /Documents/PTK\_136+2016.pdf.

357

358 Hannu Hoskonen kesk: Suomi on aina ollut Venäjälle  
tärkeä kauppakumppani. Ymmärtäen toki tämän  
nykyisen pakotepolitiikkatilanteen mikä on teidän  
näkökulmanne Suomen ja Venäjän välisen kaupan  
mahdollisuuksiin tulevien vuosien aikana, kun tämä  
arktinen yhteistyö ja sen neuvoston puheenjohtajuus  
avaa meille aivan valtavan hienon foorumin käydä  
neuvotteluja ja keskusteluja nimenomaan itänaapurin  
kanssa ja muiden naapureittemme kanssa?

8:137 Suomi on aina ollut Venäjälle...

0.2 FIN - governmen...

4.a.ii National: dialog...

359

360 13. Eduskunta. Pöytäkirja PTK 138. December  
20, 2016.

<https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja>

/Documents/PTK\_138+2016.pdf.

Hannu Hoskonen kesk: Tärkeää on hakea uusia  
markkinoita ja odottaa sitä päivää, kun Venäjän  
elintarvikemarkkinat avautuvat. Pietari, yli 10  
miljoonaa ihmistä tuossa itärajan takana, on varmaan  
markkina-alue, joka meidän pitää ottaa haltuun,  
mutta se kestää vielä muutaman vuoden ennen kuin  
saadaan nämä pakotteet purettua. Joka tapauksessa  
suhteet on pidettävä kunnossa ja ennen kaikkea  
kotimaisten raaka-aineiden puhtaus yllä ja tuotteet  
korkeatasoisina.

8:138 Tärkeää on hakea uusia markkino...

0.2 FIN - governmen...

2.a Economic reasons

4.a.ii National: dialog...

Katri Kulmuni kesk: Se on valitettava asia, että  
Venäjän vastapakotteiden seurauksena meidän  
elintarvikekauppamme ei ole siinä kunnossa kuin se  
parhaimpina vuosina on ollut.

8:139 Se on va...

0.2 FIN - governmen...

4.a.i National: suppo...



365

366 Mikko Savola kesk: Kansainvälisen politiikan  
seurauksena Suomi on joutunut aika suureksi  
375 kärsijäksi, nimenomaan suomalainen viljelijä on  
joutunut suureksi kärsijäksi.

367

368 Pakotteet, mitä kohdistettiin Krimin valtauksen  
seurauksena Venäjälle, ja siitä tulleet vastapakotteet,  
377 jotka nimenomaan elintarvikkeitten viennin Venäjälle  
378 kielsivät Venäjän päätöksellä, ovat aiheuttaneet  
varmasti Venäjän kansalaisille hallaa

379

369 mutta erityisen paljon meidän suomalaiselle  
elintarviketuotannollemme.

370

371

372 14. Eduskunta. Pöytäkirja PTK 139. December  
21, 2016.

[https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja  
/Documents/PTK\\_139+2016.pdf](https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Poytakirja/Documents/PTK_139+2016.pdf).

Leena Meri ps: Itse koen, että me emme voi sivuuttaa  
tämäntyyppisiä toisen itsenäisen valtion  
loukkaamisia. Mitä vastaisit näille kansalaisille, jotka  
kuuntelevat tätä: miksi Suomi on mukana näissä  
pakotteissa?

Simon Elo ps: Arvoisa puhemies! Venäjän kanssa on  
pidettävä rakentava keskusteluyhteys.

EU:n pakotteet ovat sidotut Minskin sopimuksessa  
saavutettaviin edistysaskeliin, joissa eteneminen  
helpottaisi Venäjän kanssa käytävän keskustelun  
edellytyksiä. Eristetty Venäjä ei ole kenenkään etujen  
mukaista.

8:140 Kansain...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
4.a.i National: suppo...

8:141 Pakotteet, m...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
2.f Other

8:142 mutta ...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
2.a Economic reasons

8:143 Its...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
1.b.i Continuation: e...  
3.b.iii.3 Upholding ex...

8:144 Arvois...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
4.a.ii National: dialog...

8:145 EU:n pakotte...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
1.b.ii Continuation: i...  
2.c.ii Minsk agreeme...

382 Ulkopoliittisen instituutin hallituksen jäsenenä  
383 katson, että Suomen Venäjä-tuntemusta on  
384 monipuolistettava ja syvennettävä.

8:146 Ulko...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
4.a.iv National: other

385 Antti Kaikkonen kesk: Suhteet Venäjään on pidettävä  
386 vakaina ja toimivina kahdenkeskisesti samalla, kun  
387 Suomi tukee EU:n yhteisiä Venäjä-linjauksia.

8:147 Suhtee...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
1.b.ii Continuation: i...  
4.a.ii National: dialog...  
5.a.ii.2 Assertive: sup...

388  
389 Aila Paloniemi kesk: Suomi ei hyväksy Venäjän toimia  
390 Ukrainassa ja Krimin liittämistä Venäjään.

8:148 S...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
3.b.iii.1 Upholding ex...

391  
392 Tuomitsemme myös sotilaalliset toimet Syyriassa  
401 siviileitä vastaan, joista Venäjä osaltaan kantaa  
402 vastuuta.

8:149 T...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
3.b.vii Upholding exl...

403  
404 Mutta vuoropuhelua Venäjän kanssa on kuitenkin  
välttämätöntä edistää niin EU:ssa kuin  
kahdenvälisesti. Mikään erimielisyys tai konflikti ei  
ole ratkaistavissa järkevällä tavalla eristämisen, saati  
puhumattomuuden kautta.

8:150 Mutta v...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
4.c Both national an...

Keskustan eduskuntaryhmä pitää hyvänä, että  
presidentti Niinistö on pitänyt aktiivisesti yhteyttä  
suoraan Venäjään, ja hallituskin on lisännyt  
vuoropuhelua Venäjän kanssa. Niin pääministeri Sipilä  
kuin ulkoministeri Soini pitävät yhteyttä Venäjän  
kollegoihinsa. Lisäksi muun muassa ulkomaankauppa-  
ja kehitysministeri Mykkänen sekä maatalous- ja  
ympäristöministeri Tiilikainen ovat omilla  
sektoreillaan olleet tiivistämässä yhteistyötä itäiseen  
naapuriin.

8:151 Keskustan eduskuntaryhmä...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
4.a.ii National: dialog...

Tiina Elovaara ps: Idänsuhteiden merkityksellisyys ei  
ole poistunut, sen vuoksi dialogi ja eri  
yhteistyömahdollisuuksien kehittäminen Venäjän  
kanssa jatkuvat.

8:152 Idän...  
0.2 FIN - governmen...  
4.a.ii National: dialog...



405 Pertti Salolainen kok: Ei ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikkaa  
 ilman Venäjää. Venäjä oli, on ja tulee aina olemaan  
 naapurimme. Naapurin kanssa on oltava hyvät,  
 411 toimivat naapuruussuhteet.

8:153 Ei ul...  
 0.2 FIN - governmen...  
 4.a.ii National: dialog...

407 Suhteiden ylläpitäminen ei kuitenkaan tarkoita eikä  
 edellytä sitä, että suomalaisessa keskustelussa  
 414 pidättäydytään rehellisistä arvioista niin suhteessa  
 415 Venäjään kuin maailmaan laajemminkin.

8:154 Suht...  
 0.2 FIN - governmen...  
 1.b.ii Continuation: i...  
 4.a.iv National: other

409 Käynnissä on jännityksen kierre, mutta on  
 418 muistettava, että Venäjä on kiistatta aloittanut sen  
 419 kansainvälisiä sopimuksia rikkovilla voimatoimillaan  
 erityisesti Ukrainassa.

8:155 Käyn...  
 0.2 FIN - governmen...  
 3.b.iii.1 Upholding ex...

420 Ulospääsy on Minskin sopimuksen täysimittainen  
 toimeenpano.

8:156 Ulo...  
 0.2 FIN - governmen...  
 1.b.ii Continuation: i...  
 2.c.i Minsk agreeme...

423 Paavo Arhinmäki vas: Venäjä rikkoi kansainvälistä  
 oikeutta liittämällä Krimin itseensä ja kiihdyttämällä  
 424 sotatoimia Ukrainassa.

8:157 Venä...  
 0.1 FIN - opposition  
 3.b.iii.1 Upholding ex...

425 Tästä huolimatta keskusteluyhteyden ylläpitäminen  
 naapuriin on joka tapauksessa järkevää ja  
 426 välttämätöntä. Vaikka se näyttäisi kaukaiselta, on  
 Suomen etu saada Venäjä lopulta takaisin mukaan  
 normaaliin eurooppalaiseen kanssakäymiseen.  
 Notes the importance of dialogue with Russia, and that  
 getting Russia back to normal EU relations is important.

8:158 Tästä hu...  
 0.1 FIN - opposition  
 4.b.i.1 International: ...

Ulkoasiainministeri Timo Soini: Venäjä on Suomelle  
 aina merkittävä ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikan  
 kysymys. Moneen asiaan voimme vaikuttaa, mutta  
 emme maantieteeseen. Hyvät suhteet Venäjään on  
 Suomelle luonteva tavoite.

8:159 Venäjä o...  
 0.2 FIN - governmen...  
 4.a.iv National: other

Mutta on olennaista pitää kiinni niistä keskeisistä  
 periaatteista, joille eurooppalainen  
 turvallisuusjärjestelmä on rakennettu. Väkivallalla ei  
 ole sijaa, eikä sen käyttöä voida hyväksyä.

8:160 Mutta on ...  
 0.2 FIN - governmen...  
 3.b.iv.1 Upholding ex...

Venäjä on rikkonut keskeisiä turvallisuusperiaatteita  
 anastamalla Krimin ja horjuttamalla Ukrainaa. Tätä ei

8:161  
 0.2 FIN - governmen...  
 3.b.iii.1 Upholding ex...

- 426 voida hyväksyä, etupiirien Eurooppa kuuluu historiaan.
- 427
- 428 Venäjän toiminta on Euroopan jännittyneen turvallisuusilmaston aiheuttaja, ja tämä jännite heijastuu tunnetusti myös Itämeren alueelle.

8.161	
8.162 Venä...	0.2 FIN - governmen...
	3.b.iv.1 Upholding ex...

- 1 1. Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal.  
"Kamerstuk 21501-02 Raad Algemene Zaken en Raad Buitenlandse Zaken." *Vergaderjaar 2015-2016*, no. 1598, March 9, 2016. Published March 29, 2016.  
<https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-21501-02-1598.html>.
- 2
- 3 Van Bommel (SP) Dan kom ik op Rusland. De brede betrekkingen tussen de Europese Unie en de Russische Federatie staan op de agenda. Ik vraag me af waarom dat punt nu aan de orde zou moeten zijn. Eigenlijk moeten we niet praten over die brede agenda, maar over de kortetermijnvraagstukken ten aanzien van Rusland die spelen. Ik denk dan aan de sancties.
- 4
- 5 Ik zie dat Duitsland en Frankrijk nadenken over opheffing of beëindiging van die sancties. Dat kan wat ons betreft onderdeel van de discussie zijn, maar niet de inzet van de Nederlandse regering.
- 6
- 7 Sjoerdsma (D66): Ik zag dat al diverse fracties in het Europees Parlement hebben gepleit voor aanvullende persoonsgerichte sancties richting Rusland. Mijn fractie heeft daar al eerder voor gepleit, ook vanwege het optreden in Syrië.
- 8
- 9 Ten Broeke (VVD): Op dat vlak ben ik voor het pakket van sancties.
- 10
- 11 Ten Broeke (VVD): Mocht hieruit voortvloeien dat personen kunnen worden aangewezen die hierbij betrokken zijn, vallen persoonsgerichte sancties nooit uit te sluiten. Ik wil daar echter op dit moment niet in den brede voor pleiten. Ik dacht dat de heer Sjoerdsma dat bedoelde.
- 12
- 13 Ik heb al vaker gezegd – ook in algemeen overleggen als deze – dat ik niet voor verzwaring van de sancties ben, waar de fractie van de heer Sjoerdsma en de fractie van de heer Servaes wel voor pleiten.

0.3 NL - opposition  
5.a.ii.2 Assertive: sup...

0.3 NL - opposition  
1.b.i Continuation: e...  
5.a.ii.2 Assertive: sup...

0.3 NL - opposition  
1.a.i Stricter: specific  
3.a.i.1 Stricter sanctio...  
5.a.ii.1 Assertive: sup...

0.4 NL - government...  
1.b.i Continuation: e...

0.4 NL - government...  
1.b.ii Continuation: i...  
5.a.i Assertive: block

0.4 NL - government...  
1.b.ii Continuation: i...



14		
15	Minister Koenders: Het is belangrijk dat we daar steeds weer over spreken, omdat dat natuurlijk toch een land is dat geografisch gezien dicht bij ons staat, al spelen er tegelijkertijd allerlei grote problemen. Ik vind het goed dat die discussie plaatsvindt.	<div>9-7 Het is belangrij...</div> <div>0.4 NL - government...</div> <div>4.a.iv National: other</div>
16		
17	Ik zeg maar direct dat ik niet voor additionele sancties ben. Ik ben voor het huidige pakket, want dat is al scherp genoeg.	<div>9-8 N8 Ik z...</div> <div>0.4 NL - government...</div> <div>1.b.i Continuation: e...</div> <div>3.b.v.2 Upholding exi...</div>
18		
19	De discussie moet juist niet gaan over een verlichting van de sancties, zolang er niet voldaan wordt aan Minsk II. Dat blijft de lijn en die houden we vast.	<div>9-9 De dis...</div> <div>0.4 NL - government...</div> <div>3.b.ii Upholding exist...</div> <div>5.a.ii.2 Assertive: sup...</div>
20		
21	De Kamer weet ook van de scherpe kritiek van de Duitse regering op de regering in Kiev. Dat is iets waarin beide kanten hun verantwoordelijkheid nog moeten nemen. Daarmee zeg ik overigens niet dat ik vind dat de Russische Federatie nu voldoende doet aan de implementatie van Minsk II. Dat is niet het geval.	<div>9-10 De Kamer weet o...</div> <div>0.4 NL - government...</div> <div>3.b.ii Upholding exist...</div> <div>4.b.i.3: International: ...</div>
22	Ten tweede moeten wij, denk ik, het maximale doen om de Oekraïne ook in staat te stellen om die beslissingen door het parlement te krijgen. Zij gaan daar zelf over.	<div>9-11 Ten twee...</div> <div>0.4 NL - government...</div> <div>4.b.i.3: International: ...</div>
23		
24	Ook de benadering van het conflict in Oekraïne kan niet beperkt worden tot sancties, net zo min als dat kan in het geval van de Russische Federatie.	<div>9-12 Ook ...</div> <div>0.4 NL - government...</div> <div>4.b.ii.3 International: ...</div>
25		
26	We moeten steun blijven geven aan het Oekraïense hervormingsproces en mogen ook de humanitaire gevolgen van dit conflict niet uit het oog verliezen. We moeten Oekraïne niet laten vallen.	<div>9-13 We moet...</div> <div>0.4 NL - government...</div> <div>3.b.iv.2 Upholding ex...</div> <div>4.b.ii.3 International: ...</div>
27		
28	Nord Stream 2 is een private overeenkomst, maar de Nederlandse regering kijkt zeer scherp naar het sanctie-instrumentarium en beziet of alles wel goed wordt toegepast. De juridische sanctietoets vind ik essentieel.	<div>9-14 Nord Stream...</div> <div>0.4 NL - government...</div> <div>4.a.iv National: other</div>

29

- 30 Het belangrijkste is in Europa toch dat de Europese Unie een eenheid blijft. Daarom vind ik het ook van groot belang dat daar opnieuw naar gekeken wordt aanstaande maandag. Die eenheid is tot nu toe behouden gebleven en dat moet ook zo blijven.

9-15 Het belangrij...  
0.4 NL - government...  
3.b.vi Upholding exis...  
5.b.i Reticent: united ...

31

- 32 De heer Sjoerdsma vroeg of we dan nu met verdere sancties tegen Rusland moeten beginnen. Ik denk dat dat onverstandig zou zijn, nu er sprake is van een beginnende samenwerking.

9-16 De heer ...  
0.4 NL - government...  
1.b.ii Continuation: i...  
3.b.v.1 Upholding exi...  
4.b.ii.1 International: ...

33

34

- 35 2. Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal.  
"Kamerstuk 21501-02 Raad Algemene Zaken en Raad Buitenlandse Zaken." *Vergaderjaar 2015-2016*, no. 1649, June 9, 2016. Published August 12, 2016.  
<https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-21501-02-1649.html>.

36

- 37 Servaes (Pvda): Ik lees met tevredenheid dat de Minister en het kabinet er geen misverstand over laten bestaan dat de sancties tegen Rusland gewoon blijven bestaan, want de Minskakkoorden worden nog zeker niet volledig nageleefd.

9-17 Ik lees met t...  
0.4 NL - government...  
1.b.i Continuation: e...  
3.b.ii Upholding exist...

38

- 39 Toch zie ik op verschillende plekken het debat zich weer openen. Tot nu toe kwam het voorlopige dieptepunt van de Franse senaat, die gisteren een resolutie aannam waarin ervoor wordt gepleit dat de sancties geleidelijk worden afgebouwd. Blijft de Minister standvastig? Hoe schat hij het krachtenveld elders in Europa in? Een verlengingsbesluit van sancties moet met unanimititeit worden genomen. Ik hoop dat de Minister mij kan geruststellen. Daar komt het eigenlijk op neer.

9-18 Toch zie ik op verschillende ple...  
0.4 NL - government...  
1.b.ii Continuation: i...  
3.b.vi Upholding exis...  
5.a.ii.2 Assertive: sup...

- 40 Sjoerdsma (D66): Ik ben het helemaal eens met het standpunt van het kabinet dat de sancties op Rusland niet mogen worden opgeheven.

9-19 Ik be...  
0.3 NL - opposition  
1.b.i Continuation: e...

41



42	Ik heb echter heel grote zorgen dat sommige landen in Europa toch zwakke knieën krijgen.	9.20 Ik... 0.3 NL - opposition 3.b.vi Upholding exis...
43		
44	Gezien het feit dat er van de Minskakkoorden niets terecht komt, lijkt het mij dat er geen sprake kan zijn van het verlichten van sancties.	9.21 Gezie... 0.3 NL - opposition 1.b.i Continuation: e... 3.b.ii Upholding exist...
45		
46	Het zou zeer slecht zijn, niet alleen inhoudelijk gezien maar ook voor de reputatie van de EU, als dat niet zo is.	9.22 Het z... 0.3 NL - opposition 3.b.vii Upholding exi...
47		
48	Ten Broeke VVD: Ook ik ben voor handhaving van de sancties. We kijken elke dag op de website van de Organisatie voor Veiligheid en Samenwerking in Europa. Er wordt momenteel even geen zware artillerie meer gebruikt, maar er is deze week nog een Oekraïner overleden en er zijn er zeven zwaargewond geraakt. Daarnaast worden er op bepaalde plekken op de Donbass geen waarnemers toegelaten.	9.23 Ook ik ben voor handhavin... 0.4 NL - government... 1.b.i Continuation: e... 3.b.iii.1 Upholding ex...
49		
50	Er is dus nog geen volledige navolging van het Minskakkoord. Het is niet zo erg als een paar maanden geleden – dat moet worden toegegeven – maar Minsk II wordt zeker nog niet nageleefd.	9.24 Er is dus ... 0.4 NL - government... 3.b.ii Upholding exist...
51		
52	Ik zeg er wel iets bij, anders dan de collega's. Er lijkt in Frankrijk, Duitsland en in een paar andere landen behoorlijk wat te bewegen. De heer Servaes wees al op de Franse senaat. Ook de Duitse Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken laat zich al heel lang duidelijk anders uit dan de Duitse bondskanselier. Het is aan het schuiven met de sancties.	9.25 Ik zeg er wel iets bij... 0.4 NL - government... 2.b Need for united ...
53		
54	Ik zeg er namens de VVD bij dat als de sancties worden verlicht, de Russen wel een heel hoge prijs moeten betalen. Als de prijs is dat er in Syrië een bestand kan worden getroffen, heb je een koppeling van dossiers. Dat is allemaal niet fraai, maar dan ben ik bereid om erover na te denken.	9.26 Ik zeg er namens... 0.4 NL - government... 2.f Other
55		

56 Ik ben in elk geval niet voor verzwaring van de sancties, zoals een paar maanden geleden nog door sommige collega's werd bepleit.

9:27 Ik be...  
0.4 NL - government...  
1.b.ii Continuation: i...

57

58 Minister Koenders: Ik kom op een aantal andere punten die te maken hebben met de sancties voor Rusland. Laat ik omwille van de tijd zeggen dat ik het eens ben met de opvattingen die ik in de Kamer heb gehoord. Onder de huidige omstandigheden kan er nog steeds geen sprake zijn van business as usual.

9:28 Ik kom op een a...  
0.4 NL - government...  
1.b.i Continuation: e...

59

60 Europese eenheid is het enige krachtige signaal dat we kunnen blijven geven. Daar investeert het voorzitterschap in.

9:29 Europ...  
0.4 NL - government...  
3.b.vi Upholding exis...

61

62 Ook al zijn we geen voorzitter in deze Raad, we gebruiken waar we kunnen onze invloed om die positie vast te houden.

9:30 Ook ...  
0.4 NL - government...  
5.a.ii.4 Assertive: sup...

63

64 Die positie is verbonden aan de implementatie van Minsk. Daarmee is momenteel onvoldoende voortgang geboekt.

9:31 Die p...  
0.4 NL - government...  
3.b.ii Upholding exist...

65

66 Ik erken dat ook Oekraïne achterligt met de implementatie, maar dat mag geen reden zijn om Rusland minder op zijn verantwoordelijkheid te wijzen door de sancties te verlichten.

9:32 Ik erken ...  
0.4 NL - government...  
1.b.i Continuation: e...  
4.b.i.3: International: ...

67

68 Nederland zet zich in voor een verlenging van de sancties met zes maanden. Als ik de huidige situatie zo bekijk, heb ik er een goed vertrouwen in dat dat gaat lukken.

9:33 Nederland zet zi...  
0.4 NL - government...  
1.b.i Continuation: e...  
5.a.ii.2 Assertive: sup...

69

70 3. Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal.  
"Europese top." *Handeling 2016-2017*, no. 11, item 3, October 12, 2016. Published November 3, 2016.  
<https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20162017-11-3.html>

71

72 Van Bommel (SP): Inmiddels wordt steeds duidelijker dat ook Kiev zich niet houdt aan het in Minsk gesloten akkoord, terwijl het land miljarden aan steun ontvangt van het westen, onder andere van de Europese Unie en het IMF. Diverse Europese landen pleiten er in die context voor om de sancties tegen Rusland op te heffen. Nederland ziet echter geen reden om de sancties af te zwakken. Op welke wijze spoort de regering Kiev aan om zich aan de Minsk-afspraken te houden? Wij mogen hier niet met twee maten meten. Dat ondermijnt het vredesproces juist.

9-34 Inmiddels wordt steeds duidelijker ...  
0.3 NL - opposition  
4.a.iii National: West...

73

74 De heer Van Bommel (SP): Wij zijn op dit moment niet voor verzwakking van de sancties.

9-35 ...  
0.3 NL - opposition  
1.b.i Continuation: e...

75

76 Daar kan in de toekomst wel aanleiding voor zijn, bijvoorbeeld als er vorderingen worden gemaakt op het vlak van de Minsk-afspraken.

9-36 Daar ...  
0.3 NL - opposition  
2.c.ii Minsk agreeme...

77

78 Tegelijkertijd zijn wij niet voor het verder opvoeren van de sancties, omdat dat de zaak verder onder druk zou zetten en wij aan oplopende spanning en verdere escalatie in deze regio geen behoefte hebben; dat vinden wij levensgevaarlijk.

9-37 Tegelijkertijd ...  
0.3 NL - opposition  
1.b.ii Continuation: i...  
3.b.iv.2 Upholding ex...

79

80 Verhoeven (D66): Maar nu is het wat D66 betreft wel tijd voor een extra stap. Heeft de premier al persoonlijk met Poetin gebeld om hem te herinneren aan VN-resolutie 2166?

9-38 Maar nu i...  
0.3 NL - opposition  
1.a.ii Stricter: general...  
4.a.iv National: other

81

82 Is de premier bereid zich in de Europese Unie in te zetten voor extra sancties tegen Rusland? Is de premier bereid straks de Nederlandse zetel in de VN-Veiligheidsraad te benutten om Rusland tot de orde te roepen? Ik krijg hierop graag een reactie van de premier.

9-39 Is de premier ber...  
0.3 NL - opposition  
1.a.ii Stricter: general...  
5.a.ii.1 Assertive: sup...

83

84 Bontes (Groep Bontes/Van Klaveren): Het krachteloze optreden van premier Rutte zien we ook bij de MH17. Nu de Russische betrokkenheid is aangetoond, moeten de sancties tegen Moskou natuurlijk worden

9-40 Het kra...  
0.3 NL - opposition  
1.a.ii Stricter: general...  
3.a.i.2 Stricter sanctio...  
5.a.ii.1 Assertive: sup...



84 verzwaard. Gaat de premier daarvoor pleiten bij de Europese top?

9:40

85

86 Maij (PvdA): De PvdA steunt de strategie van het kabinet ten aanzien van Rusland: waar noodzakelijk stevige maatregelen, zoals de economische sancties, maar tegelijkertijd proberen diplomatiek overleg levend te houden.

9:41 De PvdA steu...

0.4 NL - government...

1.b.i Continuation: e...

4.a.ii National: dialog...

87

88 Net als het kabinet ziet de PvdA geen reden om de EU-sancties die zijn opgelegd als reactie op het Russische optreden in Oekraïne, de illegale annexatie van de Krim en het destabiliseren van het oosten van Oekraïne, af te zwakken. Er zijn immers nog geen vorderingen gemaakt rondom de implementatie van de Minsk-akkoorden.

9:42 Net als het kabinet zi...

0.4 NL - government...

1.b.i Continuation: e...

3.b.ii Upholding exist...

89

90 Mulder (VVD): Ook zal worden gesproken over sancties tegen Rusland. Volgens mij is in het gedrag van Rusland niets veranderd, dus hoeven we ook niets te veranderen aan de sancties: die kunnen worden gehandhaafd.

9:43 Ook zal word...

0.4 NL - government...

1.b.i Continuation: e...

3.b.iii.3 Upholding ex...

91

92 Minister Rutte: Allereerst merk ik op, omdat er ook een link met MH17 werd gelegd, dat het huidige sanctiepakket noch met Syrië, noch met MH17 heeft te maken. Dat is er gekomen vanwege de bezetting van de Krim en het interfereren in Oost-Oekraïne. Dat vindt dus ook een juridische basis in het Russische optreden in Oekraïne.

9:44 Allereerst merk ik op, ...

0.4 NL - government...

3.b.iii.1 Upholding ex...

93

94 Het is niet eenvoudig, laat ik dat maar meteen zeggen, althans veel minder eenvoudig dan het misschien lijkt, om extra sancties in te voeren naar aanleiding van het Russische optreden in Syrië. Daarvoor zou je een heel nieuw EU-sanctiebesluit moeten nemen en dat moet met unanimiteit.

9:45 Het is niet eenvo...

0.4 NL - government...

1.b.ii Continuation: i...

3.b.vi Upholding exis...

5.b.i Reticent: united ...

95

96 Het lijkt mij echter buitengewoon schadelijk en een grote overwinning voor Rusland als Europa een hele discussie zou gaan voeren over sancties vanwege het

9:46 Het...

0.4 NL - government...

1.b.ii Continuation: i...

3.b.vi Upholding exis...

5.a.i Assertive: block

96	optreden in Syrië en als dat vervolgens niet zou lukken. Mijn taxatie is dat het buitengewoon ingewikkeld is.	9:46	
97			
98	Minister Rutte: Ik ben het natuurlijk helemaal met Van Bommel eens dat wij ook druk moeten houden op Oekraïne. Ik doe dat zelf ook; we doen dat allemaal, maar ik blijf wel steeds zeggen dat niet Rusland bezet is maar Oekraïne.	9:47 Ik ben het nat...	0.4 NL - government... 4.a.iii National: West...
99			
100	Minister Rutte: Dat hangt natuurlijk altijd samen met de haalbaarheid.	9:48 D...	0.4 NL - government... 1.d Indifferent / uncl...
101			
102	Het heeft niet heel veel zin om stevige signalen uit te zenden als je niet zeker weet dat daar ook steun voor is. Wat ik uiteindelijk wil, is niet dat wij met schone handen staan; wat ik wil, is dat het bombarderen stopt. Ik vind dat al onze inzet daarop gericht moet zijn.	9:49 Het heeft niet ...	0.4 NL - government... 3.b.iv.2 Upholding ex... 5.b.i Reticent: united ...
103			
104	Verhoeven (D66): Ik zie ook wel in dat haalbaarheid en standpunt met elkaar samenhangen, maar daar moet je natuurlijk niet eindeloos in doorgaan, want dan neem je alleen nog standpunten in die haalbaar zijn. Ik denk niet dat dat goed zou zijn, zeker op meer principiële punten.	9:50 Ik zie ook wel in d...	0.3 NL - opposition 5.a.ii.1 Assertive: sup...
105			
106	Minister Rutte: Je kunt als nationale regering niet zeggen: dit vind ik. Ik heb net gezegd dat het van belang is dat Europa met één mond spreekt.	9:51 Je ku...	0.4 NL - government... 3.b.vi Upholding exis... 5.b.i Reticent: united ...
107			
108	Dat lijkt mij veel verstandiger dan het innemen van heel principiële standpunten, waarna wij moeten vaststellen dat dat die standpunten niet haalbaar zijn.	9:52 Dat lij...	0.4 NL - government... 5.b.ii Reticent: other
109			
110	Minister Rutte: Nogmaals: ik leg uit waarom ik bewust voorzichtig en subtiel ben in mijn uitingen, want ik vind het weinig zinvol om als Nederland te zeggen dat het A, B, C, X, Y of Z moet zijn. Volgens mij	9:53 Nogma...	0.4 NL - government... 3.b.vi Upholding exis... 5.b.i Reticent: united ...



110 telt hier de eenheid in de Europese Unie ten opzichte  
van Rusland. Dat is voor mij cruciaal.

9:53

111

112 De heer Voordewind (ChristenUnie): Op 30  
september hebben de VN besloten om een  
onderzoek te doen naar het gebombardeerde  
hulpkonvooi. Er doen geruchten de ronde dat de  
Russen bij dat bombardement betrokken zouden zijn.  
Dat zijn geruchten; daarom moet dat onderzoek  
plaatsvinden, maar als uit dat onderzoek blijkt dat de  
Russen verantwoordelijk zijn geweest voor het  
bombarderen van een humanitair konvooi dat naar  
die belegerde steden ging — ik weet dat dat een als-  
danvraag is, maar ik stel die vraag toch — is dat dan  
voor de minister-president eventueel een haakje om  
te zeggen dat we de druk op Rusland echt stevig  
moeten opvoeren?

9:54 Op 30 september hebben de VN besloten om een ...

0.3 NL - opposition  
1.a.i Stricter: specific  
3.a.i.1 Stricter sanctio...

113

114 Minister Rutte: De heer Voordewind gaf het  
antwoord zelf: dat is echt een als-danvraag. Wij  
moeten dit stap voor stap doen. Ik wil niet dat  
Nederland stoer A roept, of stoer X, Y of Z roept. Ik  
wil dat wij effectief zijn. Op dit moment zijn wij dat  
collectief niet. De wereldgemeenschap is niet  
effectief.

9:55 De heer Voordewind ...

0.4 NL - government...  
5.b.ii Reticent: other

115 De heer Voordewind (ChristenUnie):

116 Uiteindelijk hebben wij de hulp van de Russen nodig  
...

9:56 U...

0.3 NL - opposition  
2.f Other  
3.b.iii.2 Upholding ex...

117

118

119 De heer Bontes (Groep Bontes/Van Klaveren): Mijn  
vraag is dan toch: kunnen de sancties naar aanleiding  
van het gedrag van de Russen inzake het JIT-  
onderzoek naar de MH17 niet worden uitgebreid? Ik  
hoorde dit ook terug in de inbreng van de heer  
Omtzigt en van de heer Verhoeven. Ook zij dringen  
aan op meer druk, op een verzwaring van sancties. Is  
er toch niet een haakje om dat voor te leggen aan de  
collega's in Brussel?

9:57 Mijn vraag is dan toch: kunne...

0.3 NL - opposition  
1.a.ii Stricter: general...  
3.a.i.2 Stricter sanctio...  
5.a.ii.1 Assertive: sup...

120

121 Minister Rutte: De heer Bontes wil nog een stap  
verder gaan. Daar ben ik het niet mee eens, omdat je

9:58...

0.4 NL - government...  
1.b.ii Continuation: i...  
3.b.vii Upholding exi...

121 daardoor naar mijn overtuiging met de beschuldigende vinger zou wijzen naar één land. Je kunt een land pas aanwijzen of beschuldigen als je meer weet op basis van de lijst met namen die straks naar buiten komt.

9:58

122

123 De heer Bontes (Groep Bontes/Van Klaveren): Er zijn bijna 200 Nederlanders omgekomen bij deze verschrikkelijke moordaanslag. Daarom vraag ik de minister-president: is hij toch bereid om die sanctieverzwaring voor te leggen tijdens de Europese top?

9:59 Er zijn bijna 200 ...

0.3 NL - opposition

1.a.ii Stricter: general...

3.a.i.2 Stricter sanctio...

5.a.ii.1 Assertive: sup...

124

125 Minister Rutte: Ik vind dat dat instrument averechts werkt en daarom zal ik dat niet doen. Ik heb maar één doel: de daders moeten voor het gerecht komen, zodat zij kunnen worden veroordeeld. Ik ben ervan overtuigd dat de suggestie van de heer Bontes dat doel verder weg zal brengen, en daarom zal ik dat niet doen.

9:60 Ik vind dat dat instru...

0.4 NL - government...

1.b.ii Continuation: i...

3.b.v.1 Upholding exi...

126

127 De heer Omtzigt (CDA): Nederland heeft zijn partners in een later stadium namelijk gewoon nodig om druk op Rusland te kunnen zetten. Ik snap de afwegingen van de premier met betrekking tot de sancties, maar dit proces moet nu wel in gang worden gezet.

9:61 Nederland he...

0.3 NL - opposition

3.b.iii.2 Upholding ex...

128

129 Verhoeven (D66): constaterende dat Rusland in de VN-Veilighedsraad zeer recentelijk het veto heeft uitgesproken tegen een resolutie die opriep tot het beëindigen van bombardementen op Aleppo in Syrië en een staakt-het-vuren om humanitaire hulp mogelijk te maken;

9:62 constaterende dat Rusland in de...

0.3 NL - opposition

1.a.ii Stricter: general...

3.a.i.1 Stricter sanctio...

5.a.ii.1 Assertive: sup...

130 verzoekt de regering, zich in de Europese Raad op 20 en 21 oktober 2016 in te zetten voor extra sancties namens de Europese Unie op Rusland,

131

132 De heer Bontes (Groep Bontes/Van Klaveren):

133 overwegende dat Rusland op ernstige wijze twijfel blijft zaaien over de professionaliteit en onafhankelijkheid van het strafrechtelijk onderzoek

9:63 ove...

0.3 NL - opposition

1.a.i Stricter: specific

3.a.i.2 Stricter sanctio...

5.a.ii.1 Assertive: sup...



- 133 naar de aanslag op de MH17, uitgevoerd door het  
Joint Investigation Team (JIT);
- 134 verzoekt de regering, bij de Europese top in te zetten  
op het verzwaren van de economische sancties tegen  
Rusland,

9:63

135

- 136 Minister Rutte: Dan de moties. De motie-  
Verhoeven/Sjoerdsma op stuk nr. 1156 gaat over  
sancties tegen Rusland. Ik heb al gezegd dat dat niet  
effectief is. Ik ontraad dan ook echt deze motie.

9:64 Dan de m...

0.4 NL - government...  
1.b.ii Continuation: i...  
3.b.v.1 Upholding exi...

137

- 138 Minister Rutte: Met de motie-Bontes op stuk nr. 1159  
wordt de regering verzocht om in te zetten op het  
verzwaren van de economische sancties. Ook in dat  
verband verwijs ik naar mijn reactie op de motie op  
stuk nr. 1156 en naar het debat. Ook die motie  
ontraad ik dus.

9:65 Met de motie-Bo...

0.4 NL - government...  
1.b.ii Continuation: i...  
3.b.v.1 Upholding exi...

139

- 140 4. Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal.  
"Kamerstuk 27925 Bestrijding internationaal  
terrorisme." *Vergaderjaar 2016-2017*, no. 600,  
September 29, 2016. Published October 25,  
2016.  
<https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-27925-600.html>  
file:///C:/Users/vanbrugg/Downloa  
ds/kst-27925-600.pdf.

141

- 142 Servaes (PvdA): Een lid van de Veiligheidsraad,  
Rusland, schendt deze resolutie dag in, dag uit. Wat  
doen we ertegen? Wanneer is het tijd om hardere  
stappen tegen Rusland te nemen?

9:66 Een lid va...

0.4 NL - government...  
1.a.ii Stricter: general...  
3.a.i.1 Stricter sanctio...

143

- 144 Knops (CDA): In lijn daarmee vindt onze fractie dat we  
dit niet voor kennisgeving kunnen aannemen. We  
moeten Rusland hierop blijven aanspreken. Er moet  
een onafhankelijk onderzoek komen. Dat is eerder in  
de geschiedenis van de VN gebeurd. Dit lijkt me echt  
iets waarbij heel veel grenzen van humaniteit  
overschreden zijn. Dit kan dus echt niet zonder  
gevolgen blijven.

9:67 In lijn daarmee vindt on...

0.3 NL - opposition  
1.d Indifferent / uncl...  
4.b.ii.3 International: ...

145

146	<b>Voordewind (CU):</b> In navolging van mijn collega's vraag ik welke internationale mogelijkheden er zijn om Rusland op te roepen om te stoppen met deze vreselijke bombardementen. Frankrijk, Engeland en Amerika hebben dit natuurlijk ook al gedaan. Ik weet dat de marges beperkt zijn, maar er moet meer kunnen dan op dit moment, met die gruwelijke bombardementen die gaande zijn.	9:68 In navolging van mijn c... 0.3 NL - opposition 1.a.ii Stricter: general... 3.a.i.1 Stricter sanctio...
147	<b>Sjoerdsma (D66):</b> Wat kunnen we doen om Rusland toch te bewegen tot het veranderen van zijn rol daar? Wordt het niet tijd om langzamerhand in Europees verband, maar misschien ook in breder verband te bekijken of hier sancties aan verbonden moeten worden, gezien de ernst van de situatie?	9:69 Wat kunnen we ... 0.3 NL - opposition 1.a.ii Stricter: general... 3.a.i.1 Stricter sanctio... 5.a.ii.1 Assertive: sup...
148		
149	<b>De heer Grashoff (GroenLinks):</b> Welke opties zijn er? Gaat het dan, behalve het diplomatieke front, ook om economische sancties en dergelijke? Worden die overwogen? In hoeverre zouden die zinvol kunnen zijn? Er zijn hier ernstig grenzen overschreden en daarom kun je je afvragen of er geen bredere initiatieven nodig zijn.	9:70 Welke opties zijn er?... 0.3 NL - opposition 1.a.i Stricter: specific 3.a.i.1 Stricter sanctio...
150		
151	<b>Minister Koenders:</b> Dat betekent niet dat ik denk dat het met sancties aan Rusland ineens opgelost zal worden. We weten allemaal dat dit niet zo is.	9:71 Dat b... 0.4 NL - government... 1.b.ii Continuation: l... 3.b.v.1 Upholding exi...
152		
153	Ik kom terug op de essentie van de situatie. Ik kan niet zeggen dat ik morgen de gouden oplossing in mijn zak heb. Ik zeg alleen maar dat Nederland zich nu opnieuw hiervoor zal gaan inzetten, met Frankrijk, Italië, Duitsland, het Verenigd Koninkrijk en de VS. Wij hebben daar constant contact mee. Daarbij zal het gaan om een stevige positiebepaling ten opzichte van de Russische Federatie.	9:72 Ik kom terug op de esse... 0.4 NL - government... 4.b.ii.3 International: ...
154		
155	Daarbij gaat het helemaal niet om sancties, maar om eensgezinde actie van de internationale gemeenschap.	9:73 Daar ... 0.4 NL - government... 4.b.ii.3 International: ...
156		
157	Gezien de aard van de Russische Federatie zie ik namelijk niet dat dit anders een gedragsverandering tot stand kan brengen.	9:74 Gezie... 0.4 NL - government... 3.b.v.1 Upholding exi...

158

9.74

159

5. Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal.

“Kamerstuk 21501-02 Raad Algemene Zaken en Raad Buitenlandse Zaken.” *Vergaderjaar 2016-2017*, no. 1684, October 5, 2016.

Published October 26, 2016.

<https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-21501-02-1684.html>.

160

161

162 Anne Mulder (VVD): Wat mijn fractie betreft gaan we door met de sancties voor Rusland.

9.75 W...

0.4 NL - government...

1.b.i Continuation: e...

163

164

165 6. Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. “Stand

van zaken MH17.” *Handeling 2016-2017*, no.

14, item 8, October 26, 2016. Published

November 16, 2016.

<https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20162017-14-8.html>.

166

167 Voordewind (CU): Mijn vraag aan het kabinet is welke acties er nog mogelijk zijn om Rusland wel volledig te laten meewerken met het JIT-onderzoek. Het zou de druk op Rusland toch kunnen verhogen als andere JIT-landen de politieke en publieke druk op Rusland ook zouden opvoeren om volledige openheid van zaken te geven en de nieuwe radarbeelden vrij te geven?

9.76 Mijn vraag aan het kabi...

0.3 NL - opposition

1.a.ii Stricter: general...

3.a.i.2 Stricter sanctio...

168

169 De heer Bontes (Groep Bontes/Van Klaveren): Nadat het JIT de Russische betrokkenheid aantoonde, had het kabinet de Russische ambassadeur moeten uitwijzen en op zwaardere economische sancties moeten inzetten.

9.77 Nadat het JIT ...

0.3 NL - opposition

1.a.i Stricter: specific

3.a.i.2 Stricter sanctio...

5.a.ii.1 Assertive: sup...

170

171 Ook Oekraïne gaat natuurlijk niet vrijuit. Het hield het eigen luchtruim boven het gevaarlijke oosten van het

9.78

0.3 NL - opposition

4.b.i.3: International: ...



171 land gewoon open. Waarom wordt er in het JIT-  
onderzoek hier geen aandacht aan besteed?

9-78

172

173 De heer Ten Broeke (VVD): Heel breed werd in deze  
Kamer gezegd: we moeten er alles aan doen om te  
voorkomen dat Nederland alleen komt te staan, zeker  
met betrekking tot het diplomatieke spoor. Ik ben het  
daarmee eens.

9-79 Heel breed w...

0.4 NL - government...  
4.b.i.1 International: ...  
5.b.i Reticent: united ...

174

175 Maar daar hoort dan ook bij dat we geen eenzijdige  
acties ondernemen die Nederland juist alleen zetten,  
zoals het indienen van een klacht waar niemand ons  
in steunt, of het bepleiten van sancties die het  
misschien niet zullen halen. Je kunt daar heel veel  
voorbeelden van geven. Die hebben de afgelopen  
jaren ook meerdere keren de revue gepasseerd.

9-80 Maar daar hoort dan ...

0.4 NL - government...  
1.b.ii Continuation: i...  
3.b.vi Upholding exis...  
5.b.i Reticent: united ...

176

177 7. Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal.  
"Kamerstuk 21501-02 Raad Algemene Zaken  
en Raad Buitenlandse Zaken." *Vergaderjaar*  
2016-2017, no. 1686, October 5, 2016.  
Published October 27, 2016.  
[https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-  
21501-02-1686.html](https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-21501-02-1686.html).

178

179

180 De heer Servaes (PvdA): Mijn fractie blijft van mening  
dat het eerder door het kabinet geformuleerde  
uitgangspunt voor de relaties met Rusland, namelijk  
dat we een vuist en een open hand naast elkaar  
moeten hebben, hier ook steeds pregnanter aan de  
orde zou moeten zijn.

9-81 Mijn fractie blijft ...

0.4 NL - government...  
4.c Both national an...

181

182 Het is, met andere woorden, mijn overtuiging dat de  
kans op een dialoog en een oplossing steeds kleiner  
wordt als we niet bereid zijn om gezamenlijk, met  
andere landen in Europees verband, een vuist te  
maken naar Moskou. Lees: dreigen met verzwaring  
van sancties.

9-82 Het is, met ande...

0.4 NL - government...  
1.a.ii Stricter: general...  
3.a.ii Stricter sanctio...  
5.a.ii.1 Assertive: sup...

183

184 Ik wil ook wijzen op een open brief die door ongeveer 150 wetenschappers is opgesteld. Zij zeggen eigenlijk hetzelfde. Zij zijn trouwens niet zozeer voor economische sancties, maar voor het opstellen van een zwarte lijst van mensen die op enigerlei wijze militair of politiek betrokken zijn bij de oorlogsmisdaden in Syrië, zoals we ze inmiddels noemen.

9:83 Ik wil ook wijzen op een ...  
0.4 NL - government...  
1.a.i Stricter: specific  
3.a.i.1 Stricter sanctio...

185

186 Anne Mulder (VVD): Wat kunnen Nederland en de Europese Unie doen? Er wordt gesproken over nog meer sancties tegen Rusland. Maar als je kijkt naar de wijze waarop het gaat in de Europese Unie, zie je dat het al moeilijk is om de huidige sancties te handhaven, omdat niet alle landen het daarmee eens zijn.

9:84 Wat kunnen Nederla...  
0.4 NL - government...  
1.b.ii Continuation: i...  
3.b.vi Upholding exis...

187

188 Dan komt de vraag aan de orde wat er dan nog wel mogelijk is, gegeven het gebrek aan draagvlak voor extra sancties.

9:85 Dan k...  
0.4 NL - government...  
4.b.i.4 International: ...

189

190 Minister Koenders: Je zou kunnen denken aan de uitbreiding van het bestaande Syrische sanctieregime naar bijvoorbeeld piloten en indien mogelijk niet-Syrische nationals, Iran of de Russische Federatie. Dat vergt een aanpassing van de criteria. Het zal daarom niet van vandaag op morgen gebeuren, maar ik ben wel bezig om erover na te denken of dat een middel zou kunnen zijn.

9:86 Je zou kunnen denken a...  
0.4 NL - government...  
1.a.i Stricter: specific  
3.a.i.1 Stricter sanctio...

191

192 Enerzijds heb ik er niet zo heel veel vertrouwen in dat het zal leiden tot enige gedragsverandering. Integendeel, waarschijnlijk zal het het beleid versterken, omdat juist het inbrengen van de sancties heeft geleid tot de Russische reactie: we gaan met u niet samenwerken want er zijn toch al sancties opgelegd. Daar hoeven wij ons niets aan gelegen te laten liggen, maar ik zet dus wel vraagtekens bij de effectiviteit. Ik sluit niks uit, zo zeg ik ook vanavond opnieuw.

9:87 Enerzijds heb ik er niet zo heel ...  
0.4 NL - government...  
1.b.ii Continuation: i...  
3.b.v.1 Upholding exi...

193

194 Er is geen middel uitgesloten, maar het zal zich moeten bewijzen op de effectiviteit van de maatregel.

9:88 Er ...  
0.4 NL - government...  
3.b.v.1 Upholding exi...

195

196 Verder is het een probleem dat ik zeker wil weten dat  
we in Europa unaniem zijn, mocht het wenselijk zijn.  
Dat ligt niet direct voor de hand, omdat er een  
heleboel landen zijn die zeggen dat dit juist de minst  
effectieve manier is om het te doen. Dat betekent dus  
dat de verdeeldheid van Europa dan inderdaad een  
groter probleem zou zijn dan de eenheid die we nu  
nodig hebben.

9-89 Verder is het een proble...	0.4 NL - government...
	3.b.vi Upholding exis...
	5.b.i Reticent: united ...

197

198 **Servaes (PvdA):** Dan moet het toch de les zijn dat we  
niet alleen de open hand van Ayrault, die naar  
Moskou gaat, nodig hebben maar ook de vuist. Ik  
moedig de Minister aan om die discussie flink te  
blijven stimuleren in Europees en mondiaal verband.

9-90 Dan moet he...	0.4 NL - government...
	1.d Indifferent / uncl...
	3.a.ii Stricter sanctio...
	5.a.ii.4 Assertive: sup...

199

200 **Minister Koenders:** Ik erken en herken wat de heer  
Servaes zegt over sancties tegen de Russische  
Federatie en Oekraïne. Ik ben er ook voor om die  
voort te zetten, juist vanwege wat er nog steeds in  
Minsk gebeurt.

9-91 Minister Koe...	0.4 NL - government...
	1.b.i Continuation: e...
	3.b.ii Upholding exist...

201

202 8. Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal.  
"Uitslag van het Oekraïnerferendum."  
*Handeling 2016-2017*, no. 19, item 37,  
November 8, 2016. Published November 24,  
2016.  
<https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20162017-19-37.html>.

203

204 De heer Verhoeven (D66):

205 overwegende dat Europese eensgezindheid het beste  
antwoord is op het Russische buitenlandse beleid dat  
leidt tot destabilisering van Europa's grenzen;

9-92 over...	0.3 NL - opposition
	3.a.iii Stricter sanctio...

206

207 overwegende dat dit niet alleen gaat om de Krim en  
Oost-Oekraïne maar ook om bijvoorbeeld Syrië en de  
honderdduizenden onschuldige burgers die in Aleppo  
in de val zitten;

9-93 overwe...	0.3 NL - opposition
	3.a.i.1 Stricter sanctio...

208



209	verzoekt de regering, zich in te zetten voor extra sancties namens de Europese Unie op Rusland,	9:94 ... 0.3 NL - opposition 1.a.ii Stricter: general... 5.a.ii.1 Assertive: sup...
210		
211		
212	<b>Minister Rutte:</b> We delen zeer de verantwoordiging over wat Rusland doet in Syrië. Dat vraagt ook om een antwoord. Tegelijkertijd moeten we ook vaststellen dat er op dit moment in Europa geen gedeeld beeld is over inzet van extra sancties.	9:95 We delen ze... 0.4 NL - government... 1.b.ii Continuation: i... 3.b.vi Upholding exis... 5.b.i Reticent: united ...
213		
214	Ik ben het met de indieners eens, maar onze eerste prioriteit moet nu zijn het handhaven van de sancties gekoppeld aan de gebeurtenissen op de Krim en in Oost-Oekraïne. Met die kanttekening wil ik het oordeel over de motie graag aan de Kamer laten. Met de inhoud, met de richting is het kabinet het namelijk gewoon eens.	9:96 Ik ben het met de in... 0.4 NL - government... 1.b.i Continuation: e... 3.b.iii.1 Upholding ex...
215		
216	Ik wijs er wel op dat dit heel lastig is in Europa. Dat bleek ook tijdens de laatste Europese Raad. We moeten de Europese eenheid niet doorbreken. Die is heel belangrijk, ook op dit punt.	9:97 Ik wijs er ... 0.4 NL - government... 3.b.vi Upholding exis... 5.b.i Reticent: united ...
217		
218	De heer Ten Broeke (VVD): als Nederland in zijn eentje gaat pleiten voor iets wat niet gaat gebeuren, dan toon je alleen maar weer aan dat de Europese Unie geen overeenstemming daarover kan bereiken. Het middels is dus sympathiek, maar falen is mogelijk net zo schadelijk.	9:98 als Nederland in ... 0.4 NL - government... 3.b.vi Upholding exis... 5.b.i Reticent: united ...
219		
220	<b>Minister Rutte:</b> Het belangrijkste nu is om de eenheid die er is ten aanzien van de sancties die samenhangen met de bezetting van de Krim en de bemoeienis met Oost-Oekraïne, te behouden.	9:99 Het bela... 0.4 NL - government... 3.b.vi Upholding exis...
221		
222	Het goede nieuws is wel dat het geluid dat je hier en daar nog weleens hoorde dat we wat betreft de sancties misschien een beetje moeten verslappen, eigenlijk weg is en dat iedereen zegt: nee, we moeten de sancties handhaven. Dat is het goede nieuws.	9:100 Het goede ... 0.4 NL - government... 1.b.ii Continuation: i... 4.b.i.4 International: ...
223		

224 Maar het creëren van een nieuw pakket sancties samenhangend met wat er op dit moment gebeurt in Syrië, waar in de motie om wordt gevraagd, zie ik echter ook niet een-twee-drie gerealiseerd.

9-101 Maar he...  
0.4 NL - government...  
1.b.ii Continuation: i...  
3.b.vi Upholding exis...

225

226 De heer Van der Staaij (SGP): Eerder heeft de minister-president over een motie met dezelfde strekking gezegd: het gaat echt niet lukken in Europa en daarom ontraad ik haar. Nu kiest hij voor een andere benadering. Betekent dit dat er nu ineens meer kans is dat dit het wél gaat halen in Europa?

9-102 Eerder heeft de...  
0.3 NL - opposition  
1.d Indifferent / uncl...  
5.a.ii.1 Assertive: sup...

227

228 Minister Rutte: Het is geen dubbeltje op zijn kant als je bekijkt hoe het in Europa ligt. Ik zie het niet een-twee-drie gebeuren. Dat is niet veranderd; daar heeft de heer Van der Staaij gelijk in.

9-103 Het is g...  
0.4 NL - government...  
3.b.vi Upholding exis...

229

230 Iedere keer nee zeggen, leidt tot het verwijt, dat ik heel goed begrijp, dat de regering er blijkbaar tegen is. Dat werd hier en daar in de eerste termijn gezegd. Dat is niet zo, maar ik wil voorkomen dat je strijdt voor iets wat vervolgens het beeld van eenheid schaadt.

9-104 Iedere keer ne...  
0.4 NL - government...  
1.b.ii Continuation: i...  
3.b.vi Upholding exis...

231

232 9. Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal.  
"Begroting Buitenlandse Zaken." *Handeling*  
2016-2017, no. 26, item 3, November 23,  
2016. Published December 15, 2016.  
<https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20162017-26-3.html>.

233

234 Van Bommel (SP): Hoe beoordeelt hij Trumps uitlatingen over Rusland? Is hij het met de SP eens dat alle kansen op de-escalatie met beide handen moeten worden aangegrepen? Hoe kijkt de minister naar de rol van het Westen bij het ontstaan van een Koude Oorlog 2.0? Valt het Westen überhaupt iets te verwijten naar zijn opvatting? Is de minister het met mij eens dat het intrekken van de belofte dat Georgië en Oekraïne ooit lid zouden worden van de NAVO bij kan dragen aan de gewenste de-escalatie?

9-105 Hoe beoordeelt hij Trumps uitlatingen...  
0.3 NL - opposition  
4.b.i.3: International: ...

235



236 De heer Van Bommel (SP): Inderdaad maken wij ons grote zorgen over het sanctiebeleid. Dat richt zich niet op de bestaande sancties, die wat de SP betreft intact moeten blijven. Maar discussie over verdergaande sancties vanwege het conflict in Oekraïne of vanwege het uitblijven van stappen met betrekking tot de Krim, wil ik vandaag niet voeren.

9:106 Inderdaad maken ...  
0.3 NL - opposition  
1.b.i Continuation: e...

237

238 In de bestaande sancties vanwege het beleid tot op heden, zeker met betrekking tot de illegale annexatie van de Krim, treft de heer Servaes in mij een bondgenoot, maar verdergaande sancties zou ik nu niet willen nemen.

9:107 In de besta...  
0.3 NL - opposition  
1.b.ii Continuation: i...  
3.b.iii.1 Upholding ex...

239

240 Dat is een vorm van escalatie die in dit conflict op dit moment naar de opvatting van onze fractie gevaarlijk wordt geacht.

9:108 Dat ...  
0.3 NL - opposition  
3.b.v.1 Upholding exi...

241

242 De heer Van Bommel (SP): Ik denk dat het altijd beter is om te praten en te onderhandelen dan om uit te sluiten en er met je rug naartoe te gaan staan.

9:109 Ik d...  
0.3 NL - opposition  
4.b.ii.1 International: ...

243

244 Over de sancties het volgende. Er is een proces gaande waarbij vastgesteld moet worden dat beide partijen, zowel de opstandelingen in Rusland als Oekraïne, zich niet houden aan de afspraken die gemaakt zijn in het Minskproces. Zolang dat niet het geval is, vind ik dat die sancties intact moeten blijven.

9:110 Over de sanctie...  
0.3 NL - opposition  
1.b.i Continuation: e...  
3.b.ii Upholding exist...

245

246 Op het moment dat daar stappen worden gezet, zie ik ruimte om te komen tot verlichting.

9:111 ...  
0.3 NL - opposition  
2.c.ii Minsk agreeme...

247

248 De heer Sjoerdsma (D66) De heer Van Bommel zegt dat hij ruimte ziet als daar stappen worden gezet, maar de houding van dit kabinet en overigens ook van mijn partij, is: alleen bij volledige naleving van het Minskakkoord kan er worden gesproken over het afnemen van deze sancties.

9:112 De heer Van Bo...  
0.3 NL - opposition  
2.c.i Minsk agreeme...

249

250 De heer Van Bommel (SP): Dat is niet het  
uitgangspunt van de SP. Wij zeggen niet: alles in één  
keer en dan zijn de sancties weg.

9:13 Dat ...  
0.3 NL - opposition  
2.c.ii Minsk agreeme...

251

252 Nee, wij zijn inmiddels zo vergevorderd in dit conflict  
qua tijd en qua handelingen — er zijn nog steeds  
schermutselingen en er vallen nog steeds doden —  
dat wij iedere stap die daar gezet wordt en die  
substantieel is, ter sprake moeten brengen, ook in  
relatie tot de sancties.

9:14 Nee, wij zijn in...  
0.3 NL - opposition  
2.d General impact o...

253

254

255 N120 Ik zeg niet dat er bij iedere stap meteen  
sanctieverlichting moet zijn, maar wij moeten wel  
met elkaar dat gesprek aangaan. Goed gedrag moet  
worden beloond, slecht gedrag moet worden  
bestraft.

9:15 Ik zeg niet ...  
0.3 NL - opposition  
4.b.ii.3 International: ...  
5.a.ii.4 Assertive: sup...

256

257 De heer Van Bommel (SP):

258 N122 Mijn lijn is dat er substantiële stappen moeten  
worden gezet, zoals het terugtrekken van zware  
wapens naar de grenzen die daarvoor zijn  
aangegeven. Dat vind ik een substantiële stap. Die  
stap is nog niet gezet.

9:16 Mijn lijn is d...  
0.3 NL - opposition  
2.c.ii Minsk agreeme...

259

260 De heer Ten Broeke (VVD):

261 N123 Kan de heer Van Bommel, als hij de realiteit wil  
laten prevaleren, niet inzien dat juist de druk op  
Rusland, bijvoorbeeld met de mogelijkheid om meer  
met sancties te doen, maakt dat de Russen aan tafel  
gaat zitten en niet — om maar weer even dat  
gebroken geweertje dat de heer Van Bommel  
vandaag weer tentoonstelt, naar voren te halen —  
het van tafel nemen van die sancties?

9:17 Kan de heer Van Bom...  
0.4 NL - government...  
1.a.ii Stricter: general...  
3.a.ii Stricter sanctio...

262

263 De heer Van Bommel (SP):

264 Ja, er moet voortdurend druk blijven op Rusland,  
maar dat geldt ook voor Oekraïne.

9:18 J...  
0.3 NL - opposition  
4.b.i.3: International: ...

265

266 We kijken alleen maar naar Rusland bij sancties, en dat is onterecht. Daarmee laten we de vrije hand aan het corrupte regime in Kiev, zodat dat de stappen kan zetten die het zet en de stappen die we vragen, achterwege laat.

9:119 We kijken al...  
0.3 NL - opposition  
4.b.i.3: International: ...

267

268 Van Bommel (SP): We kunnen wel zeggen "we hebben gelijk en daarom gaan we volle kracht vooruit", maar als de gevolgen daarvan slecht zijn voor de stabiliteit en de veiligheid in Oekraïne en uiteindelijk ook voor onszelf, dan is dat een onverstandige route.

9:120 We kunnen wel...  
0.3 NL - opposition  
1.b.ii Continuation: i...  
3.b.iv.1 Upholding ex...

269

270 Ten Broeke (VVD): Het geldt ook voor de economische sancties, die ik van begin af aan heb gesteund. Anders dan de heer Van Bommel ben ik op dit moment ook niet voor het verlichten van die sancties. Als het gaat om Rusland, erken ik dit dus zeker niet.

9:121 Het geldt ook v...  
0.4 NL - government...  
1.b.i Continuation: e...

271

272 Ten Broeke (VVD): Respect bereik je natuurlijk met serieuze diplomatiek, ook door af en toe een biertje niet af te slaan, zo zeg ik tegen de heer Sjoerdsma, maar toch vooral met spierballen en met de vuist van economische sancties.

9:122 Respect ber...  
0.3 NL - opposition  
1.b.i Continuation: e...  
3.b.v.2 Upholding exi...  
4.a.ii National: dialog...

273

274 De heer Ten Broeke (VVD): Met economische sancties, bijvoorbeeld in de olie- en gasindustrie, zetten we Rusland langzamerhand onder druk. Dat heeft ook effecten. In mijn interruptiedebat met de heer Van Bommel heb ik ook aangegeven dat je, zodra je daar iets meer doet, ineens kleine gedragswijzigingen ziet.

9:123 Met economische s...  
0.4 NL - government...  
3.a.ii Stricter sanctio...

275

276 Ten eerste economische sancties. Die hebben we en daar heb ik ook voor gepleit. Ik pleit niet voor het verlichten van de sancties.

9:124 Ten ...  
0.4 NL - government...  
1.b.i Continuation: e...

277

278 Ten tweede met duidelijkheid over je militaire samenwerking en als het nodig is ook met meer troepen aan de grens om de veiligheidsgaranties te

9:125 T...  
0.4 NL - government...  
4.b.ii.3 International: ...



278	handhaven die we binnen de NAVO met elkaar hebben afgesproken.	9-125	
279			
280	Ten derde doe je dat met de open hand van diplomatie.	9-126 ...	0.4 NL - government... 4.b.ii.1 International: ...
281			
282	Sjoerdsma (D66): Ik wil graag dat de minister serieus onderzoekt of Russische financieringsstromen naar Nederlandse organisaties gelieerd aan politieke partijen of maatschappelijke instellingen aan banden gelegd kunnen worden, zolang er sancties tegen Rusland zijn. Is hij bereid om dat te onderzoeken?	9-127 Ik wil graag dat...	0.3 NL - opposition 3.b.iv.1 Upholding ex... 4.a.iv National: other
283			
284	10. Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. "Begroting Buitenlandse Zaken." <i>Handeling</i> 2016-2017, no. 27, item 5, November 24, 2016. Published December 16, 2016. <a href="https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20162017-27-5.html">https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20162017-27-5.html</a> .		
285			
286	Minister Koenders: De Nederlandse regering is niet voor een beperking — ook niet voor een gedeeltelijke, zo zeg ik tegen de heer Van Bommel — van de sancties, zolang er niet aan de voorwaarden van Minsk wordt voldaan.	9-128 De Nederla...	0.4 NL - government... 1.b.ii Continuation: i... 3.b.ii Upholding exist...
287			
288	Het is dus misschien een beetje een mantra en mensen vinden het weinig interessant, maar volgens mij is er echt niks buiten vuist, open hand, en het openlaten van communicatie.	9-129 Het is d ...	0.4 NL - government... 4.c Both national an...
289			
290	We hebben van de week weer geprobeerd om een Rusland Raad te beleggen met de Russische Federatie en de NAVO. Ik ben voor dat soort contacten en zet me daar ook voor in, maar ik blijf constateren dat Rusland in Syrië, in Oekraïne en door de mate waarin het invloed probeert uit te oefenen aan onze randen, een risicovolle rol speelt. Daar ben ik niet naïef in.	9-130 Ik ben voor ...	0.4 NL - government... 3.b.iv.1 Upholding ex... 4.b.ii.1 International: ...
291			

292 De heer Van Bommel (SP): Mijn fractie onderschrijft dat je iets te vragen en iets te bieden moet hebben en dat er dus sprake moet zijn van een open hand en, als dat nodig is, een vuist.

9:131 Mijn fra...  
0.3 NL - opposition  
4.a.ii National: dialog...

293

294 Als we blijven vasthouden aan het volledig voldoen aan alle afspraken in de Minsk-akkoorden, kan het weleens heel lang wachten worden. Ik wil de minister ertoe oproepen om ook met een open blik naar dat proces te kijken en om ook onderdelen van het akkoord te kunnen waarderen op hun eigen waarde. Als de zware wapens worden teruggetrokken, is dat een belangrijke stap. Als de autonomie verder wordt ingevuld, is dat een belangrijke stap.

9:132 Als we blijven vasthouden ...  
0.3 NL - opposition  
2.c.ii Minsk agreee...

295

296 Het moet niet alles of niets zijn, want dan blijven we waarschijnlijk heel lang met niets zitten en dan betaalt de bevolking de prijs daarvan.

9:133 Het ...  
0.3 NL - opposition  
2.d General impact o...

297

298 Minister Koenders: Ik vind dat Rusland gewoon aan die punten — u noemde terecht de zeer zware wapens en de grens — moet voldoen. Anders blijven de sancties gewoon bestaan, wat de Nederlandse regering betreft.

9:134 Ik vind dat ...  
0.4 NL - government...  
1.b.ii Continuation: i...  
2.c.i Minsk agreee...

299

300 Het andere punt is dat ook de Oekraïense regering een verantwoordelijkheid heeft. Dat is wel waar. Daar zal zij ook fors op moeten worden aangesproken.

9:135 Het ...  
0.4 NL - government...  
4.b.i.3: International: ...

301

302 De heer Van Bommel (SP): Het Minsk-akkoord bevat echter veel meer onderdelen. We moeten niet eisen dat aan alle eisen is voldaan voordat we het gesprek, ook over de sancties, kunnen aangaan. Dat is de enige oproep die ik hier zou willen doen.

9:136 Het Minsk-...  
0.3 NL - opposition  
2.c.ii Minsk agreee...

303

304 Minister Koenders: Ik wil geen misverstand laten bestaan over het feit dat ik met betrekking tot de sancties echt vind dat de Russische Federatie gewoon moet voldoen aan wat in het akkoord staat. Dat heeft zij ook met zichzelf afgesproken.

9:137 Ik wil geen ...  
0.4 NL - government...  
2.c.i Minsk agreee...

305



306 Dat neemt niet weg dat, als er positieve tekenen zijn, het gesprek uiteraard geopend kan worden op allerlei fronten. Die kleine nuancering vind ik wel van belang.

9:138 Dat ...  
0.4 NL - government...  
4.b.ii.1 International: ...

307

308 De heer Sjoerdsma (D66): zou het niet verstandig zijn als Nederland, zolang er sancties zijn tegen Rusland, de Russische financiering van politieke partijen en daaraan gelieerde organisaties aan banden legt?

9:139 zou het ...  
0.3 NL - opposition  
1.a.i Stricter: specific  
4.a.iv National: other

309

310 Minister Koenders: De kracht van de Europese samenleving is dat die zich daar zelf voor behoedt. Ik heb schriftelijk al een aantal vragen hierover beantwoord. Wat betreft eventuele onderzoeken van de inlichtingendiensten kan ik de Kamer uiteraard niet publiekelijk inlichten over het feit of die plaatsvinden en, zo ja, op welke wijze. Uiteraard is de Nederlandse regering wel alert op dit probleem.

9:140 De kracht van d...  
0.4 NL - government...  
4.b.i.4 International: ...

311

312 De heer Sjoerdsma (D66): Moeten we in onze regelgeving niet iets doen tegen die Russische beïnvloeding? We zien wat er in Frankrijk is gebeurd via financiering. Zouden we dat in Nederland niet ook aan banden moeten leggen, zeker zolang er sancties gelden tegen Rusland?

9:141 Moeten we in o...  
0.3 NL - opposition  
1.a.i Stricter: specific  
3.a.iii Stricter sanctio...  
4.a.iv National: other

313

314 Minister Koenders: Ik heb gewoon geen concrete gegevens of feiten over actieve beïnvloeding of financiële ondersteuning. Dan ga ik er ook geen regels voor opstellen. Duidelijker kan ik niet antwoorden.

9:142 Ik heb gew...  
0.4 NL - government...  
3.b.vii Upholding exi...

315

316 11. Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal.  
"Kamerstuk 28676 NAVO." *Vergaderjaar*  
2016-2017, no. 261, December 1, 2016.  
Published December 21, 2016.  
<https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-28676-261.html>.

317

318

319 De heer Ten Broeke (VVD): De nieuw gekozen leiders pleitten al voor het opheffen van de sancties tegen Rusland. Is hierop al gereageerd door de EU of wellicht door afzonderlijke lidstaten? Zo ja, op welke wijze? Mijn fractie wijst dit in ieder geval af.

9:143 De nieuw g...  
0.4 NL - government...  
1.b.ii Continuation: i...  
4.b.i.4 International: ...

320

321 Minister Koenders: Ik zie het risico van discussie over de sancties overigens niet.

9:144 I...  
0.4 NL - government...  
5.a.ii.2 Assertive: sup...

322

323 Wij houden fors vast aan het Minsk-akkoord. Dat neemt echter niet weg dat ik risico's zie in «die zachte onderbuik» van de Balkan. Ik neem alle opmerkingen die daarover zijn gemaakt zeer serieus.

9:145 Wij hou...  
0.4 NL - government...  
3.b.ii Upholding exist...

324

325 De heer Servaes (PvdA): Ik spreek onze zeer grote steun uit voor de koers die dit kabinet al een tijd uitzet. Het balt enerzijds de vuist, maar zorgt er anderzijds voor dat de uitgestoken hand eindelijk vorm krijgt, bijvoorbeeld door het weer op politiek niveau bijeen laten komen van de NAVO-Rusland Raad (NRR).

9:146 Ik spreek onze zeer ...  
0.4 NL - government...  
1.b.i Continuation: e...  
4.b.ii.1 International: ...

326 Kunnen we verwachten dat er bij deze NAVO-ministeriële een volgende stap wordt gezet, in navolging van het bijeenkomen op ambassadeursniveau dat al wel gebeurt?

9:147 Kunnen ...  
0.4 NL - government...  
4.b.ii.1 International: ...

327

328 12. Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal.  
“Kamerstuk 21501-02 Raad Algemene Zaken en Raad Buitenlandse Zaken.” *Vergaderjaar 2016-2017*, no. 1709, December 1, 2016.  
Published December 22, 2016.  
<https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-21501-02-1709.html>.

329

330 De heer Servaes (PvdA): Ongeveer een maand geleden leek er enig momentum te ontstaan om de druk te verhogen, met name op Rusland. Mijn partij pleit al veel langer voor sancties. Het uitblijven van die druk leidt er nu in ieder geval toe dat er helemaal niets gebeurt. Het is internationaal helemaal stil.

9:148 Ongeveer e...  
0.4 NL - government...  
1.a.ii Stricter: general...  
3.a.i.1 Stricter sanctio...

330 Eigenlijk staan we erbij en kijken naar wat zich op dit  
moment in Aleppo voltrekt.

9-148

331

332 13. Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal.  
“Debat over Syrië.” *Handeling 2016-2017*, no.  
38, item 10, December 21, 2016. Published  
January 6, 2017.  
[https://zoek.officiëlebeelden.nl/h-  
tk-20162017-38-10.html](https://zoek.officiëlebeelden.nl/h-tk-20162017-38-10.html).

333

334

335 De heer Servaes (PvdA): Terugkijkend op de  
oorspronkelijke debataanvraag van Ten Broeke in  
februari, denk ik: hadden we niet toen al die druk op  
Moskou met steviger middelen, dus sancties, moeten  
opvoeren? Ik doe dit niet uit een soort achteraf  
gelijkhalerigheid of zo, maar ik doe het ook om naar  
de toekomst te kijken.

9-149 Terugkijkend op de...

0.4 NL - government...

1.a.ii Stricter: general...

3.a.i.1 Stricter sanctio...

336

337 Zijn wij bereid om druk uit te oefenen of is de  
cynische realpolitieke conclusie: wij staan buitenspel  
en dat moeten we accepteren?

9-150 Zijn ...

0.4 NL - government...

1.a.ii Stricter: general...

5.a.ii.1 Assertive: sup...

338

339 De heer Sjoerdsma (D66): Als dit ten sterkste wordt  
veroordeeld, zou ik de minister willen vragen of wij  
niet veel eerder met extra sancties hadden moeten  
komen richting het land dat hier heel cynisch heeft  
opgetreden, namelijk Rusland.

9-151 Als dit ten s...

0.3 NL - opposition

3.a.i.1 Stricter sanctio...

340

341 Of moeten we nu alsnog tot extra sancties komen?

9-152

0.3 NL - opposition

1.a.ii Stricter: general...

342

343 De heer Sjoerdsma (D66): Ik zou hem willen vragen:  
wat is zijn oplossing? Een van de oorzaken van deze  
grote ellende naast Assad is Poetin, is Rusland. Als er  
dan voorstellen liggen om Rusland middels sancties  
te dwingen deze ellende, deze oorlogsmisdaden te  
staken, de ellende te stoppen waar de heer Kuzu zo  
van wakker ligt, dan geeft hij niet thuis, dan steunt hij  
dat voorstel niet.

9-153 Ik zou hem willen vraag...

0.3 NL - opposition

3.a.i.1 Stricter sanctio...



344

345 De heer Kuzu (Groep Kuzu/Öztürk): Maar wij zijn er niet van overtuigd dat we door Rusland buiten de deur te houden en door te dreigen met sancties richting Rusland, iets verbeteren ten aanzien van de burgerbevolking van Syrië en de uitzichtloze situatie van de afgelopen vijf jaar. Daarvan zijn wij niet overtuigd. Volgens mij hebben de afgelopen jaren dat ook heel duidelijk laten zien.

9-154 Maar wij zijn er niet va...  
0.3 NL - opposition  
1.b.ii Continuation: i...  
3.b.v.1 Upholding exi...

346

347 De heer Sjoerdsma (D66): Zijn analyse over Rusland kan hij met niets staven, want de sancties die wij als gevolg van de situatie in Oost-Oekraïne hebben ingesteld, hebben behoorlijk gewerkt.

9-155 Zijn ana...  
0.3 NL - opposition  
3.a.ii Stricter sanctio...

348

349 De heer Kuzu (Groep Kuzu/Öztürk): Het tweede punt is de rol van Rusland. We hebben gezien wat de afgelopen vijf jaar hebben gebracht. We hebben gezien dat krachttaal richting Poetin er alleen maar voor zorgt dat we de boel verder escaleren.

9-156 Het tweede...  
0.3 NL - opposition  
3.b.v.1 Upholding exi...

350

351 In die zin bieden de sancties tegen Rusland die D66 bepleit, geen oplossing en soelaas voor de burgerbevolking in Syrië. Ze dragen niet bij aan een constructieve oplossing.

9-157 In die zi...  
0.3 NL - opposition  
1.b.ii Continuation: i...  
3.b.v.1 Upholding exi...

352

353 De heer Servaes (PvdA): Wat mijn partij, de Partij van de Arbeid, betreft hadden er wel degelijk hardere maatregelen genomen moeten worden en had er wel degelijk gedreigd moeten worden met sancties voor de landen die verantwoordelijk zijn voor hetgeen er nu gebeurd is.

9-158 Wat mijn partij...  
0.4 NL - government...  
1.a.ii Stricter: general...  
3.a.i.1 Stricter sanctio...

354

355 Ten derde dan toch de Europese Unie. Wij waren eerder voor sancties. Wij zien nu ook in dat op dit moment de humanitaire nood voorrang heeft. Is de minister bereid de discussie in EU-verband voort te zetten over de manier waarop toekomstige misstanden voorkomen kunnen worden?

9-159 Ten derde dan t...  
0.4 NL - government...  
1.a.ii Stricter: general...  
3.a.iv Stricter sanctio...  
5.a.ii.1 Assertive: sup...

356

357 De heer Ten Broeke (VVD): Wij zien allemaal voldoende redenen om sancties op te leggen.

9-160  
0.4 NL - government...  
1.b.ii Continuation: i...  
3.b.iv.2 Upholding ex...

357 Niemand heeft daar een ander gevoel bij. Het probleem is: wie tref je met die sancties? Je weet zeker dat je voor welke vorm van humanitaire toegang dan ook, de afgelopen weken in Aleppo en misschien straks in Idlib, toestemming van de Russen en van het Syrische regime nodig hebt? Dat is precies het dilemma waarop ik doelde in mijn bijdrage. Je kunt wel vragen om sancties, maar wie willen wij treffen? Wil de heer Servaes Rusland treffen? Dan moet hij er ook verantwoordelijkheid voor nemen dat dat als consequentie kan hebben dat wij alle deuren dichtgooien om nog een humanitair transport mogelijk te maken.

9-160

358

359 De heer Servaes (PvdA): ik zei al dat ik heel goed begrijp dat op dit moment de humanitaire toegang, het lenigen van humanitaire noden, wellicht het sturen van waarnemers, prioriteit heeft. Dit is dus niet het moment om die sancties voor te stellen.

9-161 Ik zei al dat ...

0.4 NL - government...

1.b.ii Continuation: i...

3.b.vii Upholding exi...

360

361 Maar als wij de afgelopen jaren iets geleerd hebben, is het dat Poetins Rusland alleen maar tot gedragswijzigingen overgaat als we bereid zijn dit type maatregelen op tafel te leggen. Dat heeft Oekraïne ons geleerd. Dat hebben de Minsk-akkoorden ons geleerd.

9-162 Maar als wij de ...

0.4 NL - government...

3.a.ii Stricter sanctio...

362

363 Toen we niks deden, werd de Krim geannexeerd. Toen we wel iets deden, begon er een gesprek en werd er een akkoord afgesproken. Datzelfde hadden we kunnen doen in Syrië.

9-163 Toen we...

0.4 NL - government...

3.a.i.1 Stricter sanctio...

364

365 Terugkijken heeft betrekkelijk weinig zin, maar daar gaat het me om: het afdwingen van een gedragswijziging. Op dit moment heeft humanitaire nood eerste prioriteit.

9-164 Terugkij...

0.4 NL - government...

1.d Indifferent / uncl...

3.a.i.1 Stricter sanctio...

366

367 Ten Broeke (VVD): Bij sancties komt het niet alleen aan op de reden waarom je ze oplegt, maar ook op de opportuniteit wanneer je dat doet, het liefst ook nog zo dat je niet struikelt nog voordat je de eerste horde hebt genomen. Dat betekent bijvoorbeeld dat je Europese eenheid moet organiseren. Anders lacht Poetin je uit, simpelweg omdat je het hebt gesuggereerd.

9-165 Bij sancties komt het ni...

0.4 NL - government...

1.b.ii Continuation: i...

3.b.vi Upholding exis...

5.b.i Reticent: united ...



368

369 Sancties zouden ook toen al een averechts effect hebben gehad. Ze zouden bijvoorbeeld een averechts effect hebben gehad op de militaire inzet die de alliantie destijds pleegde en ze zouden in mijn ogen ook helemaal niets hebben gedaan voor de humanitaire toegang.

9-166 Sancties zoude...  
0.4 NL - government...  
1.b.ii Continuation: i...  
3.b.v.1 Upholding exi...

370

371 Dat hebben wij daarna immers wel gezien.

9-167  
0.4 NL - government...  
3.b.v.2 Upholding exi...

372

373 Servaes (PvdA): Dit is gewoon een verschil van mening. Dat hadden we indertijd ook na de annexatie van de Krim. Toen vond Ten Broeke ook dat er geen sancties nodig waren. Hij voegde zich pas later in het koor, eigenlijk pas achteraf, toen die Europese overeenstemming er al was. Ik vind dat ik in de politiek zit om discussies aan te jagen. Natuurlijk moet je vervolgens Europese eenheid zoeken. Daar zijn wij het erover eens, maar wij hebben een andere visie op sancties. Daar gaan wij vandaag niet uitkomen.

9-168 Dit is gewoon een verschil van me...  
0.4 NL - government...  
5.a.ii.1 Assertive: sup...

374

375 De heer Ten Broeke (VVD): Daar gaat het debat niet over, maar mijn fractie was voor sancties, maar niet zo snel als de heer Servaes, die nog wel eens de neiging heeft om al om sancties te roepen als hij zeker weet dat er nog geen eenheid over bereikt kan worden. Wij zijn voor sancties en wij waren als Nederland ook zeker niet het laatste land dat dat deed. Wij zaten keurig in de middenmoot. Je moet ergens zitten om die sancties ook effectief te laten zijn.

9-169 Daar gaat het debat niet over, ...  
0.4 NL - government...  
1.b.i Continuation: e...  
5.b.i Reticent: united ...

376

377 Ik heb hier vaak genoeg betoogd dat sancties, als je ze slim en vooral op de juiste momenten inzet, effect kunnen hebben.

9-170 Ik h...  
0.4 NL - government...  
3.b.v.2 Upholding exi...

378

379 Maar als je er elke week om vraagt, zoals de D66 en de Partij van de Arbeid ... Nou ja, niet elke week, maar laten we zeggen dat ze er elk kwartaal om vragen. Dan hol je alleen hier al het sanctiewapen uit.

9-171 Maar al...  
0.4 NL - government...  
3.b.v.1 Upholding exi...  
5.b.ii Reticent: other

380

381 De heer Servaes (PvdA): Als je in de politiek iets voor elkaar wilt krijgen, zul je het voortouw moeten nemen, bondgenoten moeten zoeken en Europese eenheid moeten smeden. Als die Europese eenheid er eenmaal is en je zegt "ik ben er ook voor", heb je altijd gelijk.

9-172 Als je in de poli...  
0.4 NL - government...  
5.a.ii.4 Assertive: sup...

382

383 Minister Koenders: We kunnen vervolgens iedereen sancties opleggen, maar ik geef de Kamer op een briefje dat dát het niet gaat worden. Dit gaat nu echt over kijken wat er nu gebeurt, met een sterkere rol van de Russische Federatie. Er zijn nu onderhandelingen, samen met Turkije en Iran.

9-173 We kunnen ver...  
0.4 NL - government...  
1.b.ii Continuation: i...  
3.b.vi Upholding exis...

384

385 Dat geldt inderdaad ook voor de relatie met de Russische Federatie. Ik kom zo nog even op de sancties terug, omdat ik dat geen gelukkige methode vind om de situatie op korte termijn te verbeteren. Daar is iedereen het geloof ik ook wel over eens. Op zich hoeft je echter niets uit te sluiten.

9-174 Dat geldt inder...  
0.4 NL - government...  
1.b.ii Continuation: i...  
3.b.v.1 Upholding exi...

386

387 Ik laat zien dat ik die sancties belangrijk vind, maar ik heb niet de illusie dat die nu tot een gedragsverandering zullen leiden die wij allemaal willen.

9-175 Ik laat zi...  
0.4 NL - government...  
1.b.ii Continuation: i...  
3.b.v.1 Upholding exi...

388